Journal of Human Security Studies

Vol.7, No.1, Spring 2018

Table of Contents

Towards a Social Science Understanding of Human Security

Victor T. King[1]   Paul J. Carnegie[2]

Abstract

Threats and impediments to human security are part of the daily-lived experience of large numbers of people (especially in developing countries) but their vulnerability and precariousness are neither readily understood nor measurable. Action tends to be generic, imitative, and overly ambitious. If each country or region confronts a different context of human security and faces a set of specific challenges, how are we to proceed? This article argues that the field of human security needs to engage more fully with a range of sociological and anthropological concepts to maintain its relevance and gain greater analytical purchase on the multiple insecurities of the 21st Century. It reconsiders human security within conceptual discussions of 'safety' and 'risk' and their complex relationship to 'trust' and 'uncertainty'. In particular, we bring into focus the utility and application of important theoretical and empirical developments in the understanding of marginality and by extension insecurity generated by such scholars as Zygmunt Bauman, Anthony Giddens, Mary Douglas, Olivia Harris, James C. Scott and   Edward P. Thompson.

Keywords: Human Security, Risk, Safety, Trust; Uncertainty

In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) launched an ambitious attempt to expand the concept of 'security' to include the day-to-day lived insecurities experienced by numerous different peoples and communities globally. 'Human Security' entered the lexicon of world affairs by way of the now much cited *Human Development Report 1994* (UNDP Report).[3] A primary observation of the Report was that many nation-states continued to privilege military expenditure over and above the human development and welfare priorities of their populations.[4] The state-centric paradigm of security premised on the primacy of sovereign territorial integrity while far from moribund was seen as increasingly at odds with contemporary sources of conflict and insecurity.

As Mary Kaldor further highlighted, the structural and somatic violence generated by rapacious economic globalization and pernicious forms of ethno-nationalism have exacerbated the problem. Disruptive inequalities and conflict have perpetuated poverty, emboldened criminality and deepened shadow economies.[5] Large numbers of humanity do not have ready access to alternative livelihoods

---

[1] Chair Professor of Borneo Studies, Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam,

[2] Associate Professor and Director of Governance, School of Government, Development and International Affairs, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji,

[3] *Human Development Report* 1994.

[4] Roberts 2007.

[5] Kaldor 1999.

and forms of support nor do they have receptive channels of communication to voice their concerns. Their precariousness is largely beyond their control.[6] It permeates and reproduces by gradual and debilitating increments in the rivers, forests, and fields of our planet and its many corners and alleyways.[7] In other words, the high levels of risk and insecurity that the global 'precariat' find themselves living through are the real outcomes of a range of largely unacknowledged sociocultural-economic transformations.[8] These are the localized consequences of interlinked national, regional and global forces and interests.

As such, the attempt to shift the referent point of agenda setting from that of traditional security to individual freedom and development underscored a growing awareness that international security and development are interdependent. The interrelated nature of economic, food, health, environmental, personal (in relation to crime and violence), community (particularly in relation to inter-ethnic issues and minority group rights), and political surety (with reference to basic human rights) are mutually supportive of human well-being.[9] There is recognition in normative terms, if not always in practice, that human security is an essential part of sustainable development and poverty reduction in the 21st Century.[10]

Nonetheless, expanding security beyond the level of international relations between nation-states and their traditional security concerns is not without its critics and skeptics.[11] The primary charge is that the concept of human security is too open-ended and imprecise for practical application. Its malleable definitional ambiguity is seen as having limited analytical utility for prioritizing and apportioning valuable resources. As Yuen Foong Khong neatly surmises, trying to prioritize everything means nothing is.[12] Others have gone further by arguing that states can adopt a discourse of human security to mask the entrenchment of their own interests.[13] Moreover, rather than give voice to the voiceless, the increasing privatization of reform packages to developing countries resembles a case of protecting 'us over here' from 'those over there'.[14]

Evidently, real tension exists between the ways in which local, community and individual level insecurities are understood and the transferability of the human security agenda to particular settings.

---

[6] Standing 2011.
[7] Carnegie et al 2106
[8] Standing 2016; Harvey 2006.
[9] See Commission on Human Security 2003
[10] See the Human Security Research Group, affiliated with the School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Canada www.hsrgroup.org/about-hsrp/about-us.aspx
[11] Buzan 2004, 369-370; Chandler 2008, 427-439; Chandler and Hynek 2011; Krause 2004, 367-368; Mack 2004; Paris 2001, 87-102; 2004, 370-372.
[12] Khong 2001, 231-236.
[13] Chandler and Hynek 2011.
[14] Duffield and Waddell 2006, 1-23.

Each country or region confronts a different context of human security and faces a set of specific challenges but action is formulated largely with the backing of international donors.[15] It tends to be generic, imitative, and overly ambitious. If the threats and impediments to human security are part of the daily-lived experience of large numbers of people (especially in developing countries) and their vulnerability and precariousness are neither readily understood nor measurable, how are we to proceed? What is becoming clearer is that it is not possible to encapsulate the range of issues confronting regions, countries, communities and individuals within a neat conceptual framework of human security. Yet, what we can do is identify specific concepts to deploy in developing our understanding of the range of uncertainties, insecurities and risks currently exercising us.

In the following article, we contend that the field of human security (which tends to be dominated by the disciplinary concerns of international relations, development and security studies) needs to engage more fully with a range of sociological and anthropological concepts to maintain its relevance and gain greater analytical purchase on the multiple insecurities of the 21ˢᵗ Century. We do so by situating vulnerable and precarious circumstances (human insecurities) within conceptual discussions of 'safety' and 'risk' and their complex relationship to 'trust' and 'uncertainty'. Particularly important to this endeavour is a consideration of apropos theoretical and empirical contributions from the fields of sociology and anthropology generated by such scholars as Zygmunt Bauman, Anthony Giddens, Mary Douglas, Olivia Harris, James C. Scott and Edward P. Thompson. While we readily accept that our selection of works displays a certain randomness and remains open to charges of Eurocentric bias, the choices are informed. They are based on the import of their insights to the task at hand and their ability to encapsulate much about contemporary marginality and the range of human insecurities confronting us. They should in no way be read as definitive templates (the selected authors would shudder at the thought) but rather indicative of the path ahead.

1. Recalling useful concepts for uncommon times

Before going further, a few remarks need to be made about the ways in which concepts in the social sciences particularly sociology and anthropology can relate to considerations of security and insecurity. What comes to mind immediately when someone refers to issues of insecurity? Straightaway we conceive of higher levels of uncertainty, vulnerability and a lack of protection; more particularly, higher risks attached to the exercise of one's everyday routine and a lack of trust in social,

---

[15] See Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit at the London School of Economics under Professor Mary Kaldor. www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/CSHS/Home.aspx

political, economic and other kinds of relationships. This is especially so if those who are experiencing higher levels of risk are having to deal with those who exercise power, influence or control over their life chances and opportunities. For those who experience insecurity, or perceive themselves to be insecure, there is a sense of an absence of the ability to make decisions about their own life. They do not have a say in the way in which their community and, at a higher level, the nation-state is run. This reinforces a sense that their lives lack meaning. They detect an absence of generally accepted norms and values that were previously considered to govern every day relationships. They may even develop an inability to identify with and acknowledge the legitimacy of the dominant norms of society. Overall, those who experience insecurity in these ways feel a sense of isolation and marginalization.

These issues spark an immediate response in the sociological and anthropological imagination. For those schooled in critical traditions, the concept of 'alienation' comes to mind. The loss of connection between what workers produce and why they are producing it. Their loss of control over their working lives, their destinies, and their relationship with other workers find a parallel in the vulnerability and uncertainty of many contemporary and increasingly temporary employment conditions. When lives are fragmented and mediated through money relationships or global capital forces, a sense of separation and loss ensues.[16]

This also resonates with Émile Durkheim's related concept of 'anomie'. A sense of disconnection from the social world can develop by way modernization, urbanization and individualization. The breakdown of social bonds between an individual and their society or a mismatch between individual expectations, desires and behaviour and the wider society is a symptom of this process. A synonym, though perhaps not quite what Durkheim had in mind, is 'normlessness' or 'estrangement'.[17] If you lack identification with the dominant values and ideals of the developmental state in which you live then marginalization and a precarious existence become a real possibility. *In extremis*, of course, this could lead, and Durkheim devoted a detailed study to it, to the taking of one's own life.[18]

Significantly, these frequently ignored concepts retain relevance with our current and, in many ways, silent predicaments of vulnerability and precariousness (human insecurities). The World Health Organization (WHO) provides figures of over 800,000 suicides globally every year due to suicide. It is the second leading cause of death among young people from the age of 15 to 29. The rate of suicide is much higher in men than in women, with men (especially young men) worldwide three to four times

---

[16] Marx [1844] 1968.

[17] Durkheim [1893] 1977.

[18] Durkheim [1897] 1951.

more likely to kill themselves than women. There are also anywhere between 10 to 20 million non-fatal attempted suicides every year across the globe.[19] The WHO identifies vulnerable groups in low and middle-income countries as especially prone to suicide: those experiencing conflict, disaster, violence, abuse, loss, discrimination and a sense of isolation

At least some of these problems must be laid at the door of the governments that preside over their citizens because either they have generated some of these very problems themselves, or they have simply failed to address them. They usually assign them to a low priority or quite simply they do not have the capacity, or the political will, support or interest to help solve them.

One of the central problems in examining such multiple insecurities is the question of at what level do we address them? And when we engage this question, we find that there is tension between the levels and spaces of insecurities in both discourse and practice. The actions taken to ensure the security and integrity of the nation-state or increasingly international peace, stability and cooperation, may work against the rights, freedoms and security of individuals and communities. In short, globalization may create insecurities at the local level. Ideally, the security of individuals and communities and the political and physical integrity and security of the nation-state within which they live should be mutually reinforcing, but this is certainly not always the case.

Decisions of political leaders, taken, as they argue, in the interests of the nation-state often cut across and compromise an individual or community sense of what is needed to ensure local-level collective 'security'. People intuitively know what that latter 'security' means but it is hardly surprising that national-level policy-making in a complex society will invariably affect the interests and the perceptions of security of some segment of society. The compromise can take many forms. For instance, the need to cut the public deficit can lead to a reduction in the resources provided for the police force. As a result, this can increase fear and anxiety about crime levels and heighten the threat felt by individuals to their security and well-being.   The pressure from global financial institutions to prioritize interest payments on national debts can lead to reductions in public funding of health services or education and concomitant increases in charges and fees. This in turn makes it difficult for families to ensure that their children will have access to the health services and education necessary to ensure their future occupational and economic security. They may begin to disassociate with the dominant values and ideals of the developmental state in which they live and jeopardize themselves further.

The above examples seem to touch the heart of the debate on the relationship between 'security

---

[19] See World Health Organization 2017.

and safety' on the one hand and 'risk and danger' on the other. Embarking on the promulgation of an international norm and operationalizing a safety and security regime to embody the right to feel and be safe and secure raises expectations of delivery. This leads us into paradoxical terrain. The more secure we make the world appear, the less its image can tolerate risk. Over-protectionism on all levels tends to breed a debilitating inability to cope with difficulty and complexity. It is the opposite of what our contemporary condition demands.

On the face of it, this might seem a somewhat trite conundrum when the perceptions of security-safety and insecurity-risk vary so widely and brutally, especially in the developing world or areas beset by warfare and conflict. There is no easy response to such a comparative dilemma. Some developing nation-states, more than others, live with risk and insecurity and create a populace that sees itself as largely independent of the state. To survive they are forced to make their own way and develop their own creative solutions to address insecurities. The state does not support them and indeed may exploit them in a range of contexts through corrupt practices.

Nonetheless, we can begin on a conceptual level at least to think our way through the seeming impasse between norm promulgation and practical application. How much more pressing is the safety-risk dilemma for those countries in which one's very life is at risk because of inter-ethnic conflict, civil war, uncontrolled violence and crime, poverty and unemployment, disease, environmental destruction, and loss of rights in land? Situating vulnerable and precarious circumstances (human insecurities) within conceptual discussions of 'safety' and 'risk' and their complex relationship to 'trust' and 'uncertainty' can assist in this endeavour. The following sections detail the navigable clues left by a set of unusual suspects from the fields of sociology, anthropology and social and political history. Not only did they conceptualize and address issues of risk, insecurity and marginality, but each in their own way, from their background, life experiences or life choices, were marginal or saw themselves as marginal from mainstream society. They were involved in socialist-communist and radical politics; interested in anarchism or feminism; touched by violence, civil war and minority politics in distant places in South America and Africa; living and studying in the declining industrial heartlands of England; or opting for rural seclusion in north-east America.

2.   From Bauman to Giddens and the late modern condition

Many writers and scholars have documented issues of trust, risk and uncertainty in the age of late

modernity.[20] But none more eloquently and extensively as the Polish Jewish exile, Zygmunt Bauman, for whom uncertainty was an immediate and everyday experience in communist Poland in the 1950s and 1960s. Antoni Gramsci influenced him among other social thinkers but Bauman brought together a range of ideas from social and political philosophy.[21] If we are to gain purchase on the largely unacknowledged range of contemporary insecurities, he deserves our attention.

For Bauman, the major task of modernity (which he refers to as 'solid' in that it emphasizes matters of control and order rather than alienation and anomie) has been to remove unknowns and uncertainties; to make order. This means allocating people a place in the division of labour, to rationalize, bureaucratize, categorize, and address personal insecurities. The implication was that following rules and regulations is a morally good thing to do in the modern condition. However, Bauman   was fully aware that the process of order-making is never complete; some people are never administered in this way; they remain 'strangers', 'outsiders', 'other' and in certain cases identified as people to be feared. The devastating logical corollary is that they must be controlled or eliminated.

From this Bauman begins to identify that rules and regulations that ordered 'solid' modernity experience slippage in the increasingly 'liquid' world of 'post-modernity'. Having said this, it is worth noting that both Anthony Giddens and Bauman view post-modernity or 'late modernity' as an extension of the same forces which shaped modernization.[22] Significantly, late modernity is a 'reflexive modernization' in which people are less concerned with the precedents that were set by the generations that went before them; this requires some qualification of course. For Bauman, in close association with Giddens, instead of producers we become consumers; security is given up in return for freedom and the freedom to purchase and enjoy. But whilst late modernity provides individuals with freedoms to choose (an era of liberation if you will), simultaneously it generates uncertainties, risk and emotional stress. In the context of our discussion, individuals ensnare themselves in a constant search for the means to minimize the risk of insecurities that become ever more diffuse and unpredictable.

Bauman attempted to capture these increasingly uncertain circumstances in several interrelated works.[23] A recurring motif for Bauman was the problem of outsiders. This is relevant in situating the relational qualities of contemporary human insecurities. To elaborate, in a world of consumers (or those who can afford to consume), those who live in sink estates, squatter settlements, banlieues, slums

---

[20] Beck 1992; Bhide and Stevenson 1992; Endres and Six-Hohenbalken 2014; Watson and Moran 2005; Yamagashi, Cook and Watabe 1998; Zinn 2008

[21] Forgacs 1988.

[22] Giddens 1990; 1991; Hutton & Giddens 2000.

[23] Bauman 2000; 2003; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2011.

or favelas are increasingly closed off and marginalized. They are unemployed, spatially and socially segregated, involved in crime, are feared; they live in a world of insecurity and uncertainty themselves and they inflict it on others. Consequently, those who can afford to consume, increasingly live in walled and gated communities, employ private security with surveillance technology, alarms and guard dogs. The salient point here are the connections between both the experience and the perception of uncertainty among various social and cultural groups. The frailty of human bonds in late or liquid modernity is a precursor to the situations we seek to manage and rarely avoid.[24]

3.   Douglas to Harris on risk, ways of life and ties that re-bind

Bauman may have popularized the concepts of the 'solid' and the 'liquid' but another concept that overlaps with some of his work is that of 'risk'. Just as our experience of uncertainty is coincidental to our construction of it, so to with risk. If we accept that perceptions of risk are socially constructed, then they represent different evaluations. In other words, there are different estimates of life chances within different institutional and historical contexts, and with reference to sets of cultural values and ways of life. If 'fate' is certainty, and 'risk' is uncertainty, how do we decide upon what is potentially dangerous or harmful and what is not? The approach of Mary Douglas, and her co-author Aaron Wildavsky to risk is interesting here. Their construction of 'ways of life' in terms of 'group' and 'grid' comprise different permutations of social organization that endow people with perceptions that serve to strengthen the very institutional context within which they are embedded. As a frame this helps explain people's outlook on risk and uncertainty, and the apportioning of blame if things go wrong.[25]

It depends then on cultural ways of life: egalitarian-collectivist [fear of risks] while individualistic-hierarchical [resist claims of risk] in determining what states of affairs individuals view as worthy of taking risks to attain a specific goal. What levels of uncertainty will they be prepared to tolerate and how do they organize themselves to be able to cope with them?

Although Douglas' work is situated in rather more of an anthropological tradition than Bauman, it also speaks to the condition of 'solid' modernity, and the aversion to subversive or marginal behaviour. In this sense, it may have drawn significant insight from the French anthropologist René Girard's work, *Violence and the Sacred*.[26] But like Bauman, she draws attention to the tendency to

---

[24] King 2016, 25-42.
[25] Douglas 1992; Douglas & Wildavsky 1982
[26] Girard 1979.

focus resentment and blame on those who are perceived to be different, who defy authority and institutions, and who live on the edge of what is defined as 'society'.[27]

Olivia Harris further connects to the above concerns from an anthropological perspective.[28] For Harris, if reason and rationality achieved a certain, confident and autonomous status and temporality of continuity, then insecurity confronts us again in the post-modern moment of fluidity and indeterminacy. It is a moment, where, rather than linear or systematic contrast, we find a constant process of re-creation; of impermanence, where we privilege the marginal, and the significance of individual agency. This might sound like the echo of Heraclitus but Harris is relevant to our discussion because she also emphasizes the point that in this post-modern world, and in response to uncertainty, social groups 'defend continuity, and their rights to claim and express particular links with the past'.[29]

Though sometimes frail, our bonds of cultural identity, our connection with the past, our celebration of tradition, and the mutual support which underpins these claims for continuity, are sometimes all we can muster to counter our feelings of insecurity. People may be constrained by social structures or the contexts within which they find themselves, and some people are more constrained than others but there are still varying degrees of human agency. What bears on the theme of insecurities, are the ways in which identities and ethnicities are constructed or crystallize often in the face of perceived threats and insecurities, and the domination of some by others. In turn, the cultural expressions of these inter-ethnic identity formations, as we know, have frequently resulted in violence.

For instance, in developing countries, conflict has often arisen over how to define postcolonial identities and in response to exclusionary injustices. Certain group identities have forged and crystallized in opposition to the emergence of the modern nation-state and its coercive-exclusionary practices. This has then fuelled certain demands for autonomy and sometimes precipitated violent action. As Della Porta and Diani note, "the more intense one's socialization into a particular vison of the world, the stronger the impetus to act."[30] From a human security perspective, addressing complex and deeply rooted types of insecurity takes more than coercive action by the state. The latter is potentially counter-productive in the long term. On its own, punitive strategic action fails to address effectively the conditioning factors and social imaginary underlying insecurity and violence. If over-utilized, it runs too high a risk of antagonizing and further polarizing oppositional segments of the population by perpetuating a 'ghettoized' sense of enmity and alienation towards the state and wider

---

[27] For a critique of Mary Douglas' work see Boholm 1996, 64-84; 2003, 159-178.
[28] Harris 1996, 1-16.
[29] Harris 1996, 11.
[30] Della Porta and Diani 1999, 62

society.[31]

4. Scott through Thompson on trust, respect and coming in from the margins

James C. Scott's work provides another reference point for our considerations.[32] His central idea, though probably not expressed in quite this way is 'trust' and one might add 'respect', and from which flow safety and livelihood security. For Scott, peasant values and the ways in which they evaluate the behaviour of others are oriented to the need to secure an adequate level of subsistence (the 'subsistence ethic'); the concern therefore is with the security of supplies of basic foodstuffs and other essential needs (shelter, support and mutual reciprocity). Local elites provide charitable donations and other gifts or provisions to their dependents. Scott's thesis was persuasive and bold in its comparative perspective, but it was certainly not without conceptual and empirical problems.[33] Scott and his co-researcher Benedict J. Kerkvliet focus on the character and quality of patron-client relations, and the consequences of the breakdown or breach of these relations for peasant security.[34] Once the traditional paternalistic 'moral order' begins to break down with the intervention of market relations, capital and profit (in other words, modernity), then the likelihood is resistance and possibly protest and violence. For Scott, peasant society and culture (though the analytical value of the term and concept of 'peasant' has been subsequently critically evaluated) placed an emphasis on respect for the subsistence needs of the rural poor, on mutual support and a reciprocal sense of give-and-take fairness in the face of the potential and actual insecurity of one's livelihood. In short, it draws attention to the contextual bonds of trust, safety and security.

The work of Scott and Kerkvliet in Southeast Asia owes an intellectual debt to a pivotal work in social history, specifically labour history. Scott's thesis drew significantly on the enormously influential work of Edward P. Thompson.[35] Thompson along with other 'New Left' historians including Eric Hobsbawm and Christopher Hill sought not simply to re-write history from the perspective of the downtrodden ('history from below') but to capture the values, perspectives and culture of those living at the margins, those who had been left out of history, just as Scott's and Kerkvliet's Southeast Asian peasantry had been. As Thompson declared, "I am seeking to rescue the

---

[31] Carnegie et al. 2016, 53-68.
[32] Scott 1977; 1985; 1990.
[33] King 1978, 123-149; Popkin 1979; King 1981, 249-251.
[34] Kerkvliet 1977.
[35] Thompson [1963] 2013; 1971, 76-136. And see Götz 2015, 147-162, for his argument which seeks to extend the concept of 'moral economy' from the narrow historical and economic contexts of Thompson's, and indeed Scott's and Kerkvliet's work, to an exploration of the moral dimension of such fields as 'welfare', 'humanitarianism'' and 'civil society'

poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the 'obsolete' hand-loom weaver, the 'Utopian' artisan, and even the deluded follower of Joanna Southcott, from the enormous condescension of posterity. Their crafts and traditions may have been dying. Their hostility to the new industrialism may have been backward-looking. Their communitarian ideals may have been fantasies. Their insurrectionary conspiracies may have been foolhardy. But they lived through these times of acute social disturbance, and we did not."[36] For Thompson, class was not a structure but a relationship. It arises in different times and places, but never in just the same way. The contemporary expression of this is the growing distance between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'. Who speaks for the latter in the apportioning of ever-scarcer resources when the walls go up?

5.   What does all of this have to do with human security?

In an era of globalization, there is a telling relationship between uncertainty, insecurity and violence. What we confront is an unsettling human moiré patterned by a range of often unseen and overlapping local, national, regional and global interests and forces. In many countries, political elites wish to promote agricultural modernization and large-scale commercial plantations, to maintain and enhance national integrity and incorporate minority populations into the majority or dominant culture, to define who qualifies as a citizen and who does not, to police and monitor territorial borders and to exert punitive action and sanctions for those who do not conform. This tension between the security and interests of the nation-state and the need to address individual, community and local insecurities is often amplified in developing countries. It is a deeply contradictory matter and invariably exacts a high price on human development aspirations.

If we are to take our evaluations of risk and insecurities seriously in an ever more diffuse and unpredictable world then it is not enough to reach into the generic solution cupboard. Whether it be marginalized communities, shifting cultivators or insecure migrants who traverse borders, they depend on those who govern to recognize their rights as human beings to protection and support and their need to conduct their daily lives in safety and security, and if migrants to provide a safe and welcoming haven. Their realities occupy a range of local struggles to survive in environments where ruling political elites are often preoccupied with securing economic growth, shoring up configurations of politico-business dominance and preserving territorial state-sovereignty against threats (real and perceived). It is not possible to encapsulate the range of issues confronting regions, countries,

---

[36] Thompson [1963] 2013, 12-13.

communities and individuals within a neat conceptual framework of human security. Yet, our brief sojourn through the work of some influential and pioneering scholars shows there are specific concepts we can deploy in developing our understanding of the range of uncertainties, insecurities and risks currently exercising us. Most importantly, we need to address interrelationships and the localized consequences of interlinked national, regional and global forces and interests.

We need to do more than merely rely on strictly scientific or measurable calculations of uncertainty and risk. This involves considering the knowledge of the probable consequences and possibilities of an event or process. We must then link that to the perceptual dimension of those calculations, based on values and beliefs, and importantly the political dimension of framing risk (in which the risk under scrutiny is subject to negotiation and contestation among political actors who have specific interests, goals and agendas). Which brings us to what is related intimately to uncertainty and risk in the context of human security. The tentative response is safety and trust, which are also social constructs. If we are to get a handle on uncertainty and risk, we must strive for trust in our relationships and the establishment of an environment of safety.

But there is the rub. In our globalizing age, transnational corporations, international organizations and economists are constantly concerned and berating others about the reliability or trustworthiness of transactions, especially in relation to developing countries, and expound on the virtue of this reliability as a pillar of good economic governance. Yet, we have lamentably witnessed the extent to which uncertainty, debt and risk (including risk-seeking behaviour) inhabit our international financial system. Driven by global electronic technology, the triumvirate of uncertainty, debt and risk are now deeply embedded in a range of interrelated but largely invisible transactions from the global to the local.

We used to trust financial institutions with our income, our lives, our future; this trust has increasingly diminished. And trust is something which we usually rely on when we negotiate the edge between having confidence in what we think we know and sampling the contingencies of new possibilities. Without the stability that trust induces, uncertainty creeps into everyday lives and we develop a growing dependency on the need for protection. But if we are dependents of others more powerful and influential than us, can we trust those we are dependent upon? Can we trust them not to undermine community or collective security and livelihoods?

6. Conclusion

Although ideas can travel widely, reconciling norms with messy realities is more problematic.

As mentioned at the beginning of this discussion, the ways in which vulnerability and precariousness (human insecurities) play out across different settings are not readily understood or measurable.

If we are to expand effectively the scope of 'security' towards addressing the day-to-day inequities and lived insecurities experienced by many people then gaining a better understanding of the complex and largely hidden nexus of interrelated conditioning forces and interests underlying them constitutes a significant step forward.

In our conceptual exploration, we have drawn on a set of interrelated readings not previously brought together in this form and for this purpose. We attempted to re-situate human security not necessarily within a coherent theory but a 'collage' of concepts relevant to the central preoccupations of the social sciences. Conceptually locating threats and impediments to human security within relationships of risk, uncertainty, safety and trust, opens a way to understand more fully the context of human insecurities in regions, countries, communities and for the individuals who populate them. By engaging the work of prominent and influential scholars, we hope to have demonstrated that the field of human security (particularly the notion of multiple insecurities) resonates directly with some of the crucial concepts in the social sciences. In our terms and as we have sought to use and interpret them here: 'uncertainty, risk, safety and trust'. Without trust, which in turn entails respect in relationships, then uncertainties and threats abound and the everyday lives of the populace are constantly engaged in coping with risk. These are the central concepts which underpin human security and provide a direction for future research and practice.

References

Bauman, Z. 2000. *Liquid Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bauman. Z. 2003. *Liquid Love: on the Frailty of Human Bonds*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bauman, Z. 2005. *Liquid Life*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bauman, Z. 2006. *Liquid Fear*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bauman, Z. 2006. *Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bauman, Z. 2011. *Culture in a Liquid Modern World*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Beck, U. 1992. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage Publications

Benda, H. J. 1962. "The Structure of Southeast Asian History: Some Preliminary Observations."
    Journal of Southeast Asian History, 3(1): 106-138.

Bhide, A. and Stevenson, H. 1992. "Trust, Uncertainty and Profit." *The Journal of Socio-Economics*.
    21(3):   191-208.

Black, D. R. 2006 "Mapping the Interplay of Human Security Practice and Debates: The Canadian
    Experience." in S. J. MacLean, D. R. Black & T. M. Shaw, eds., *A Decade of Human Security:
    Global Governance and New Multilateralisms*, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 53-62

Boholm, A. 1996. "Risk Perception and Social Anthropology: Critique of Cultural Theory." *Ethnos,
    Journal of Anthropology*, 61(1-2): 64-84.

Boholm, A. 2003. "The Cultural Nature of Risk: Can there be an Anthropology of Uncertainty?"
    Ethnos, Journal of Anthropology, 68(2): 159-178.

Booth, K. 2007. *Theory of World Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buzan, B. 2004. "A Reductionist, Idealistic Notion that Adds Little Analytical Value." *Security
    Dialogue*, 35(3): 369-370.

Carnegie, P.J., King, V.T. and Zawawi Ibrahim, eds. 2016. *Human Insecurities in Southeast Asia*.
    Singapore: UBD-Institute of Asian Studies and Springer, Asia in Transition 5.

Chandler, D. 2008. "Human Security: The Dog That Didn't Bark." *Security Dialogue*, 39(4): 427-
    439.

Chandler, D. and Hynek, N. eds. 2011. *Critical Perspectives on Human Security*. PRIO New
    Security Studies, London: Routledge.

Commission on Human Security. 2003. *Human Security Now*.   Washington, DC: Communications
    Development Incorporated.

Della Porta, D. and Diani, M. 1999. *Social Movements: An Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell
    Publishers.

Douglas, M. 1992. *Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory*. London and New York: Routledge.

Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A.B. 1982. *Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers*. Berkeley: University of California Press

Duffield, M. and Waddell, N. 2006. "Securing Humans in a Dangerous World." *International Politics*, 43(1): 1-23.

Durkheim, E. [1893] 1977. *The Division of Labor in Society*. Translated by W.D. Halls, New York: Free Press.

Durkheim, E. [1897] 1951. *Suicide: a Study in Sociology*. Translated by John A. Spaulding and George Simpson, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. .

Endres, K.W. and Six-Hohenbalken, M. "Introduction to Risks, Rupture and Uncertainties: Dealing with Crisis in Asia's Emerging Economies" *Cambridge Anthropology* 32(2): 42-48.

Forgacs, D., ed. 1988. *The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935*. New York: Schocken Books Inc.

Giddens, A. 1984. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge, Polity Press.

Giddens, A. 1991. *Modernity and Self-identity: Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press,

Girard, R. 1979. *Violence and the Sacred*. Translated by Patrick Gregory, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Götz, N. 2015 "'Moral Economy': Its Conceptual and Analytical Prospects." *Journal of Global Ethics*. 11(1): 147-162.

Harris, O. 1996. "The Temporalities of Tradition: Reflections on a Changing Anthropology", in Václav Hubinger, ed., *Grasping the Changing World: Anthropological Concepts in a Postmodern Era*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 1-16,

Harvey, D. 2006. "Neo-Liberalism as Creative Destruction." *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography*, 88(2): 145-158.

Hutton, W. and Giddens, A. eds. 2000. *On the Edge: Living with Global Capitalism*. London: Jonathan Cape.

Human Security Research Group, 2014. *The Decline in Global Violence: Evidence, Explanation, and Contestation. Human Security Report 2013*. Simon Fraser University, Canada: Human Security Press.

Kahn, J. S., ed. 1998. *Southeast Asian Identities: Culture and the Politics of Representation in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, and Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies.

Kaldor, M. 1999. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Kerkvliet, B.J. 1977. *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Khong, Y. F. 2001. "Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?" *Global Governance*, 7(3): 231-236.

King, V.T. 1978. "Moral Economy and Peasant Uprisings in South-East Asia." *Cultures et développement*, 10(1): 123-149.

King, V.T. 1980. "Review of 'The Huk Rebellion. A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines', by Benedict J Kerkvliet." *Modern Asian Studies*, 14(1): 170-174.

King, V.T. 1981. "Review of 'The Rational Peasant. The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam', by Samuel L Popkin." *Journal of Development Studies*, 17(2): 249-251.

King, V.T. 2016. "Review Article: Conceptualising Culture, Identity and Region: Recent Reflections on Southeast Asia." *Pertanika: Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, 2(1): 25-42.

Krause, K. 2004. "The Key to a Powerful Agenda, If Properly Defined." *Security Dialogue*, 35(3): 367-368.

Lévi-Strauss, C. 1963. *Structural Anthropology*. New York: Basic Books, translated by Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf.

Mack, A. 2004. "A Signifier of Shared Values." *Security Dialogue*, 35(3): 366-367.

Marx, K. [1844] 1968. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. Translated by Martin Mulligan, Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Paris, R. 2001. "Human Security: Paradigm Shit or Hot Air?" *International Security* 26(2): 87-102.

Paris, R. 2004. "Still an Inscrutable Concept." *Security Dialogue* 35(3): 370-372.

Popkin, S. L. 1979. *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: California University Press.

Roberts, D. 2007. *Human Insecurity: Global Structures of Violence*, London: Zed Books.

Scott, J.C. 1977. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Standing, G. 2011. *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Standing, G. 2016. *The Corruption of Capitalism: Why Rentiers Thrive and Work Does Not Pay*. London: Biteback Publishing.

Thompson, E.P. 1963. *The Making of the English Working Class*. London: Victor Gollancz; revised in 1968.

Thompson, E.P. 1971. "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century." *Past and Present*, 50(1): 76-136.

Thompson, E.P. 2013. *The Making of the English Working Class*. London: Penguin Books, Modern Classics.

UNDP 1994. *Human Development Report 1994*. United Nations Development Programme. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Watson, S. and Moran, A., eds. 2005. *Trust, Risk and Uncertainty*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

World Health Organization 2017. *Suicide Fact Sheet*. Geneva: WHO Media Centre. http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs398/en/ Accessed on 15 March 2017.

Yamagishi, T., Cook, K.S. and Watabe, M. 1998. "Uncertainty, Trust and Commitment Formation in the USA and Japan." *American Journal of Sociology*, 1998, 104(1): 165-194.

Zinn, J. O., ed. 2008. *Social Theories of Risk and Uncertainty: An Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Human Security: An Islamic Worldview

Abdalrahman Mohamed Migdad[1]

Abstract

The world today faces multiple threats that spread faster and more extensive than ever before and threaten the core of our human security. These threats cannot be seen or solved in isolation but must be addressed collectively to enable people to live their lives free from want, free from fear, and free to live in dignity. These three; fear, want, dignity, are the essential components of human security, a concept that remains open for discussion. Human security is entrenched in religion, in fact, religion is the primary source for literature on human security and dignity. This theoretical research focuses on the classical Islamic scholarship, especially the work of Imam Al-Shatibi compared to the contemporary discourse on human security mainly featuring the UNDP1994 report.

While the research compares contemporary and classical Islamic literature, it engages the critical discussion of the term that mainly points to the inability to present a unified, measurable, and commonly accepted definition. To this conclusion, most scholars agreed, and Imam Al-Shatibi stresses the importance of time, place, and cultural differences in actualizing human security as it suits the individual or group. This research presents a framework that combines all human security dimensions and means of protection from the Islamic perspective that shares many commonalities with the contemporary discourse on the subject. The main conclusion implies that faith is key to actualizing human security. However, faith components are up the individual to possess, but the nature of this individual that is driven by incentive makes law necessary. Thus a role for the state acting as the regulator is also essential. Notably, this research marginally mentions the practice of both the individual and the state and focuses on the theory, and on this regard, the discussion on the practice based on the presented framework is an important future research.

Keywords: Islamic worldview on human security, Classical Muslim scholars, Protecting human security, holistic Islamic solution

1. Introduction

The world today faces multiple threats such as drought, hunger, flood, conflict, disease, climate change, and financial crises. The Human Security Unit at the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (HS) elaborates that not only have the number of threats multiplied; they spread faster and more extensive than ever before, together, they threaten the core of our HS. But these threats cannot be seen or solved in Isolation. To overcome them, all the threats must be addressed collectively to enable people to live their lives free from want and fear, and free to live in dignity. These three; fear,

---

[1] Ph.D. candidate. Doshisha University Graduate School of Global Studies

want, dignity, are the three most essential components of HS. However, the understanding, definition, and expectations for what HS is cannot resemble nor could it be unified. Terms such as quality of life, welfare, empowerment, human development, human poverty, and more recently happiness are often used interchangeably without explicit discussion as to their distinctiveness (McGillivray and Clarke n.d., 3, Hammad 2010, Al-Raysouni 1995, Malouf 2009, Ameen 2009).

HS, featuring a holistic paradigm for development introduced by both Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen as explained by the UNDP in its (1994, 22) report is "a universal concern." The report also talked about the many threats that are common to all people such as "unemployment, drugs, crime, pollution and human rights violations." The Commission on HS (2003, 4), builds on the 94 report a third point "freedom of the future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment," or in short, "dignity." Another landmark was the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that adopted a common understanding on the notion of HS. This UNGA resolution agreed that HS "is an approach to assist the Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their people," and points out eight main pillars to the definition, but leaves the discussion on HS open (UNGA 2012).

Classical Muslim scholar such as *Al-Shatibi* (Passed 789) and *Ibn-Khaldoon* defined HS based on the *Quran* and the *Sunnah*. The term was also thoroughly explained in a paper by the Minister of Islamic and *Awqaf* affairs of Saudi Arabia (Al-Turkey N.A.). The main difference between the conventional and Islamic HS discourse is that the latter actively incorporates faith and goes beyond life to security in the hereafter. The *Quran* explains the essentials of HS in verses (Q.106:4), (Who has fed them, [saving them] from hunger and made them safe, [saving them] from fear). On dignity, the *Quran* says, "we have honored and dignified the sun of Adam" (Q.17:70). And Prophet Mohamed puh says "The one among you who wakes up secure in his property (or tribe, or community), healthy in his body and has his food for the day; it is as if the whole world were brought to him."

Imam *Al-Shatibi* (Passed 789, 20, margin 5), explains that HS necessities are five, which are "safeguarding the religion, the soul, progeny, wealth, and mind." He then explains that those five are essential for all nations with consideration to each nations habits culture and laws. "Human well-being and HS, however, remain ambiguous concepts. It lacks a universally accepted definition and has numerous, and often competing, interpretations. As human well-being and HS cannot be directly observed, it cannot be directly measured" (McGillivray and Clarke n.d.). Stewart (2004), also finds lots of space for different interpretations and usages of HS as a term. This is not surprising because the UN also left the discussion on HS open for future development.

On a final regard explaining the margins of this research, Islam is a becoming process, and it is

left to humans to live up to its teachings (Autey 2017); the principal guides are clear, but the practice could be different. The present however, indicates a gap between Islam and the practice. There are multiple reasons, the biggest being the religious institutions in Muslim countries follow the unreligious state regime. As a result, publications on political Islam and the different practices of Muslim communities concerning HS and other concepts were generated. This is not the goal of this research. To clarify the margins of this theoretical research, a holistic framework is presented to explain a group of interlinked concepts concerning HS. However, in this research, a light will be shed on the Islamic views of what HS is.

2.   Explaining human security

HS is a new concept introduced by the United Nations and appeared as part of a holistic paradigm for development by both Mahbub ul Haq former Pakistani Minister of Finance, and Amartya Sen economics Nobel prize winner of 1998 (Hammad 2010). The International Humanitarian Law is outdated which called for a more comprehensive term (Alsubaihi N.A). The 1994 "Human Development Report" by the United Nations Development Program, was comprehensive, it spoke specifically about the main dimensions of HS while explicitly informing that those dimensions are exclusive to others (Gomez and Gasper 2013). The basic definition of HS in the report as; "Human security is a universal concern. It is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and poor. There are many threats that are common to all people-such as unemployment, drugs, crime, pollution and human rights violations. Their intensity may differ from one part of the world to another, but all these threats to human security are real and growing" (UNDP 1994, 22).

HS in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It ensures that each has opportunities and choices to fulfill their potential… freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of the future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human, and therefore national security (Commission on Human Security 2003, 4). In reference to the dimension of HS in the UNDP 1994 report and following reports by the Commission on HS in 2003 Stewart (2004, 3) argues that "this definition of security is too extensive for my purposes because it covers much of what is normally included in human development, i.e., levels of achievement as well as risks,[2] And also includes economic sources of insecurity as well

---

[2] Although Sen suggests that, in comparison with Human Development, it focuses more on the 'downside risks' (CHS, 2003, page 8).

as those arising from violence".

However, the development of the concept continued, and one of the main landmarks was the United Nations General Assembly resolution that adopted a common understanding on the notion of HS. This UNGA resolution enacted on the 66ᵗʰ session agrees that HS "is an approach to assist the Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their people", and points out eight main points to the definition, but leaves the discussion on HS open (UNGA 2012).

3. Human security in Islam

HS is addressed from two main references, first from the perspective of the *Quran* and *Sunnah* which are the essential references for all Islamic teachings, and the second perspective is the objectives of sharia and Islamic Jurisprudence. Humans are created with the purpose of worshiping Allah (*Q*.51:56), and with a duty which is to develop and build this earth (*Q*.11:61) according to the teachings of Islam. Security (*amn*), linguistically means tranquility (*tumaa'nenah*) which is opposite to fear (*khawf*) (Almaany-dictionary n.d.), so it is the tranquility of the soul and the elimination of fear that formulates HS.

In both the *Quran* and *Sunnah*, verses and *hadiths* that talk about human security, and describe rights of people upon each other are many. There are family, community, and state rights. In Islam, the word "people," is not limited to Muslims, as the *Quran* was sent to all of the humanity. Many topics were covered that include the type of relationship between the ruler and the ruled, the rights of a Muslim member of the community and the right of a non-Muslim member, see for more details (Al-Turkey N.A., Hammad 2010). Al-Turkey (N.A., 24) explains that Al-Medina was the first Muslim community that guaranteed security for all its members in the Prophetic document that had two main distinctions; first, it was the first regulatory system that guaranteed the rights of those with different affiliations, especially on the basis of religion, and second, it was the first document that made "achieving security for all" as its main pillar. It prohibited discrimination, ended thoughts of superiority, and punished violators of the documents values.

3.1 Human Security in the Quran

Security in the *Quran* refers to the individual, group, and state security. Furthermore, many verses of the *Quran* and *sunnah* talked about the rights of people, and after that, the Islamic Sharia elaborated on Islamic laws. The following are verses from the *Quran* that talk about human security (Q. 2:125;

3:97; 12:99; 34:18; 15:82; 14:35; 24:55; 17:112; 7:99; 106:4). Many other verses of the *Quran* appeared in the opposite of security, talking about the word fear and its derivatives (Q. 29:33; 51:28; 17:59; 2:155; 16:112; 106:4).

The *Quran* talked about security referring to security from hunger and fear as was evident in the chapter of *Quraysh* (Who has fed them, [saving them] from hunger and made them safe, [saving them] from fear) (Alquran-English n.d.). According to this verse, scholars explained security from hunger and security from fear (Hammad 2010). Another critical dimension in HS is fear from God's punishment, which would keep people from imposing injustice upon others, and invokes them to remain within the margins of security and away from God's punishment, by continually committing to the teachings of Islam that promote peace and security (Al-Turkey N.A.).

3.2 Human security in the Sunnah

Among the very famous hadiths known for many Muslims that addresses HS is "The one among you who wakes up secure in his property (or tribe, or community), healthy in his body and has his food for the day, it is as if the whole world were brought to him." Narrated by *Al-Bukhaari* in *al-Adab al-Mufrad* (no. 300). This Hadith adds security from illness (or health) to those mentioned in the *Quran* (security from fear and hunger). Thus, according to Islam, civilization does not prosper without the establishment of the fundamental dimensions of HS which are food, security, and health. Those are physical constituents referring to the economic, security, and health sectors (Hammad 2010). However, the distinction of HS from the Islamic perspective arises from making the connection to the Muslims spirituality and worship of Allah. In Surat (Q,106:4), Allah directs people to the path that preserves those three dimensions, and thus, civilization and development (Hammad 2010, Al-Turkey N.A.).

3.3 Human security in the Islamic law

The idea of human security in all its contemporary perspective is not alien to Islam, certainly not alien to Muslim scholars that addressed the matter more than 800 years ago. Previously, academic survives have underestimated not only the true scale and potential of the Islamic materials, but also the rich tapestry of integrated formats through which ideas germane to morality and inner worth were articulated and applied in legal, theological, and ethical discussions" (Shab 2017, 126). The work of Imam *Al-Shatibi*[3] Will be addressed from now on.

---

[3] Imam *Al-Shatibi* is a Muslim scholar (passed 790). His volume (*Al-Muwafaqat*) is a great reference for this

Imam *Al-Shatibi* was a founder of what is known today as "Human Security" with a clear distinction between his work and the contemporary definition of human security (Hammad 2010). Furthermore, he established a complete theory on HS. Imam *Al-Shatibi* (Passed 789, 7-9), started his introduction of the second chapter by introducing given (agreed upon) facts –as he mentions- and it is "that the positioning of laws (Sharia) is for the good and benefit of people in the present and the future." He mentions four types of objectives for the Sharia, the first being the principal, and the other three explanatory types.

- The objective of Allah in Sharia (in putting laws),
  1. Benefit humans in both this world and in the hereafter.
  2. Make people understand
  3. Make it a duty of humans to follow
  4. And to make it an umbrella for all people

Imam *Al-Shatibi* then continues that Sharia must protect the creation in three that follow the order shown (17):

- To be a necessity
- To be a need
- To be complementary

The necessity must address the establishment of necessary matters of this world and the hereafter, as such, if the necessities were not established, this world would be rewind, and reward in the hereafter would be lost. It is important to protect the necessities in the five important dimensions of security: religion, soul, progeny, wealth, and mind (Al-Shatibi, 20). As for needs according to Imam *Al-Shatibi* (21), it means, things important to alleviate pressure, or some hardship, however, would not lead to the ruining of lives. Similarly, complementary matters follow the same pattern and are fulfilled after needs.

The philosophy of Imam *Al-Shatibi* assumes that the necessary objectives to achieve human

---

research. Imam *Al-Shatibi* was one of the founders of social sciences, and he established the basis for the term "Human Security" as we came to know it over the course of the past few decades. His volume *Al-Muwafaqat* is an old manuscript, that was written clearly and made available in most libraries. It is found on the internet on "*Awqaf* library" which makes this book available online for everyone. This is a volume consisting of six books, the second, which is the focus of this research consists of over 570 pages.

security are the origin of both needs and complementary objectives. Assuming the complete disruption of the necessary objectives would undoubtedly mean the total disruption of both the needs and complementary objectives, However, the complete disruption of one or both; second and third objectives, would not necessarily imply the complete disruption of the necessary objectives. Thus, it is vital to safeguard the necessary objectives that achieve HS, and to do that; Imam *Al-Shatibi* puts forth five pre-requests (31)

1. First: The necessary is an origin for other objectives
2. Second: The disruption of the necessary would imply the disruption of the others
3. Third: the total disruption of the others would not imply the disruption of the necessary objectives.
4. Fourth: the total disruption of needs or complementary objectives might imply partial disruption of the necessary objectives that ensure human security
5. Fifth: Safeguarding the other objectives is important to safeguard the necessary objectives.

4. Human security between Imam Al-Shatibi and contemporary thought

In the following, a brief comparison between the writing of Imam *Al-Shatibi* on HS, and the contemporary writings on HS, especially focusing on what was presented originally in the United Nations Development Program 1994 report that talked about a necessity for a paradigm shift in thinking about HS matters. The focus will be on four main points that both works were developed upon. That will be followed by another brief comparison based on the Commission on HS 2003 report.

In the second chapter of the UNDP (1994) report, we read that the presented idea of HS is simple, but likely to revolutionize societies of the 21ᵗ century. In the following, the essential characteristics of HS enlisted in the report will be compared one after the other with the critical attributes in HS enlisted in the second book of Imam *Al-Shatibi* in his volume (Al-Muwafaqat).

4.1 Universal Concern

The first element of focus to be considered in the basic concept of human security in the UNDP 1994 report was that: "Human security is a universal concern. It is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and poor. Many threats are common to all people-such as unemployment, drugs, crime, pollution and human rights violations. Their intensity may differ from one part of the world to another,

but all these threats to human security are real and growing" (UNDP 1994, 22).

To begin with, in the human development report of (1994, 3), we read "HS is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and in poor." This point was later emphasized as it appears in the quote above. To this point, referring to Imam *Al-Shatibi's* writings, he started by introducing given (agreed upon) facts –as he mentions- and it is "that the positioning of laws[4] is for the good and benefit of people in the present and the future" (Passed 789, 9). *Al-Shatibi* (Passed 789, 20)that HS necessities are five, which are "safeguarding the religion, the soul, progeny, wealth, and mind." Those five are essential for all nations with consideration to each nations habits culture and laws (Al-Shatibi Passed 789, 20, margin 5). Hammad (2010, 16) points to the comprehensiveness of *Al-Shatibi*es writing on HS and adds that one cannot argue that his writing is only addressed from an Islamic Sharia viewpoint.

4.2 Interdependent components

The second element of focus to be considered in the basic concept of human security in the UNDP 1994 report was that: "The components of human security are interdependent. When the security of people has endangered anywhere in the world, all nations are likely to get involved. Famine, disease, pollution, drug trafficking, terrorism, ethnic disputes and social disintegration are no longer isolated events, confined within national borders. Their consequences travel the globe" (UNDP 1994, 22).

The interdependence of human security dimensions is a given factor in today's culture of social sciences. Hammad (2010, 16) elaborates on this point "I cannot see a better theory explaining the interdependence of HS dimensions than the theory of Imam *Al-Shatibi*" who identified the necessities of HS (safeguarding the religion, soul, progeny, wealth, and mind), and continued by building and explaining the connections between human necessities, needs, and complementary. Hammad stresses on the sophistication of *Al-Shatibi's* theory that identifies the important dimensions and builds a clear priority based relationship.

4.3 Early prevention

The third element of focus to be considered in the basic concept of human security in the UNDP 1994 report was that: "Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention. It is less costly to meet these threats upstream than downstream. For example, the direct and indirect cost of HIV/AIDS (human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency

---

[4] And he said (Al-Sharae'), meaning laws not only the Islamic law, and did not say (Sharia) meaning the law (Sharia), which is mostly used to refer to Islamic law in Arabic,

syndrome) was roughly $240 billion during the 1980s. Even a few billion dollars invested in primary health care and family planning education could have helped contain the spread of this deadly disease" (UNDP 1994, 22).

In the introduction of the report, we read that "it is less costly and more humane to meet these threats upstream rather than downstream, early rather than late. Short-term humanitarian assistance can never replace long-term development support (1994, 3). In the writing of Imam *Al-Shatibi*, the emphasis on early protection⁵ And the preservation of the necessary dimensions of security is clear (Hammad 2010). Imam *Al-Shatibi* informs that necessary HS dimensions shall be protected, and that could be ensured through two steps:

1. First: by protecting what establishes its pillars and fixes its rules, this happens by protecting the existential factors of necessary HS dimensions.

2. Second: by protecting the necessary HS dimensions from actual or expected imbalances, this happens by protecting the necessary HS dimensions from vanishing.

4.4 People-centered

The fourth element of focus to be considered in the basic concept of HS in the UNDP 1994 report was that: "HS is people-centered. It is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities and whether they live in conflict or peace" (UNDP 1994, 23).

Surely, the UNDP report puts people at the center of development, "regards economic growth as a means and not an end, protects the life opportunities of future generations as well as the present generations and respects the natural systems on which all life depends" (UNDP 1994, 4). In its final remarks and analysis, the report puts forth slogans that sustainable human development is "pro-people," "pro-jobs" and "pro-nature." Imam *Al-Shatibi* indicates that law exists for the good of the people in the present and the future alike. He also adds that the primary purpose of a law, and thus,

---

⁵ By protection, Imam Al-Shatibi clearly explains (18 margin 3) that maintenance of the existing HS dimension is only one part of the "the act of protection", the second and more important part of protection is the continues development of HS dimensions according to time and place, and according to local needs. So, if a public service were necessary for a country, then, the word protection would refer to "the development of the requested necessity," which also does not imply neglecting the protection of what already exists. The proper understanding of protection for necessary HS dimensions is what ensures the development of nations and prevents them from inertia and cultural backwardness. To this end also concludes many of the Muslim scholars, see (Al-Raysouni 1995).

Islamic law is to protect and serve people. All this was mentioned before, and what is worth repeating is that Imam *Al-Shatibi* had put people, their security and their benefit in the center of all his discussions mentioned earlier. The reference to people was inclusive to all and was not limited to Muslims.

The theory of Imam *Al-Shatibi* in HS is not a theory of Islamic HS, rather a theory implementable in all places and times, a theory he beat the world to before seven centuries (Hammad 2010). Previously, the world has recognized the great works of Muslim scholars such as *Ibn-Khaldun* that was regarded a pioneer of sociology, also recognized Mohammed *Ibn Al-Hassan Al-Shaybani* and considered him a pioneer of international law that derived from within the International Humanitarian Law. It is of great importance and value to re-revolutionize the work of great Muslim scholars to be able to present scholarly human and social knowledge from an Islamic perspective (Hammad 2010, Al-Raysouni 1995).

5. An Arabian Schaller critique

Although HS as a concept is clear - in his estimation - Hammad (2010, 9) explains that it is not specific, and could not be adjusted for. However, to do so, it would be a requirement to take note of all its meanings and stand on its concepts, thus, talking about humans and all that surrounds them. Human relationships amongst themselves and with other creations are complicated, so, to account for all the interconnected variables affecting human lives would require a study of all sciences in an interconnect manner which is impossible in today's research culture that is characterized with specialization (Hammad 2010).

In another viewpoint presented by Malouf (2009), this contemporary more comprehensive HS concept than earlier UN concepts still carries a lot of contradictions. Malouf explains that while this concept incorporates economic insecurities of poverty and unemployment, food insecurities of hunger and famines, health insecurities addressing diseases, political insecurities addressing human rights violations and the absence of democracy, individual insecurities addressing violence and crime, it omits other insecurities. Among the unaddressed is the psychological security matters that are the leading cause of security threats in the world, and especially in the Arab world (Malouf 2009).

Furthermore, Ameen (2009, 43) indicated that there is variance in the different definitions for HS which reflects on the complicated nature of the concept. She adds that defining HS on the bases that it includes every aspect of human life makes it difficult to provide a concrete definition, and further complicates the attempts to measure and introduce practical policies. However, concentrating on an

aspect and excluding another, makes the concept suitable for one thing without the other. In the conclusion of her book, Ameen (2009, 195) explains that "while it is essential to reach precision in defining HS, the implementation remains subject to each countries priority, and even within the one country, implementation priorities will remain subject to community difference. More importantly, Ameen adds that the concept will continue to develop, and each region will have its different challenges. For the Arabs, one crucial challenge will be the foreign occupation and interference in local affairs.

6. The centrality of Islam, practice, media, and politics.

The foundation of the discussion is the religion of Islam, and Islam; the way of life that includes the religion. No other discussion centralizes the importance of religion in achieving HS like Islam, and this is the main difference, importantly noted since the previous discussion elaborated on the similarities between the Islamic and contemporary views on HS. The argument generated in this research simply stipulates that the religion is essential in protecting HE, without it, HS is less likely to be achieved in Muslim communities. On the contrary, Islam in the minds of many people around the world is a source of insecurity itself. In this regard, media is important. The main media highlights on crises are in Muslim countries and communities, the largest covered terrorist attacks are those carried out by groups that claim to follow Islam, Islamophobia is spreading, many Muslim countries are politically misrepresented and their religious institutions follow the state when they should be independent. This is the picture for many people. Facing this picture is the argument; without Islam, HS is less likely for Muslims.

This discussion is larger than to be mentioned in a small section in this paper, but this is to place the discussion on the Islamic worldview on HS in the bigger picture. Furthermore, policies are important. The policies of state-owned media agencies and the policies of Muslim country regimes and their wealth ownership and management. One example is the wealth generated and possessed within and by Muslim countries; that wealth is enough to end all poverty in Muslim countries and develop all Muslim communities at all levels. This problem evolved partially as a result of the un-Islamic regime in Muslim countries controlling the religious institution; even independent scholars find themselves suppressed.

To this end, any solution presented to any group or community must adhere to their expectations, not contradict with their faith or culture, and address their specific concerns and insecurities. This is why an Islamic view on HS is important; to address HS for Muslims. But when it comes to the practice,

if there is no faith, there is no guarantee for it to adhere to the teachings of Islam. The relationship is relative, the more the faith, the better the practice, but the practice will never be entirely perfected, and that's part of human nature. For example, Islamic economics is growing, but there are evident arguments that some practices do not comply with the Islamic law, this is not the problem, the problem is if they don't correct the wrongful practice. Faith is up to the individual to possess, but the nature of this individual that is driven by incentive makes law necessary. Thus, a role for the state acting as the regulator and a leader is also important. In Muslim countries, the state does not regulate with full compliance to Islamic law; this is one reason the Islamic views must be theorized separately from the practice, then a discussion on the gap could take place.

7.   Human Security framework, an Islamic perspective

The main components of HS must be correctly understood and explained to provide a framework for protecting HS. The establishment of this framework features the centrality of faith in this life and the hereafter, addresses human nature that operates based on incentive, explains the meaning of protection, and stresses on the objective of Islam; which is protecting religion, soul, mind, progeny, and wealth.

Figure (1): Framework, Protecting Human Security, Islamic perspective

7.1 Explaining the framework

Spirituality is an essential part of human life. Reward and punishment are also essential in the human's life. Thus, the presence of a law "*Sharia*," is important. The individual inner police add great value; however, not all people have that conscience, which makes the law more necessary. This is where the state or the authority play a role. HS is proposed as a never-ending process. Otherwise, deterioration and cultural backwardness will take place. Additionally, regarding this framework as perfect, is wrong. In Islam, humans are expected to try their best[6]. Furthermore, in Islam, faith fluctuates, increase and decreases (*Quran*, 48:4; 18:13; 19:76; 47:17; 74:31), and in the Hadith of the

---

[6] "and *Allah* burdens not a person beyond his scope" (Q.2:286)

prophet Mohammed, "Islam was built upon five pillars[7], it is spoken and practiced, it increases and decreases". In all aspects of a Muslims life, nothing beyond their capacity is asked of them. Finally, Islam is becoming; it lies upon humans to try perfecting the Islamic teachings.

First: Span of human security in Islam

The framework exhibits a horizontal arrow which serves as a foundation. This foundation is a pillar of faith, which is to believe in the day of judgment. In this context, the span of HS starts with life and does not end with death. It means that humans must work to ensure their security in the hereafter. This brings the whole discourse on HS in its contemporary settings to a new level and provides more avenues for the UN to think about, especially the majority of people on earth believe in the day of judgment, but to what extent does faith effect their lives is a question.

Second: Worshiping Allah and fearing his punishment

Humans were created to worship Allah and to develop this world they were entrusted with. The most general meaning of worshiping in Islam is inclusive of anything thing that is pleasing to Allah, it "may include everything a person perceives, thinks, intends, feels, says and does. It also refers to everything that God requires, external, internal or interactive. This includes rituals as well as beliefs, work, social activities, and personal behavior, as the human being is a whole such that every part affects every other" (Mufi 2015).

As for fearing Allah's punishment, it represents a deterrent for humans, which also has the potential to limit humans from inflicting harm on others. This explains the importance of law in human's life, thus the importance of the state[8]. In figure (1) this was explained in the shape of an arrow to remind of continuity, it is not an act that has a start and an end, that start is human life, and because we know little about how the end will be, intelligent humans will stay committed to the teachings of their faith to ensure their security in the hereafter. This point is important in this framework, but it is a large subject that cannot be explained fully within the margins of this research.

Third: Meaning of protection

HS tends to be naturally understood and is indeed perceived differently from one person to the

---

[7] Submission for *Allah*, and that prophet Mohamed is his last and final messenger, performing prayer, giving zakah, fasting Ramadan, performing Haj.

[8] In the context of this discussion, the state is expected to regulate law that complies with Islam, this is problematic in Muslim countries, because arguably no Muslim state fully complies with Islamic law

other, the reason why Imam *Al-Shatibi* explained that differences will exist in different places and times, and need to be recognized and addressed. However, understanding "protection" is key. By protection, Imam *Al-Shatibi* (Passed 789, 18 margin 3), clearly explains that, "to maintain the status of HS" is only one part of the "the act of protection", the second and more important part of protection is the continues development of human security dimensions according to time and place, and according to local needs.

In the *Quran* verse (Q.10:99) it says "And had your Lord willed, those on earth would have believed – all of them entirely. Then, [O Muhammad], would you compel the people so that they become believers?". In another verse (Q.2:256), it says "There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion. The right course has become clear from the wrong. So, whoever disbelieves in *Taghut* and believes in Allah has grasped the most trustworthy handhold with no break in it. And Allah is Hearing and Knowing". Furthermore, in another verse (Q.109:6), the *Quran* says "To you your religion, to me my religion."[9] The priority for a Muslim is to protect their faith. The Islamic religion implies belief in one's inevitable gain for their subsistence, and the belief that the requirement is to work "*al-Ak'ed be Alasbab*" (Q.9:105) and no questioning will be for results. The personal character of a Muslim – according to the doctrine of sustenance in Islam – makes him more resilient in bearing risks and overcoming the consequences (Eweadah 2010).

Fourth: The pyramid of priorities

Setting and managing priorities is common sense that ensures the best utilization of available resources and better outcomes. Imam *Al-Shatibi* indicated that there must be an order to actualize HS dimensions. First necessities, then need, and after that complements. Necessities are at the base, they represent basics, and everyone must have access to them to survive. Needs are at a higher level, people that can satisfy their needs are less in number but are more capable. Similarly, people that can satisfy their complements are even less in number and poses much more wealth. HS dimensions need to be satisfied in that particular order. However, what exactly is a necessity and what is a need could differ, and what is a need and a compliment could also differ from time and place.

The Commission on Human Security (2003, iv), also indicates that HS is concerned with "safeguarding and expanding people's essential freedoms. It requires both shielding people from acute threats and empowering people to take charge of their own lives. Needed are integrated policies that

---

[9] Along those lines, it is worth mentioning that the Commission on HS (2003, 141), points to the importance of education in "cultivating respect for other races, faiths, cultures, and viewpoints, as well as respect for women."

focus on people's survival, livelihood, and dignity, during downturns as well as in prosperity". Here, survival refers to necessities, and livelihoods refer to needs. As for dignity, it should be present in all stages of people's lives.

Fifth: The dimensions

Imam *Al-Shatibi* and *Ibn-Khaldoon* elaborated that what needs to be protected is religion, soul (self), mind, progeny, and wealth. Those are indeed recognized by Muslim scholars to this day. According to Imam *Al-Shatibi*, some prioritize soul (self) over religion. However, others prioritize wealth over progeny referencing from the *Quran*. Nonetheless, to protect HS, first religion should be protected, then soul, mind, progeny, and wealth, all five must first be actualized at the level of necessities. The importance of satisfying all five according to the three levels is to maintain a balance. Here, it is important to stress that this is not strictly obligatory and subject to individual logic and different situations.

8.   Conclusion

In Islam, the individual is the center of all things, and humans have been entrusted on this earth to worship Allah (Q.51:56), then ordered to build and develop this planet (*Q*,11:61) according to the teachings of Islam. As for security (*Amn*), it means tranquility which is the opposite of fear, so it is the tranquility of the soul and the elimination of fear that formulates HS. Furthermore, in Islam, judgment is based on individuality (Q.53:18). Similarly, individuals are first advised to change and improve themselves (Q.13:11), and the best among people are those most beneficial to their families, and it is part of a Muslims faith to be responsible in every capacity possible. Additionally, a Muslims responsibility should go beyond one's family when possible. Moreover, Muslims should remember always to worship Allah even if they live in complete HS because worshiping is an extended guarantee from Allah to the sustainability of HS one enjoys.

Hammad (2010, 16) explains that *Al-Shatibi's* theory on HS is comprehensive, integrated, and arranged in a logical order. Furthermore, Shab (2017, 126), elaborates that "previously, academic surveys of the concept dignity in Islamic discourse have underestimated not only the true scale and potential of the Islamic materials, but also the rich tapestry of integrated formats through which ideas germane to morality and inner worth were articulated and applied in legal, theological, and ethical discussions." The same stands for the concept of HS. Certainly, more writings on this subject will bring the attention to the true value and worth of the medieval Islamic literature on HS.

The practice

According to Islam, civilization does not prosper without the establishment of the fundamental dimensions of HS which are food, security, and health. Those are physical constituents referring to the economic, security, and health sectors (Hammad 2010). To protect HS is to worship Allah, fear His punishment, and prepare for the hereafter which would keep the believers from imposing injustice upon others. All five HS necessities are interrelated and are based upon safeguarding what exists and protecting it from vanishing. Those faith components are up to the individual to possess, but the nature of this individual that is driven by incentive makes law necessary. Thus, a role for the state acting as the regulator is also important. In Muslim countries, the state does not regulate with full compliance to Islamic law; this is one reason the Islamic views must be theorized separately from the practice, then a discussion on the gap could take place.

References

Almaany-dictionary. n.d. http://www.almaany.com/ar/dict/ar-ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86/.

Alquran-English. n.d. http://www.alquranenglish.com.

Al-Raysouni, Ahmad. 1995. *Nathariyat Almaqased Enda Alimam Alshatibi (Theory of Saria Objectives by Imam Al-Shatibi)*. Vol. 4. 4 vols. Herndon, Virginia: The International Institue of Islamic Thought.

Al-Shatibi, Ibrahim Bin-Mussa ibn-Muhammad. Passed 789. *Al-Muwafaqat*. Translated by Abdalrahman Migdad. Dar-Ibn Affan, available at Waqf Library. http://ia802608.us.archive.org/12/items/FPmuafkat/muafkat2.pdf.

Alsubaihi, AbdulRahman Ibn-Muhammed. N.A. *Mafhoom Alamn Alinsani Aljadeed Yahel Mahal Hokok Alinsan Aalamiyan (The New Human Security Concept Replaces International Humanitarian Law)*. Accessed 3 29, 2017. http://www.aleqt.com/2009/05/01/article_93544.html.

Al-Turkey, Abdullah bin muhammed. N.A. *Alamn fe Hayat Alnas wa Ahamiyatahu fe Alislam (Human Security and its Importance in Islam)*. Saudi Arabiya: Ministry of Islamic and Awqaf affairs of Suadi Arabiya.

Ameen, Khadeja Arafah Mohammed. 2009. *Human Security, Concept and practice in the Arab World and Internationaly*. Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Studies.

Autey, Mehmet. 2017. "11th Kyoto-Durham International Workshop on Islamic Economics and Finance: New Horizons in Islamic Economics." Kyoto, 9 27-28.

Commission on Human Security . 2003. *Human Security Now*. New York: Commission on Human Security.

Eweadah, Adnan Mohamed. 2010. *Nathareat Almukhatarah fe Aleqtesad Aleslami (Theory of Risk in Islamic Economics)*. Herndon. VA: The International Institute of Islamic Thought.

Gomez, Oscar A, and Des Gasper. 2013. *Human Security: A Thematic Guidance Note for Regional and National Human Development Report Teams*. UNDP Human Development Report Office.

Hammad, Ali Mohammed Husain. 2010. "Alqanoon Aldawli Alinsani wa Alamn Alinsani fe Alislam (International Human Law and Human Security in Islam)." Beirut.

Malouf, Habib. 2009. "Alamn Alinsani Kamfhoum Ghayer Shamel (Human Security, an Un-Comprehensive Concept) ." *Democratic Reneual Movement*, 10 21.

McGillivray, Mark, and Matthew Clarke. n.d. *Understanding Human Well-being*. United Nations Publications.

Mufi, Imam Kamil. 2015. *Worship In Islam (Part 1 of 3): the meaning of Worship*. 1 4. Accessed 4 9, 2017. https://www.islamreligion.com/articles/222/worship-in-islam-part-1/.

Shab, Mustafa. 2017. "Islamic Conceptions of Dignity: Historical Trajectories and Paradigms." In *Dignity*, by Remy Debes, 99-126. New York: Oxford University Press.

Stewart, Frances. 2004. "Development and Security." *Fifth Annual Global Development Conference Security and Development Workshop*. CRISE Working Paper.

UNDP. 1994. *Human Development Report 1994*. New York: Oxford University Press.

UNGA. 2012. *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 10 September 2012*. A/RES/66/290, United Nations General Assembly, United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=%20A/RES/66/290&referer=http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/r66_resolutions_table_eng.htm&Lang=E.

"Partnership" in Decision-Making Arrangements: International Organizations Responding to Challenges to Human Security

Kaori Adachi[1]

Abstract

"Partnership" in foreign aid, as it originally appeared in *Partners in Development* published by the Pearson Commission in 1969, called for mutual commitment and accountability based on an equal relationship between donors and recipients. Partnership was thought difficult to implement because of asymmetric power relation between donors and recipients, disagreement as to what constitutes sound policies and donor accountability. Nevertheless, several international organizations addressing a wide range of human security issues arose around the beginning of the 2000s, advertising themselves as organizations underlain by partnership. These "partnership organizations" had governing bodies which included representatives from the governments of developing and developed countries, NGOs from the North and the South as well as the private sector, as members with equal voting rights. This article explores how these organizations introduced such governance structure despite the difficulties of institutionalizing partnership. Namely, it reviews the processes through which the Global Fund Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria as well as the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (later the Global Partnership for Education) introduced the decision-making mechanisms underpinned by partnership drawing on theoretical debates on institutional design in International Relations. It reveals that, in introducing inclusive decision-making mechanisms, the two organizations appealed to the connection between partnership and the effectiveness of aid, rather than advocating its normative value.

Keywords: partnership, institutional design, foreign aid, international organization, human security

1. Introduction

"Partnership" in foreign aid[2] came into prominence during the late 1990s and is now widely used by development agencies. The concept, as it originally appeared in *Partners in Development* published by the Commission on International Development in 1969,[3] called for mutual commitment and

---

[1] Ph.D. Candidate, Graduate Program on Human Security, University of Tokyo

[2] Despite a great deal of effort made to develop a common definition of foreign aid, there remains a lack of clarity. This paper uses the definition of aid by referring to Official Development Assistance (ODA) as defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), i.e., government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries while excluding loans and credits for military purposes (OECD 2017).

[3] Maxwell and Riddell 1998, 258.

accountability based on an equal relationship between donors and recipients.[4] The Commission, headed by the former Canadian Prime Minister and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Lester Pearson, was formed on the request of the World Bank to evaluate the previous 20 years of development assistance and make recommendations for the future.[5] The Pearson Commission argued that "[t]he formation and execution of development policies must ultimately be the responsibility of the recipient alone, but the donors have a right to be heard and to be informed of major events and decision" and called for "a new partnership based on an informal understanding expressing the reciprocal rights and obligations of donors and recipients."[6] In short, it was suggested that aid aims to enable recipient countries to develop in their own way based on partnership between donors and recipients.[7]

Although *Partners in Development* enthusiastically advocated partnership, it indicated the difficulty of implementing it: "[I]t is natural […] that aid-providers are particularly interested in whether recipients make sincere efforts to help themselves, or whether the resources put at their disposal are wasted. However, this interest, unless carefully limited and institutionalized, creates opportunities for friction, waste of energy, and mutual irritation."[8] In a similar vein, though admitting that partnership is "the politically correct description for most forms of development cooperation," Bossuyt and Laporte argued that "[p]artnership has turned out to be very difficult to implement."[9] For instance, political pressure tax payers placed on aid agencies to maximize value for money and deliver results made it difficult for the agencies to fully abandon paternalistic approach. As donors were anxious about the misuse and diversion of aid, "[r]ecipient ownership is hard to combine with donor accountability."[10] In addition, donors and recipients do not necessarily agree on what constitutes sound policies given different political and cultural backgrounds. Even Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) indicated that it was not easy to accommodate all the requests from the South in light of the NGOs survival strategies.[11] Skepticism toward partnership was expressed also in terms of the asymmetries of political and economic powers between donors and recipients.[12] At a conference organized by Columbia University in 1970 to discuss the Pearson Report, Patel argued:

---

[4] Commission on International Development 1969, 127.

[5] World Bank 2003.

[6] Commission on International Development 1969, 127-8.

[7] Riddell 2007, 30.

[8] Commission on International Development 1969, 127.

[9] Bossuyt and Laporte 1994, 1.

[10] Ibid., 1.

[11] Ibid., 2.

[12] Fraser and Whitfield 2009, 76.

Unfortunately, the concept of a genuine partnership in development somehow lacks credibility. There has never been any real sense of equality between donors and recipients […] A mere equality of opportunity in engaging in dialogue cannot establish parity in decision making. Nor can the platonic world of knowledge as a sufficient basis for right conduct be easily summoned into existence.[13]

Notwithstanding these obstacles to implementing partnership, several international organizations addressing various issues of human security arose around the beginning of the 2000s, advertising themselves as organizations founded on partnership. These organizations had the "distributed and diluted" decision-making authority to balance "the interests and perspectives of highly diverse constituencies."[14] In 2000, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) was launched, followed by the Cities Alliance (CA). The establishments of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) and he Education for All Fast Track Initiative (EFA FTI), which later turned into the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), occurred in 2002. This is not an exhaustive list, and some pre-existing organizations such as the Global Water Partnership (GWP) and the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) significantly reorganized in the 2000s. These "global partnership organizations" had governing bodies which included representatives from the governments of developing and developed countries, NGOs from the North and the South as well as the private sector as voting members with equally weighted voting rights. They were seen as embodying a unique model of development cooperation "based on notions of stakeholders (almost all interested or affected parties) as opposed to shareholders (principally funders)."[15]

How did these partnership organizations introduce governance structures that were underlain by partnership, despite the difficulties of implementing partnership? This study will explore this question by reviewing the context and process through which the partnership organizations were established. Some scholars have reviewed the historical context in which partnership gained prominence in development cooperation.[16] Other scholars have analyzed diverse perspectives on partnership, as expressed by development agencies in their policies and strategies.[17] Policies and programs underlain

---

[13] Patel 1971, 305.

[14] Bezanson and Isenman, 2.

[15] Ibid., 1.

[16] Barnes and Brown 2011, 167-173; Fraser and Whitfield 2009, 74-84.

[17] Dahl, 2001; Kayizzi-Mugerwa 1998; Maxwell and Conway 2000; Maxwell and Riddell 1998; Widmalm 1999.

by partnership have been evaluated, which presented both positive and negative findings.[18] Also conducted were studies to examine the process through which development agencies introduced partnership into their policies. For instance, van Gastel elucidated how officials of the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation brought partnership in their policy making and policy implementation.[19] Nonetheless, limited attention has been paid to how partnership was translated into the governance structure such as the design of highest decision-making body. Since partnership essentially concerns relationships, it is arguably more salient to investigate the configurations of partnership in organizational arrangements. Given institutional "stickiness," in particular considering that it is notably difficult to alter rules that are higher in the hierarchy,[20] introducing partnership into the decision-making structure appears to carry more important implications than including partnership within the policy. In addition, the above question is especially pertinent to institutions addressing human security since fostering "people's ability to act on their own behalf"[21] is critical in responding to challenges to human security. Human security underscores the significance of empowerment and therefore, addressing human security issues calls for attention to processes. In other words, "[t]he primary question of every human security activity should not be: What can we do? It should be: How does this activity build on the efforts and capabilities of those directly affected?"[22] Indeed, human security requires "partnership among Governments, international and regional organizations and civil society." [23] It is therefore of crucial importance to reflect partnership in different aspects of undertakings for human security, including the governance structures of the organizations.

This paper proceeds as follows. It will first describe the context in which partnership rose into prominence with respect to foreign aid in the 1990s. The second section will briefly present the debates in International Relations (IR) on the design of international institutions, which can be drawn on in examining the impacts of partnership on organizational structure. The following sections will review how partnership was reflected in the decision-making arrangements of the Global Fund and EFA FTI. Finally, this paper will conclude by comparing the findings from the two cases.

2. Partnership

As the tension between the Eastern and Western blocs decreased, the relevance of foreign aid as

---

[18] Gillies 1998; Jones 2012.
[19] van Gastel 2011
[20] Pierson 2000, 490-1.
[21] Commission on Human Security 2003, 11.
[22] Ibid., 11-2.
[23] UN Document 2012, par. 3.

a diplomatic tool became less evident.[24] The end of the Cold War reshaped the prevalent view that regarded foreign aid as a means of gaining political influence, and for some, the end of the East-West divide signified "the end of the need for aid."[25] Having lost its political and strategic significance, foreign aid became more vulnerable to budget cuts. As a majority of donor governments faced recessions and budget deficits in the early 1990s, foreign aid worldwide decreased by 20% between 1995 and 1997.[26] In this context, concern grew about the effectiveness of aid, namely whether aid contributed to development outcomes.[27] With improved statistics, it was revealed that, despite the long history of aid to sub-Saharan countries, their economic performance was generally quite poor.[28] Furthermore, there was a criticism against the practices of donor countries; Critics complained that donors made decisions without taking into consideration the views of recipients.[29] The failure of the Structural Adjustment Programs, implemented by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the resulting damage to social welfare were widely perceived. Questions were raised in terms of conditionalities and project proliferation which had negative impacts on the human and financial capacities of recipient countries.[30] All in all, the "ineffective and unjust ways of organizing development relationships" incurred a severe censure "because they were both intrusive and coercive."[31]

Against this background, aid policy makers sought to redefine and justify the purpose of aid-giving.[32] After some years of seeking to clarify the purpose and justification of foreign aid, partnership (re)emerged, as the OECD DAC adopted the statement entitled *Development Partnership in the New Global Context* at its Annual High-Level Meeting in 1995.[33] The meeting took place in an unfavorable environment, where the ministers of development cooperation found themselves marginalized. After the meeting, the "Groupe de Réflection" was formed, as proposed by the European Union (EU) under the French Presidency, to review development aid and the role of the OECD DAC.[34] As a result, the OECD DAC put forward *Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation*, furthering the 1995 statement, *Development Partnership in the New Global Context*. The document was among the most significant attempts that the OECD DAC made to stimulate interest in foreign

---

[24] Lancaster 2007, 44-6.
[25] Riddell 2007, 38.
[26] Lancaster 2007, 47-8.
[27] de Renzio and Mulley 2006, 1-2.
[28] Lancaster 2007, 50.
[29] Ibid., 51.
[30] de Renzio and Mulley 2006, 2.
[31] Barnes and Brown 2011, 169.
[32] Fraser and Whitfield 2009, 76-7.
[33] Barnes and Brown 2011, 170.
[34] Hulme 2009, 13.

aid.[35]

While *Development Partnership in the New Global Context* did not discuss partnership, notwithstanding the title, *Shaping the 21st Century* emphasized partnership:

> Acceptance of the partnership model, with greater clarity in the roles of partners, is one of the most positive changes we are proposing in the framework for development co-operation. In a partnership, development co-operation does not try to do things for developing countries and their people, but with them. It must be seen as a collaborative effort to do things for themselves. Paternalistic approaches have no place in this framework. In a true partnership, local actors should progressively take the lead while external partners back their efforts to assume greater responsibility for their own development.[36]

In addition to highlighting partnership underlain by mutual rights and responsibilities between donors and recipients, *Shaping the 21ˢᵗ Century* stated that the OECD DAC "learned that development assistance will only work where there is a shared commitment of all the partners," and was "convinced that a partnership approach is the way to meet the varied and complex challenges that we face, many of which are still quite new."[37] Thus the document did not only elaborate on the meaning of partnership underscoring normative values, such as mutual respect and equality, but also linked partnership to the effectiveness of aid. Barnes and Brown argued that "the DAC Groupe made a more strategic appeal to the instrumental value of the idea of partnership."[38] De Renzio and Mulley also acknowledged this approach. According to them, *Shaping the 21ˢᵗ Century* claimed that "[i]n order to enhance the role and effectiveness of development assistance, it was necessary to focus on building more effective partnerships between donors and recipients, with joint responsibilities and mutual commitment."[39] In brief, the significance of partnership vis-à-vis effectiveness was highlighted, in addition to claiming its appeal to normative values. This contrasts with the 1969 Pearson Report, which indicated the difficulties of implementing partnership while underscoring the normative values of partnership in aid relationship.

After the publication of *Shaping the 21ˢᵗ Century*, an increasing number of actors began to lay emphasis on partnership in their policies and strategies.[40] For instance, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs established a working group, which resulted in the 1997 policy document, *Partnership*

---

[35] Riddell 2007, 41.
[36] OECD DAC 1996, 13.
[37] Ibid., 1 and14.
[38] Barnes and Brown 2011, 171.
[39] de Renzio and Mulley 2006, 4.
[40] Maxwell and Conway 2000.

with Africa.[41] The UK Department for International Development (DFID) introduced partnership in its 1997 White Paper.[42] Partnership was also mentioned as one of the underlying principles of *African Development Towards the 21ˢᵗ Century: The Tokyo Agenda for Action* adopted during the Second Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD II) in 1998.[43] TICAD was launched by Japan in 1993 for development in Africa.[44] The World Bank published a Discussion Paper entitled *Partnership for Development: Proposed Actions for the World Bank* in 1998.[45] In this context, several international organizations were launched or restructured, advertising themselves as organizations based on partnership. They had multi-stakeholder governance whose decision-making bodies consisted of developed countries, developing countries, civil society organizations and the private sector.[46]

3. Institutional Design: Logic of Consequences and Logic of Appropriateness

Before reviewing actual cases of the partnership organizations, it would be useful to consider how the organizational structures of international organizations are arranged. More specifically, is it possible that the governance structures are designed based on normative values, such as mutual respect and the sense of equality?

Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal attempted to explain why international institutions, defined as "explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior" are organized in different ways.[47] They treated institutions, including both formal institutions and well-defined agreements without bureaucracy or enforcement mechanisms, as "rational, negotiated responses to the problems international actors face."[48] The authors observed that some institutions have restrictive membership, while others allow various actors to join. Some institutions operate in a centralized manner, while others depend on decentralized systems. Their decision-making procedures also vary. To account for such differences, Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal developed the theoretical framework of the Rational Design of International Institutions. The authors claimed that, when there is a critical problem which needs to be addressed and there are no suitable international institutions to address the issue, actors create new organizations by strategically

---

[41] Widmalm 1999, 35.
[42] DFID 1997, 22-49.
[43] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1998, par. 8.
[44] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2016.
[45] Kamel et al. 1998.
[46] Bezanson and Isenman 2012, 1-7.
[47] Koremenos et al. 2001a, 762-3.
[48] Ibid., 768.

identifying the most appropriate institutional design.[49] According to their framework, international institutions are designed based on rational-choice. For instance, a member's control over decision-making process increases as the member's contribution to the institution increases. A case in point is the weighted voting system based on the assumption that how much an actor can control an institution is related to how important the actor means to the institution.[50]

Wendt, on the other hand, contended that "[i]nstead of weighing costs and benefits, they [states] choose [institutional designs] on the basis of what is normatively appropriate." In other words, institutions are designed according to the logic of appropriateness, which suggests that actors follow rules that are relevant to their identities, rather than the logic of consequences, which rational actors would use to pursue their interests by calculating the likely outcomes of alternative options.[51] A case in point is the Law of the Sea, which allowed landlocked states to have a voice, in view of the norm of universal membership. Another example is the norm of democratic control, as can be seen in the debates on whether the EU suffers from democratic deficit.[52] Bearing those normative considerations in institutional design seems germane to the legitimacy of international organizations, which refers to "the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed."[53] From this viewpoint, institutions that are deemed illegitimate presumably face great challenges in enforcing their claims. Reus-Smit argued that legitimacy is a source of power and "an actor or an institution can be said to experience a crisis of legitimacy when the level of social recognition that its identify, interests, practices, norms or procedures are rightful declines to the point where the actor or intuition must either adapt […] or face disempowerment."[54]

Wendt also argued that it is necessary to investigate not only design choices but also what motivated the actors who designed the institution, as the two logics may make the same predictions in term of configuration of design. For instance, he mentioned that Great Powers rarely employ violence to realize their preferred institutional designs. This tendency can be attributed either to the fact that Great Powers prefer to avoid the significant costs associated with using violence for such a purpose, or to that they think it is wrong.[55] It is therefore most important to examine both the design itself and the process leading to the design. This seems particularly relevant to partnership organizations, as some papers, such as *Partners in Development*, emphasized the normative value of partnership, while

---

[49] Ibid., 761-3
[50] Ibid., 791-2.
[51] March and Olsen 1998, 949 and 951.
[52] Wendt 2001, 1024-5.
[53] Hurd 1999, 381.
[54] Reus-Smit 2007, 158.
[55] Wendt 2001, 1028-9.

indicating the difficulties of implementing partnership in practice, whereas other papers, for example, *Shaping the 21ˢᵗ Century*, underscored its link to effectiveness. The strategic appeal to the instrumental value of partnership underlined in the narratives of *Shaping 21ˢᵗ Century* was a way to respond to the criticisms toward the ineffective and unjust ways of organizing development assistance.[56] Focusing on the connection between partnership and aid effectiveness may facilitate institutionalizing partnership in governance structure by diverting attention from challenges of implementing partnership. This paper therefore postulates that, in introducing partnership in the decision-making arrangements, partnership was promoted as an effective response to global challenges, rather than asserting the appropriateness of partnership in aid relationships.

In the following, it will explore this hypothesis by examining the process of establishing the Global Fund and EFA FTI/GPE. These two organizations are selected because they followed extremely different paths from the emergence of the idea of creation to the actual launch.[57] In each case, this study will review documents and statements related to the establishment of the organization to seek traces of partnership in communications.

4.   The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria

In 2001, 40 million people were living with HIV/AIDS, and 3 million people died from AIDS, including 580,000 children under the age of 15.[58] Between 1990 and 2004, approximately 1.7 million died from Tuberculosis (TB) each year.[59] Malaria was another communicable disease seriously affecting the world, killing more than one million people every year.[60] There was thus a dire need for additional funds to tackle these challenges to human security.[61] The Global Fund was launched in January 2002 to combat these three killer diseases—HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria. It was established as a mechanism to mobilize financial resources and to distribute funds to those who were most affected by the diseases. It advertised itself as an innovative solution based on the principle of partnership.

4.1   The Creation of the Global Fund

The idea for the Global Fund emerged at the G8 Summit in Okinawa, Japan, in July 2000. In the communiqué adopted at the summit, the G8 leaders underscored the need to work in partnership to

---

[56] Barnes and Brown 2011, 171.
[57] Bezanson and Isenman, 12.
[58] Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) 2002, 8.
[59] UN, 2006, 15.
[60] WHO 1999, 49.
[61] UNDP 1994, 13-4.

tackle the challenges posed by the three diseases; they committed themselves "to working in strengthened partnership with governments, the World Health Organisation (WHO) and other international organisations, industry (notably pharmaceutical companies), academic institutions, NGOs and other relevant actors in civil society" to reduce the number of HIV infections, TB deaths and malaria cases.[62] The communiqué also included a plan to organize a conference to advance the idea of creating a new partnership mechanism, for which "participation of developing country partners and other stakeholders will be essential."[63]

Following the communiqué, health experts held a meeting in Japan, in December 2000, and proposed the creation of a new funding mechanism.[64] In April 2001, another meeting took place in London and donor countries and UN agencies discussed possible models for the new mechanism, as a result of which they agreed to set up a single fund. The proposal to create a fund was welcomed at the African Summit on HIV/AIDS, in Abuja, Nigeria, in April 2001. At the summit, the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan urged that, for the fund to respond to the needs of those affected, it must take advantage of the knowledge of experts with diverse backgrounds.[65] Here, the effectiveness of the fund was linked to partnership, as having local expertise in decision-making would enable the fund to be responsive to the global health challenges.[66]

One year after the Okinawa Summit, the G8 leaders met again at the Genoa Summit in Italy. They expressed their support for the Global Fund in the official communiqué. Also highlighted was the importance of involving diverse actors for the success of the fund: "The engagement of developing countries in the purpose and operation of the Fund will be crucial to ensure ownership and commitment to results. Local partners, including NGOs and international agencies, will be instrumental in the successful operation of the Fund."[67]

Immediately after the Genoa Summit, the Transitional Working Group was held to develop a framework of the fund. The Group was chaired by an official from a non-donor country, Chrispus Kiyonga, the then Ugandan Minister without Portfolio. The Transitional Working Group consisted of approximately 45 members, including donor countries, recipient countries, NGOs, private foundations, the private sector, international organizations and representatives of people living with the diseases. Also organized were four regional meetings in Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean as well as Commonwealth of Independent States. Furthermore, consultations were held with NGOs,

---

[62] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2000, par. 29.
[63] Ibid, par. 32.
[64] Global Fund 2003, 15.
[65] UN Document 2001, par. 37.
[66] Brown 2009, 170.
[67] G8 Information Centre 2001.

the private sector and academic institutions. Finally, the first Board meeting took place in Geneva, Switzerland, in January 2002.[68] The Framework Document was developed at the time of the creation of the Global Fund, which outlined the purpose, principles, scope, governance structure and operational processes of the organization. This publication underscored the importance of partnership and stated that "[a] new way of doing business is needed so that the entire process is transparent and demonstrates an ideal partnership."[69]

The highest authority of the organization was the Board. While there were other constituent bodies within the Global Fund, this study focuses on the Board, as it is in charge of overall governance and makes all major decisions such as approval of grants. The Board consisted of 23 members, of which 18 members were voting members and five members were non-voting members. The 18 voting members came from the following four groups: 1) donor countries were represented by seven members; 2) recipient countries were represented by seven members; 3) NGOs were represented by two members (one from developing countries and one from developed countries) and 4) the private sector was represented by two members. The five non-voting members included one board designate Swiss member, three international organizations and one non-governmental representative of communities living with HIV/AIDS, TB or malaria.[70] All voting members had equal voting rights.[71]

The arrangement of equal and inclusive voting system contrasts strongly with the financial pledges made to the Global Fund. The total amount of these pledges through 2003 was USD 1,910,436,122. The US pledged the most, followed by the European Commission (EC) and Italy, committing USD 622,725,000 (32% of total contribution), USD 233,985,708 (12%) and USD 200,000,000 (10%), respectively. These top three contributors accounted for more than 50 % of the total. On the other hand, Kenya made the smallest pledge, committing USD 8,273 which accounted for less than 0.1%, following Poland (USD 10,000). The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation pledged USD 100,000,000, equivalent to 5.2% of the total amount, making them the seventh largest donor and the largest private sector contributor.[72] There was thus a significant gap among the contributions, particularly in light of many actors who did not pledge at all.

4.2 Summary of Findings

This review of the Global Fund revealed that partnership was emphasized as a key to the

---

[68] Global Fund 2003, 16.
[69] Global Fund 2001, 103.
[70] Ibid., 78-79. Non-governmental representatives of communities living with HIV/AIDS, TB or malaria became a voting member in 2004 (Global Fund 2004).
[71] Rivers 2014, 7.
[72] Global Fund 2003, 26-7.

effectiveness of the organization throughout the process of launching the organization. In introducing the inclusive and equally weighted decision-making arrangement, it was emphasized that partnership was critical for an effective response to the global challenges, instead of stressing normative considerations that are associated with partnership, such as mutual respect or the principle of equality.

5.   The Education for All Fast-Track Initiative

Education is inextricably associated with human security, given the human security perspective highlights the significance of empowerment.[73] In 1999, 115.4 million children were out of school,[74] and donors were pressured to fulfill their promise of providing financial support to achieve educational goals.[75] To accelerate progress toward universal primary school completion, EFA FTI was established in 2002. The purpose of the organization was to mobilize financial resources and link the funding to developing countries.[76]

5.1   The Creation of EFA FTI

The World Education Forum, which took place in Dakar, Senegal, in April 2000, gave the impetus for EFA FTI.[77] More than 100 ministers attended the conference, and representatives with diverse backgrounds, including multilateral agencies, NGOs, the private sector and journalists. The Dakar Framework for Action was adopted as a result of the Forum, affirming the participants' commitment to realizing EFA.[78] The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) first attempted to build the momentum of the Dakar World Education Forum and developed a proposal for a global initiative for education. The document prepared by UNESCO recognized the importance of partnership; it suggested that "broad-based partnerships" are the most effective way to achieve educational goals.[79] UNESCO was nevertheless slow in moving further, and frustration with UNESCO among donor countries and NGOs led to them turning to the World Bank, which was willing to take a leading role.[80]

The World Bank prepared an action plan operationalizing the global initiative and presented it to

---

73 Commission on Human Security 2003, 114.
74 Out-of-school children refer to "children in the official school age group who are not enrolled in school" (UNESCO 2002, 306).
75 Takala 2003, 6.
76 EFA FTI 2004, 3.
77 Rose 2003, 6.
78 UNESCO 2017.
79 UNESCO 2001, 4.
80 Rose 2003, 7.

the Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries (Development Committee) in April 2002. The action plan highlighted partnership as a critical factor for success: "[p]artnerships are central to successful implementation of EFA."[81] The Committee's communiqué stated that the ministers "strongly endorsed the action plan presented by the Bank as a basis for reaching international consensus to help make primary education a reality for all children by 2015." The emphasis on partnership was praised by ministers of finance, who supported the proposal at the Development Committee; "We appreciated in particular that the action plan is consistent with the new partnership for development based on mutual responsibility and accountability."[82] The launch of EFA FTI was officially announced in April 2002 at a press conference attended by the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Canadian Minister of Finance, the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation, the Norwegian Minister of Development and the President of the World Bank.[83] In June 2002, the G8 leaders welcomed EFA FTI at the G8 Kananaskis Summit in Canada. They commented that "we view the World Bank's Fast Track proposal as a welcome first step in mobilizing financial resources for countries committed to Education for All and demonstrating credible performance."[84]

Although EFA FTI received general support at the Development Committee and the G8 Summit in Kananaskisin, only the Netherlands pledged financial support (USD 210 million).[85] EFA FTI was criticized for "weak participation in the planning process, with key decisions being taken by a small group of organisations and individuals," and "[g]enuine partnerships need to be established" as "[t]he FTI will only succeed if it is rooted in strong partnerships between donors and developing country governments."[86] In November 2003, a FTI meeting took place in the Hague, the Netherlands, inviting not only donors but also recipient countries and NGOs. After this meeting, the donors and the World Bank engaged in serious discussions about developing a document that would clarify the purpose and functions of EFA FTI. The outcome was the Framework, which was considered an unofficial "constitution" of EFA FTI.[87] The framework highlighted partnership, and EFA FTI positioned itself as "an evolving global partnership of developing and donor countries and agencies to support global EFA goals by focusing on accelerating progress towards the core EFA goals of universal primary school completion for boys and girls alike, by 2015."[88]

---

[81] Development Committee 2002a, 20.
[82] Development Committee 2002b, par. 8.
[83] Bermingham 2009, 2.
[84] G7 Information Centre 2002, par. 18.
[85] Bermingham 2009, 2.
[86] Watt 2003, 6.
[87] Bermingham 2009, 3-4.
[88] EFA FTI 2004, 3.

According to the Framework, the governance of EFA FTI at the global level was ensured by EFA FTI Partnership. The FTI Partnership meeting aimed to determine the policies and directions of EFA FTI and to attend to related issues and concerns. It was also tasked with advocating for further financial resources, estimating country financial disparities and seeking mechanisms for resource mobilization. The composition of the FTI Partnership was: 1) participating FTI countries (recipient countries), 2) donor agencies and 3) NGOs. It seems plausible that involving not only donors, but also developing countries and NGOs, guaranteed the involvement of the various actors. Nevertheless, further consideration is required. The FTI Partnership was co-chaired by two bilateral agencies, one from the country of the G8 president and the other from a non-G8 country. These co-chairs "provide[d] political leadership for the Initiative during their one-year tenure, and serve[d] as co-conveners of the FTI Partnership meetings." The Steering Committee, which gave policy guidance to EFA FTI, was comprised of only donors: the co-chairs, the most recent out-going co-chair, UNESCO and the World Bank. At the country level, a local donor group, consisting of in-country donor representatives, was in charge of assessing the scope, needs and timing of assistance as well as making funding decisions.[89] The decision-making arrangement thus prioritized donors.

5.2 From EFA FTI to GPE

EFA FTI continued to struggle to establish a proper balance between donors and recipients in its organizational arrangements. A new governance document was approved in 2008, which again prioritized donors, placing them in charge of allocating and overseeing funds.[90] Some commentators even suggested the need to create a new global education fund that would build off EFA FTI,[91] and "[t]here was ambivalence from the outset as to whether it would be essentially a 'donor club' or transform itself into a multi-stakeholder partnership."[92]

Eventually, EFA FTI was transformed to GPE in September 2011, with major changes in its organizational design.[93] The Charter for GPE detailed its aim, principles, organizational structure and operational arrangements and advocated the principle of partnership.[94] The highest governing body of GPE was the Board of Directors whose main responsibilities included setting policies and strategies, approving annual objectives, deciding funding matters and mobilizing resources. The Board of Directors consisted of 19 members who represented five different categories: 1) six members

---

[89] Ibid., 13.
[90] Gartner 2010, 3.
[91] Sperling 2008, 13.
[92] Bezanson and Isenman 2012, 12.
[93] Rose 2011.
[94] GPE 2012,.

representing developing country partners; 2) six members representing donor countries; 3) three members representing multilateral agencies; 4) three members representing CSOs (from developing countries, developed countries and teachers) and 5) one member representing the private sector/foundations. [95] The first pledging conference took place in Copenhagen, Denmark, in November 2011, an event hosted by Denmark and co-sponsored by Australia, Guyana, Ireland, Norway, Rwanda and Sweden. At the event, donor countries pledged USD 1,511,500,000. The UK pledged the largest amount (USD 278,000,000), followed by Australia (USD 278,000,000) and Denmark (USD 201,000,000). The pledges made by these top three contributors exceeded 50% of the total.[96]

5.3 Summary of Findings

This review of EFA FTI offered two findings. First, similar to the Global Fund, the connection between effectiveness and partnership was suggested throughout the communications. Second, the EFA FTI's process from proposal to launch was prolonged and complicated; The organization received negative feedback for having the governance structure that prioritized donors. Eventually, EFA FTI was transformed into GPE, whose governance structure was analogous to that of the Global Fund.

6. Conclusion

This paper reviewed the processes through which the Global Fund and EFA FTI/GPE introduced the highest decision-making bodies, which were characterized by inclusive membership and an equally weighted voting system. This study also showcased that the two organizations appealed to the salience of partnership vis-à-vis effectiveness in introducing the decision-making mechanisms described above. This article offers some insights to understand how the two organizations introduced the decision-making arrangements underlain by partnership, which was considered particularly difficult to institutionalize. The applicability of the two cases to the other partnership organizations needs careful consideration. While the article cannot expand on this here, GAIN, for instance, was established acknowledging the significance of involving various stakeholders who have a role to play to achieve the alliance's goal.[97] The first annual report of CA explained that the alliance brought together various representatives as equal partners so that they could benefit from the experience and

---

[95] Ibid., 15.
[96] GPE 2011, 1-5.
[97] GAIN 2005, 8.

knowledge of each member.[98]

The Global Fund and EFA FTI/GPE, which were established to fill financial gaps to address global challenges in the areas of health and education, mobilized a large amount of financial resources. During 14 years since its launch, the Global Fund disbursed USD 32.6 billion.[99] GPE provided grants of USD 4.7 billion since 2003.[100] On the other hand, Brown, who reviewed the decision-making mechanism of the Global Fund, identified challenges in safeguarding the principle of multisectoral deliberative decision-making.[101] Jones also mentioned difficulties concerning the actual function of the governing body.[102] Bezanson and Isenman compared the performances of eleven partnership organizations and reported problems and weaknesses in terms of their governance.[103] Examining how institutional design may be able to bring about effectiveness is a complex undertaking,[104] and how the structures of the decision-making bodies of the Global Fund and GPE may have contributed to their performances cannot be elaborated on here. Given increasing attention in the effectiveness of international organizations,[105] the design of decision-making body vis-a-vis effectiveness can be a focus of future research.

---

[98] CA 2002, 5.
[99] Global Fund 2017, 5.
[100] GPE 2018.
[101] Brown 2010.
[102] Jones 2012, 10.
[103] Bezanson and Isenman 2012.
[104] Koremenos, et al. 2001b, 1081; Wendt, 2001, 1023.
[105] Gutner and Thompson 2010; Lindoso and Hall 2016.

Reference

Barnes, Amy and Garrett Wallace Brown. 2011. "The Idea of Partnership within the Millennium Development Goals: Context, Instrumentality and the Normative Demands of Partnership," *Third World Quarterly* 32(1): 165-80.

Bermingham, Desmond. 2009. *Scaling Up Aid for Education: Lessons from the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (FTI)*. Paris: UNESCO.

Bezanson, Keith A. and Paul Isenman. 2012. *Governance of New Global Partnerships: Challenges, Weaknesses, and Lessons*. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.

Bossuyt, Jean and Geert Laporte. 1994. *Partnership in the 1990's: How to Make It Work Better*. European Centre for Development Policy Management: Maastricht.

Brown, Garrett Wallace. 2009. "Multisectoralism, Participation, and Stakeholder Effectiveness: Increasing the Role of Nonstate Actors in the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria," *Global Governance* 15(2): 169-77.

Brown, Garret Wallace. 2010. "Safeguarding Deliberatve Global Governance: The Case of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria," *Review of International Studies* 36(2): 511-30.

CA, *2002 Annual Report*, Washington, DC: CA.

Commission on Human Security. 2003. *Human Security Now*. New York: Commission on Human Security.

Commission on International Development. 1969. *Partners in Development: The Report of the Commission on International Development*. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Dahl, Gudrun. 2001. *Responsibility and Partnership in Swedish Aid Discourse*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

de Renzio, Paul and Sarah Mulley. 2000. *Donor Coordination and Good Governance: Donor-led and Recipient-led Approaches*. Oxford: University of Oxford.

Development Committee. 2002a. *Education for Dynamic Economies: Action Plan to Accelerate Progress towards Education for All*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Development Committee. 2002b. "Communiqué - Development Committee April 21, 2002," http://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/51/cm042102 accessed on 09/18/2017.

DFID. 1997. *Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century*. London: The Stationery Office.

EFA FTI. 2004. *Framework: Education for All – Fast Track Initiative Accelerating Progress towards Quality Universal Primary Education*. Washington, DC: EFA FTI Secretariat.

Fraser, Alastair and Lindsay Whitfield. "Understanding Contemporary Aid Relationships," in Whitfield, Lindsay, ed. 2009. *The Politics of Aid : African Strategies for Dealing with Donors*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

G7 Information Centre. 2002. "A New Focus on Education for All, Kananaskis, June 26, 2002," http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2002kananaskis/education.html accessed on 09/18/2017.

G8 Information Centre. 2001. "Communiqué Genova, July 22 2001," http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2001genoa/finalcommunique.html accessed on 09/08/2017.

GAIN. 2005. *Annual Report 2004-2005*. Geneva: GAIN.

Gartner, David. 2010. *Transformed Governance and the Education for All-Fast Track Initiative*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Gillies, Pamela. 1998. "Effectiveness of Alliance and Partnerships for Health Promotion," *Health Promotion International*. 13(2): 99-120.

Global Fund. 2001. *The Framework Document*. Geneva: Global Fund.

Global Fund. 2003. *Annual Report 2002/2003*. Geneva: Global Fund.

Global Fund. 2004. "Eighth Board Meeting, Geneva, 28 - 30 June 2004," https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/3406/bm08_boardmeeting_decisions_en.pdf accessed on 09/18/2017.

Global Fund. *Results Report 2017*. Geneva: Global Fund.

GPE. 2011. *Pledging Conference Summary Report*. Washington, DC: GPE.

GPE. 2012. *Charter of the Global Partnership for Education*. Washington, DC: GPE.

GPE. 2018. "Funding," https://www.globalpartnership.org/funding accessed on 02/14/2018.

Gutner, Tamar and Alexander Thompson. 2010. "The Politics of IO Performance: A Framework," *Review of International Organizations* 5(3): 227-248.

Hulme, David. 2009. *The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): Short History of the World's Biggest Promise*. Manchester: The University of Manchester Brooks World Poverty Institute.

Hurd, Ian. 1999. "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," *International Organization* 53(2): 379-408.

Jones, Sam. 2012. "Innovating Foreign Aid—Progress and Problems," *Journal of International Development* 24(1): 1-16.

Kamel, Nawal, and Anthony Cholst, James S. A. Funna, Pablo Guerrero, Rita Hilton, John Mitchell and Akihiko Nishio. 1998. *Partnership for Development: Proposed Actions for the World Bank*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Kayizzi-Mugerwa, Steve. 1998. "Africa and the Donor Community: From Conditionality to Partnership," *Journal of International Development* 10(2): 219-225.

Koremenos, Barbara and Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal. 2001a. "The Rational Design of International Institutions," *International Organization* 55(4): 761-99.

Koremenos, Barbara and Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal. 2001b. "Rational Design: Looking Back to Moving Forward," *International Organization* 55(4): 1051-82.

Lancaster, Carol. 2007. *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lindoso, Vinicius and Nina Hall. 2016. *Assessing the Effectiveness of Multilateral Organizations*. Oxford: University of Oxford.

March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1998. "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," *International Organization* 52(4): 943-69.

Maxwell, Simon and Simon Conway. 2000. *Perspectives on Partnership*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Maxwell, Simon and Roger C. Riddell. 1998. "Conditionality or Contract: Perspectives on Partnership for Development," *Journal of International Development* 10(2): 257-68.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 1998. "African Development Towards the 21ˢᵗ Century: The Tokyo Agenda for Action," http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad2/agenda21.html accessed on 02/12/2018.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2000. "G8 Communiqué Okinawa 2000," http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2000/documents/communique.html accessed on 09/18/2017.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2016. "Looking Back at TICAD's History," http://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page23e_000411.html accessed on 02/12/2018.

OECD. 2017. "Net ODA," https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm accessed on 10/13/2017.

OECD DAC. 1996. *Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-Operation*. Paris: OECD.

Patel, I.G. "Aid Relationships for the Seventies," in Ward, Barbara and J. D. Runnalls and Lenore D'Anjou, eds. 1971. *The Widening Gap: Development in the 1970s*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Pierson, Paul. 2000. "The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change," *Governance* 13(4): 475-499.

Reus-Smit, Christian. 2007. "International Crises of Legitimacy," *International Politics* 44(2-3): 157-74.

Riddell, Roger C. 2007. *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rivers, Bernard. 2014. *Options for Reforming the Global Fund Board*. Nairobi: Aidspan.

Rose, Pauline. 2003. *The Education Fast Track Initiative: A Global Campaign Review of Progress, and Recommendations for Reform*. London: ActionAid.

Rose, Pauline. 2011. "What's in a Name? Rebranding the EFA Fast Track Initiative," https://gemreportunesco.wordpress.com/2011/09/28/what's-in-a-name-rebranding-the-efa-fast-track-initiative/ accessed on 09/19/2017.

Sperling, Gene B. 2008. *A Global Education Fund: Toward a True Global Compact on Universal Education*, Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations.

Takala, Tuomas. 2003. *Analysis of the Education for All Initiative*. Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.

UN. 2006. *The MDG Report 2006*. New York : UN.

UNAIDS. 2002. *Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic*. Geneva: UNAIDS.

UN Document. 2001. *SG/SM/7779/Rev.1*.

UN Document. 2012. *A/RES/66/290*.

UNDP. 1994. *Human Development Report 1994*. New York: Oxford University Press.

UNESCO. 2001. *The Global Initiative towards Education for All: A Framework for Mutual Understanding*. Paris: UNESCO.

UNESCO. 2002. *EFA Global Monitoring Report 2002/2003*. Paris: UNESCO.

UNESCO. 2017. "Education for All Movement," http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/education-for-all accessed on 09/18/2017.

van Gastel, JN. 2011. *The Purification of Aid: An Ethnography of Dutch Partnership Policy and (Broken) Dreams of Development*, PhD thesis, Wageningen University.

Watt, Patrick. 2003. *Fast Track or Back Track?*. London: ActionAid.

Wendt, Alexander. 2001. "Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design," *International Organization* 55(4): 1019-49.

WHO. 1999. *The World Health Report 1999*. Geneva: WHO.

Widmalm, Sten. 1999. "Defining Partnership with Africa: Sweden's New Africa Policy and Strategies for Relations with Democratic and Authoritarian States," *Forum for Development Studies* 26(2): 289-314.

World Bank. 2003. *World Bank Group Archives Exhibit Series: The Pearson Commission*.

Washington, DC: World Bank.