ISSN 2432-1427

Journal of Human Security Studies

Vol.6, No.1, Spring 2017

Table of Contents

Articles

Journal of Human Security Studies
Vol.6, No.1. pp.1-17

Foraging in the Concrete Jungle: Human Security Issues in the Way Public Urban Space Sustains the Urban Homeless in a Southeast Asian Setting

José Edgardo A. Gomez, Jr.[1]

Abstract

Urban areas in developing countries may seem to be very insecure places to the untrained observer, but at the same time, they somehow continue to provide for the basic needs of the poor and homeless. This is particularly observable in growth areas like Southeast Asia where human security issues appear as a result of, or at least adjacent to, rapid development. This study focuses on the impoverished population of two cities, Makati and San Juan, in Metropolitan Manila, the densely-populated National Capital Region of the Philippines. It tries to show that urban physical space itself may have various unorthodox, instrumental uses, and serves as an unplanned source of nourishment or shelter for those unable to afford necessities, and those who are still unreached or ineligible for government housing programs. This leads to a discussion of how and why officials and institutions in charge may fail to address the plight of the urban poor, and therefore a justification for temporary, if sometimes unsightly, maintenance of the unstructured, loose flow of informal goods and services through urban neighborhoods, if only to allow the marginalized folk to survive, at least until government, the private sector, and civil society can pull their act together and reconstruct an environment that frees the poor from want and physical danger.

1. Introduction

Deprivations of physical needs and corresponding human wants are increasingly becoming part of daily life in the growing, crowded cities of Asia. Such juxtaposition highlights both the insecurities of daily living and the sometimes heroic coping mechanisms that individuals employ to survive. As the main case study of this author, this article begins with a flashback to February 2011, in Metro Manila, a crowded megacity and capital region of the Philippines, which was once again framed in a somewhat unflattering light when BBC featured the survival strategies of impoverished urban denizens. The media focused on the practice of *pagpag*, a Tagalog verb describing, approximately, the act of striking (a handheld object) against something, in order to shake off dirt or

[1] Associate Professor, University of the Philippines, School of Urban & Regional Planning..

dust that had clung to it—in that particular documentary referring to food scraps that were still deemed viable enough after being shaken free of grit, to be recooked and eaten or sold by hungry and penniless scavengers, among other survival strategies like begging, drug trafficking, prostitution, etc. Such desperate behavior, while deplorable, is still prevalent in many such megacities of Asia (West 2003), and points to a larger spatial reality that this research would like to focus on: that the urban area can and does provide a particularly fine-grained and unplanned source of nourishment and economic succor for--to employ a marine habitat analogy, "bottom-dwellers".

This research therefore takes another look at the scavenging behavior and shifting ecology of street-dwellers against the de facto artificial habitat that they must survive in. It shall be shown that just as much as the interior living space itself, exterior amenities matter significantly in easing the daily insecurities for homeless people who use the urban utilities and facilities in an instrumental fashion, often sacrificing long-term sustainability for immediate survival needs. The research echoes the literature in so far as it also shows that despite decades of numerous and diverse institutional efforts to eradicate poverty in cities, generation after generation of poor and homeless citizens have continued to inhabit the nooks and crannies of the "urban jungle", especially in developing countries. Notwithstanding the relative abundance of land surrounding dense areas, they lack decent in-city shelter because they are often unable to afford or maintain it, and government housing provision and regulation may have been historically cumbersome, ranging from 12 steps in Thailand to 55 steps in Malaysia (Strassmann1996)[2]. The fact that they persist implies that somehow, despite their substandard living conditions, the urban environment does provide, at the very least, a minimum of sustenance for biological needs like food, shelter, clothing, and enough interaction that provides crucial information for survival. It is the nature of the inadvertent habitability and hidden sustenance that comes from mostly public urban space which this research investigates with a view towards their effects on the "abject poverty that brings indignity and self-contempt" (Ogata 1999).

[2] While Strassman does not specify the 55 steps for Malaysia, the World Bank-UNCHS reference that he cites as support broadly categories the housing indictors as (1) house price to income ratio, (2) rent to income ratio, (3) housing production, (4) floor area per person, (4) permanent dwelling units, and (5) unauthorized housing, all of which would be used to assess Malaysian housing processes through 15-20 government agencies, according to the same source. In addition, fora more recent cross-reference, the website of the World Bank Group http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/malaysia/registering-property/retrieved on 21 September 2016 lists eight steps: (1) lawyer conducts land title search, (2) lawyer conducts company search, (3) lawyer conducts winding-up search, (4) buyer and seller sign purchase agreement, (5) memorandum of transfer is sent to stamp office for adjudication of stamp duty, (6) payment of duty and stamping of forms, (7) registration at the Land Office, and (8) update of buyer's name. As for Thailand, Strassman only goes as far as naming three broad sets of steps: titling, subdivision, and building. For cross reference, the same reference of the World Bank Group, at http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/thailand/registering-property/ retrieved on 21 September 2016 does indicate only three steps: (1) Conduct title search, (2) Obtain certified copies of company's documents from Ministry of Commerce, and (3) parties submit application for registration at Land Office.

2. Significance, Scope and Methodology

This study contributes to the literature on human security issues, planning, and built environments in developing countries. It focuses on Southeast Asia, where urban populations are growing significantly, many of which are poor, amid segregated material prosperity. This growth is due to many factors, especially because of a largely unbroken peace in an era of Asian prosperity and geopolitical power. The approach is qualitative and grounded in observations of specific behavior of urban poor respondents in one megalopolis, the Philippines being representative of the less-wealthy countries, with about 25% of its 100,000,000 population officially below the poverty line, as against more upwardly-mobile neighbors like Malaysia and Thailand, and the paragon of Singapore. Even Vietnam and Cambodia have been able to bring their poverty rates down to under 20% in the last decade, although it should also be recognized in Southeast Asia as a whole, that the proportion of people living on less than $1.25/day has declined from 46% to 7%, and child mortality has declined from 71% to 27%, (CIA World Factbook, UN-Millenium Development Goals Report 2015), which suggest that development interventions have been making real impacts against poverty. In the Philippines, two sites were chosen: the cities of Makati and San Juan in Metro Manila, which present stark contrasts of wealth and poverty on the streets; the former being the country's foremost Central Business District (CBD), the latter home to a wealthy generations of Chinese-Filipino families engaged in business—yet both sites have scattered, if small, and long-entrenched slums.

Analytically, the research approached the site guided by Amartya Sen's (1989) notion of human capability, with "development" ideally being an enabler of expanding capability—and as shall be later adopted from other Human Security literature, such development would also be expected to allow for human dignity, especially in the urban spaces where daily life is lived out by millions. The research employed qualitative approaches, specifically [1] direct case-study type interviews of at least fifteen (15) urban poor street dwellers, plus various other incidental discussions with their "groups", simultaneous with observations of their use of the environment; [2] discussions with city officials coupled with a review of official documents on land use and social work interventions; and [3] on-site inspection of physical sites inhabited and used in novel, if not necessarily safe and legal ways by respondents. The review of related documents covered the last half-decade, and the fieldwork was done specifically to see reality anew, with a critical eye towards how urban space actually functions as a life-support system to ease insecurity, whether or not according to normative frameworks by government officials and building professionals.

While it is acknowledged that the sample was relatively small and therefore prone to bias, this was only the initial result of an opportunistic search (for remaining vagrants whom the researcher happened to find in the evacuated areas), which later snowballed into more respondents—18 as of the final revision of this manuscript, because people on the street were able to point to their co-habitants.

The patterns of response, so far, have been consistent, in so far as the researcher himself chose to elicit different life stories, thus ensuring variety in background while seeking out unifying threads of experience.

The research concludes with the unorthodox assertion that some loose couplings and less-strictly defined public space may have to remain in the urban physical setup as an unintended means of sustenance or refuge because these are the material enablers of survival and upliftment, at least until government can effectively step in to provide comprehensive, long-term alleviation and consistent basic services that translate into security of lifefor those who roam the streets.

3. Review of Related Literature

Human Insecurity and the Growth of Cities

In what is coming to be regarded as the first urban century when most of the world's population lives in cities, the challenges to human existence have, for some groups, become more complex, making it necessary to look at internal problems on the ground rather than external inter-state frictions. As Umegaki (2009) put it:

> "Paradoxically, the attention to the interior of a nation makes it even clearer how individuals and their communities are exposed to threats to their security which know no national borders, such as global warming or pollution from distant origins. The lives of individuals or communities within a nation serve as a powerful magnifier of life-threatening or life-damaging issues whose origins may lie beyond its borders...."

The responses in urban areas, by citizens and public authorities, however, can vary from humane and reasoned helping actions, to almost paranoid defensive mechanisms against imagined threats to security (e.g. in the wake of terrorist attacks). Physically, the latter can take the form of hardening, fortress-like architecture, enclaves and ghettos, restrictions on public space use, and a gradual erosion of humane urbanity (Marcuse 2007). Using Metropolitan Manila as a site, this research is specifically concerned with those actions of both the authorities and how human insecurities are addressed in the daily life of urban poor dwellers, especially when government is not around. It contributes to the

literature by providing a reference on the urban spatial dynamics of insecurity, and could complement Human Security studies on rural areas in Southeast Asia, such as those done by Chi (2012) and Hirokawa (2014).

Moreover, little is said about the actual plight of those ordinary, often impoverished citizens who cannot afford to alter or acquire urban space even for their basic needs or personal security. Some are classified by the United Nations as internally-displaced persons (IDPs), who are forced to migrate from elsewhere within a country and find their way into cities that are unable or unwilling to accommodate them, despite the fact that cities have in recent years been recognized as possessing their own sociopolitical power and identity distinct from, but linked to the national government (Tibaijuka 2010). In most cases, the urban area presents a unique environment where human vulnerabilities are exposed, and yet there are likely to be people and mechanisms in the same urban area that can be used to assist those in need. The plight of such peoples compels critical reflection on both the "narrow" and "broad" conceptualizations of Human Security; in the former, the absence of threats to physical security takes primacy, and in the latter, the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair comes to the fore (Shani 2014). As sometimes happens, the physical setup of the built-environment itself, despite various enclosures, indignities, impoverishing conditions, and threats to physical safety, may nevertheless provide opportunities and material for the creative user of space, as has been investigated in this study.

Conceptualizing Slums and Urban Poverty in Asia

Insecurity is a universal dimension of the human condition (Koehler et al. 2012). Less-than-secure conditions of existence make up the reality of inadequate sustenance and informal shelter that persists for poor citizens and migrants who arrive in urban centers in search of opportunities for a better life, in many cases fleeing from the poverty of rural existence. In megacities, for instance those in China, citizens' movements have been controlled since the 1950s development of the *hukou* system, which restricts settlement in cities, for whose population the state obligates itself to support, in contrast to rural area, where the state takes a less active role (Chen & Selden 1994). Hence, temporary migrants in search of employment but without the *hukou* registration papers for cities are forced to rent at farmers' accommodations at the urban periphery, resulting in a build-up of an informal rim of houses for workers who could otherwise be absorbed by government-funded housing (ADB 2009). Indeed, without scholarly circumspection, an observer of cities today might be convinced by the inevitable dominance of urban blight in Davis' (2006) *Planet of Slums*, based on evidence of growing inequality between rich and poor, among other statistics. Davis made a name for himself in

the last decade by assembling a negative but convincing storyline about the urban future based on selective presentation of data and analyses. On the contrary, others (Gilbert 2009) warn against over-generalization of any housing crisis and take to task such popular writers as Hernando de Soto and Davis, the former for offering land tenure as a panacea of sorts, the latter for painting a gloomy picture of urbanization in the 21st century.

Scavenging and Other Features of the Urban Informal Economy

In recent years, one of the influences that has driven individuals and families to difficult circumstances is the upheaval of Asian societies due to rapid sociopolitical and technological changes. As Quah (2013) puts it, global forces that impinge upon family structure and personal ability to function as an effective member of society include: (1) choices for smaller size households, delayed marriage and childbearing, increases in divorce rates and single parenthood; (2) demographic transition characterized by ageing, (3) rise in migration of the family itself or by others moving into the country, (4) the effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and (5) various other aspects of globalization. Others take a more optimistic view and perceive the city as a source of solutions itself, to address societal problems in a human-centric, smart, all-inclusive, and sustainable fashion (Kulkki 2014).

At ground level, however, coping may take the form of slippage into the informal sector, which is why some people might resort to street vending and other informal trades, as in the case of Indonesia, which in the last decade experienced widespread downsizing in the manufacturing and construction sectors (Brata 2011). Others who have fallen into desperate circumstances, might be reduced to mendicancy, or, as in the case of some youth, may join gangs engaged in illicit economic activities. State authorities will then have to resolve such delinquency in a manner of ways, depending on whether they see begging and gang membership as threats to society or social problems to be addressed in a rationalized manner (Coughlin and Venkatesh 2003).

Unorthodox Use of the Urban Built-Up Area and Alternate Views of Ecology of Spaces

The locus of such non-formal dwelling might be regarded as a new realm of investigation for those studying Human Security: "informal space", where individual initiatives, collective actions, and state-independent communication take place. In such urban habitats, there is a degree of invisibility from official public scrutiny, as observed by one scholar in the outskirts of Ho Chi Minh City (Earl 2010). It is the activities in such spaces that, ironically, impart an identity to the urban space, even if they depart from original government-approved or professionally-designed layouts, as, for instance when street vendors are concentrated in a given street, that street acquires many of the characteristics

of a marketplace, and it may be called a "street market" (Bromley 2006). By appreciating how such characters, their movements, and their goods and services harmonize together, one might realize how these lead to the emergence of a kind of ecology of urban spaces, or desperate survival behavior, as this study will show. As one sociologist (Ferrell 2006) who did street immersion with waste- and rag-pickers described it:

> "By choice or necessity, I realized, their role within the larger social ecology is to sort among the daily accumulations of trash, to imagine ways in which objects discarded as valueless might gain some new value, and always to stay one stealthy step ahead of those official agencies of collection, sanitation, and disposal, that would haul away such possibilities."

Indeed, to push alternative perspectives a little bit further, the scholarly observer might even consider that the use of spaces in uncommon ways is a counter-hegemonic response, in the Gramscian sense (Forgacs 2000), by individual and collective actors versus the establishment. Echoing Castells, the urban question is represented by conflicts which arise from consumption in everyday life of social groups: over housing, education, health, transport, which capitalist enterprises cannot sufficiently provide to all, because it is not profitable (Konzen 2011), while even government is ineffective in some countries in filling in gaps, because of its bureaucratic inefficiencies and political biases. In such cases, in urban areas throughout history, impoverished citizens have found ways and means to bargain for, steal, recycle, or otherwise obtain basic resources for survival despite what turns out to be superficial exclusivity of private property and the easily reworked functionality of narrowly-purposed public spaces.

4. Findings: A Streetwise Logic to the Use of Public Space

As a necessary first step, one needs to ask, what does the human insecurity situation of the urban poor dweller look like? In the two sites, as in many areas of Metropolitan Manila, the instabilities of day-to-day living frequently mean not knowing whether one will obtain enough to eat and drink during the day. This uncertainty becomes an especially acute need, and even life-threatening, during the extreme days of tropical summer heat in April and May, or during the consecutive days of rain of the monsoon season, which begins around July and stretches through October.

Another source of insecurity is not being able to foresee whether one will make enough from informal work throughout the day to pay for the next day's needs or other needs. There is also the

question of whether one can find adequate shelter to retire to rest or recuperate from illness, if no semblance of permanent shelter can be claimed nearby. On the other hand, and surprisingly for this researcher, hardly any respondents were worried about being potential victims of crime or violence, for, as more than one respondent put it: "…we have nothing worth taking" (L.Z. Female, 71), and the urgencies of simply surviving override any anxiety about the supposed dangers posed by other street-roamers.

Across all interviews and direct observations of the subjects, it was recorded that the street dwellers, some of whom could regularly seek refuge with relatives or friends in nearby slums, obtain potable water and electricity from either (1) sub-metered connections attached to a legally-installed main meter, or (2) through illegal wire (jumper cables) and pipe taps, with only public fountains and the occasional burst water-main as alternative sources of water for bathing and laundry. No instrumental use was mentioned by respondents of the drenching monsoon rains, which were observed to be a "treat" for streetchildren, at least until they had become overexposed to the cold. Instead, both true vagrants (i.e. absolutely homeless) and slum dwellers were willing and able to purchase canisters of water from community standpipes for daily use at prices ranging from P1.00 to P5.00 per container—amounts easily made even through mendicant behavior. Consumption would be immediate, with few reserving water for long periods of time. Simultaneously, income-generation was achieved mainly by agglomerating recyclable and resalable scraps such as plastic containers and printer ink cartridges, or by extracting valuable material such as metal from car parts and by stripping wires, cables, and circuit boards, as well as by hauling and bundling less-valuable items such as paper and cardboard, as long as these could be kept away from damp.

On the other, other uses of the landscape that seem to be typical of the Philippine urban landscape and tropical weather conditions may be deduced from the following responses:

E.C., Male, 55, separated: "*We have no toilet here (on the streets). We take our waste, wrap it in newspaper, and toss it onto the passing dumptrucks. We could go down to a creek to do our business, but it is already dirty and it is easier just to wait for the garbage collectors*."

M.S. Male, 28, living-in: "*When we need water immediately, or need to use the toilet badly, we just go to Shopwise* [a nearby grocery, part of a widespread chain]. *If we are dressed poorly however, they turn us away, like if we are unshod, or wearing only slippers and sando* [sleeveless shirt/tank top]."

L.Z. Female, 71, widowed: "*I have only coffee for breakfast most of the time. I ask for hot water from some nearby establishment, or burn firewood to heat some. Then I begin to look for garbage to sort out, here on the street. We pry apart appliances and office equipment to get at the metal, then I*

also set aside the plastic containers for sale to the junkshop... This can go on for most of the day…"

Apart from the day-to-day activity of scavenging and occupying marginal or abandoned spaces, it may be generalized that street-dwellers utilize the streetscape in the any or all of the following ways: (1) use of the roadside eateries and fastfood restaurants (e.g. the ubiquitous Jollibee hamburger chain) for their toilets, for obtaining iced water, and as sites for earning small change as parking attendants, if not outright begging—the latter vigorously prohibited by other such places like McDonalds; (2) takeover the sidewalks as vending, displaying, sorting and drying platforms (for sorted scraps as well as clothing); and (3) if knowledgeable about tropical plants, may obtain kindling, fruits, flavoring herbs, or bark (uses medicinally or as an abortifacient) for personal use. More specific details from respondents may be seen in Table 1:

Table 1: At a Glance: Non-Planned Instrumental Use of Insecure Surroundings

Daily or Important Survival Activity (Non-Economic)	**Observed Customary Coping Strategy in Urban Space**	**Observed Worst-Case/ Desperation Strategy in Urban Space**
1. Get adequate sleep for the night in a sheltered location, away from inclement weather and flooding.	1. Erect make-shift dwelling from scrap wood and metal on the streets, in abandoned sites, or attached to buildings.	1. Sleep on cardboard or paper, with/without a cloth cover, under any eaves, on or near the street.
2. Drink, wash, bathe.	2. Pay fees at a nearby standpipe-source. Take from public fountains or fast-food chains.	2. Tap illegally into a water main, or request from nearby establishments.
3. Eat enough for 2-3 times a day.	3. Purchase using yesterday's income, enough staples and a viand to share for the day.	3. Beg for food outright. Sometimes, food is given by passing motorists.
4. Pass bodily waste.	4. Urinate along the streets, defecate in improvised toilets plugged into sewers, or in fast-food restaurants.	4. Urinate along the streets, wrap feces in newspaper and throw into passing dumpsters, or pass off in grassy lots.
5. Protect self and family from violence and crime.	5. Avoid policemen and deputized watchmen. Range/forage within familiar neighborhood (2-3 km radius)	5. Flee to safe corners or populated areas, away from pursuing agents or violence.
6. Obtain clothing.	6. Purchase from second-hand shops; receive hand-me-downs.	6. Rummage through trash for clothes; sew rags together.
7. Recover from illness.	7. Seek free medical help and advice from public health clinic or city hall.Use wayside trees & herbs.	7. Beg for outright medical assistance; go to nearest public succor facility, if any. Use wayside trees and herbs.

It must be added that respondents unanimously described the urban area as a place where it was "…easy to get money", "…easy to get (informal) jobs", and "…plentiful in food and water, if you

know where to ask (or dig)…". It was unsurprising, therefore, that many respondents had actually been eligible for, or were given, low-cost government housing several kilometers outside the vast metropolis, but decided to wander their way back onto the streets of Makati and San Juan, where the largesse of passing motorists would assure them cash or food handouts daily, or where the leavings of rich residents and nearby company offices could always assure the poor of a steady stream of edible, salable, or recyclable materials not available in the semi-rural desakota (after McGee, 1991) in which government could afford to house them. If there was any unpredictability, the interviews typically revealed, it would come during the harsh rainy season, when typhoons and flooded streets would send them fleeing to higher ground, and would make it impractical for third parties to sustain random acts of charity.

It must be admitted, moreover, that difficulties typically arise when these homeless are relocated, for example, as they take the same habits of scavenging with them, which in many cases translates into a lack of respect for, or understanding of the value of common, public property. A formally-employed social worker, who had been assigned by the Makati City government to the rather large (1000+ families) resettlement site in the municipality of Calauan, Laguna province, lamented :

"Upon waking up in the mornings, I would discover that the light bulb that I had screwed into the socket in the eaves of the field office had been stolen. I learned that's the way a lot of the people still are here—they have the habit of taking, dismantling, unscrewing, cutting away, and selling whatever they can get their hands on. Perhaps it's not so much stealing…that's the way they learned to survive back in the city…So it's difficult to unlearn. …But I had to spend to replace these items; Makati does not give much of a budget for improving the field office."

Such "cannibalistic" behavior represents the darker reality of managing the transitions of urban poor populations who have learned how to cope with daily insecurities with behavior that may not be ethically acceptable to the more well-off. Such difficulties were confirmed by the mid-level bureaucrat in charge of the relocation between 2015 and 2016[3] ; according to her, early-stage movement required a lot of re-education and inculcation of a sense of community, rather than free-for-all behavior.

Physical relocation rarely suffices for lifestyle-change; indeed, if left to their own devices, resettled populations without strong leadership may lapse into somewhat self-destructive behavior that breaks up the community and degrades housing, rather than consolidating a coherent built-up area. In some cases, as learned from the interviewees themselves, they would have to return back to the metropolis in search of jobs and food, simply because there was not enough to be had in the

[3] Informal discussion with M. Javier, head of Social Welfare office that granted permission to this author to do fieldwork in Makati's resettlement site.

government relocation site, despite seemingly thorough and careful preparatory procedure in National Housing Authority documents that mandates that not only houses but some form livelihood assistance be provided[4]. Indeed LGUs like Makati city follow more or less the same protocols, at least on paper. In any case, this feedback shows that beneficiaries of low-cost housing and land sometimes need to be reeducated and given sufficient livelihood projects that will occupy their time and replace selfish, survivalist instincts with more urbane and productive behaviors that would benefit the larger community and improve the overall human security situation for the group.

5. Analysis and Discussion:

Sampling through a score of responses from on-site interviews, the researcher can reasonably substantiate the argument that urban space functions, in this case, as an unplanned source of material succor and security for those who cannot engage in formal social and economic relations with the rest of the population. More precisely, that sites of consumption like fastfood restaurants and streetfood stalls, are not impermeable to scavenging or intentional acts of charity by customers towards the homeless. In some cases, employed staff have been known to spare some handouts of food taken from their own free rations after the establishment closes for the day, implying that there are complicit leakages in an open network of waste collection and material movement that contributes to a nocturnal ecology of sorts. In both Makati and San Juan, the urban environment was observed to offer this abundance of scraps that permitted coping behavior, although the pickings in Makati were much richer, while the site in San Juan was only close to houses and not restaurants or other sources of food and social service. While results were similar between cities, it is important to note that respondents in Makati did not have to travel far to ease their daily conditions due to the density of establishments, while those in San Juan who eventually thrived were those who had moved several blocks away to a nearby wet-market.

One practical Human (In)Security issue that emerges at this level is therefore: does such coping behavior constitute a thorough-going deprivation, or does it represent an *exercise of constrained choice*, in so far as respondents themselves prefer to be poor in the city, where they can "opt" to survive on the droppings of others, rather than to be poor in the rural area where they may starve if a storm ruins crops and knocks down dwellings?

The answer cannot be a simple indictment of those who built and rule urban space, but must be

[4] Various NHA looseleaf sheets that show housing cost and components; obtained from head office, 15 June 2016.

explained in its nuances against the Human Security literature. This research therefore pushes the argument farther by recalling the instructive explanation of Murphy (2015) on *human dignity*. He reminds us that the universal right to have dignity respected manifests in different ways because dignity is socially-constructed in different cultural contexts, but is not diminished by such variety. In the Philippine context, as in most other urban settings, intrinsically "dirty" work, especially if it is not formally sanctioned, is shunned by the majority of society, and may carry an unspoken social stigma—ergo, an erosive force on the individual's dignity. While the urban milieu itself does provide better odds for survival and "capacitates" the poor in that unintended sense, these odds are largely *less-dignified* leftover choices, the dregs which the salaried and entrepreneurial classes would not stoop to.

Simultaneously, this categorized recognition of the creative if unusual uses of city space by homeless and poor urbanites can neither be an excuse for, nor a romanticization of their plight—it is, in meanest terms, survival behavior, and points a finger at the lapses, or in some instances, oppression by government and its agents. It also speaks of the neglect of the better-off in civil society and profit-seeking, private business enterprise.

In the Philippine context, structural inadequacies in the establishment and proper mission-assignment, and deployment of institutions that should service the poor arise from two contexts: national-level agencies like the National Housing Authority and Department of Social Welfare & Development, whose programs selectively remove some but leave others due to the need for beneficiary prioritization; and the widely-decentralized local government structure that is unable to sustain annual budgets for housing and social safety net services, even in the wealthiest cities of the country.

The result in citizens' lived reality is a spotty or "checkered" experience of human insecurity by the poorest and most marginalized. That is, some are officially rescued, others are left behind, and still others who were supposed to have been saved find that they cannot sustain themselves and their families in the remote, job-scarce, locations chosen by government. The city administration's net is therefore not wide enough, and is uncoordinated vis-à-vis national efforts to list, engage with, and resettle potential housing and livelihood assistance beneficiaries. For example, on-going follow-through fieldwork[5] shows that government is not as accessible to the impoverished and elderly, unmarried older adults, families squatting in private lots over which city hall has limited jurisdiction,

[5] The current round of field research, upon which this article is based, has consisted of 2-3 site visits to depressed areas inside Metro Manila as well as resettlement sites at the periphery, where 9-10 respondents per site have been interviewed. An emerging pattern noted by the author as he listens to the stories of the urban poor, is that government agents have tended to favor respondents with a certain demographic profile, especially if this fits donor-driven projects/programs, such as the World Bank funded Conditional Cash Transfer Program.

and vagrants who have had a record of scrapes with local law enforcers. It is for this reason, that one might justify, temporarily, either the substitution of helpful third parties like NGOs, or the continued scavenging behavior of the urban poor for their own survival.

Second, urban design itself seems to be unresponsive to the daily insecurities of poor people on the ground, or at least has potential to be reworked so that the environment becomes less hostile to survival behavior and those seeking menial jobs. There are several approaches to this: communal water facilities, government-operated dormitories, and public gathering areas that are elevated and sheltered against inclement weather, to name a few. Again, this argument does not condone scavenging and survivalist behavior as permanent elements of the cityscape, but rather uses structure to encourage activities in the right place, especially in touristic areas where keeping random wandering and scrounging behavior away from the public eye may be desirable, unless this is part of branding strategy (Hernandez and Lopez 2011).

Prospectively, urban design can and should be used to make centers of employment accessible to the poor, even after government has relocated poor families elsewhere—preferably in-city, but if this is not feasible, then bus and train lines ought to be provided that access the periphery, even during early morning and late night hours as blue-collar workers try to find their way from and to their homes. These are facilities still lacking in Metropolitan Manila, hence the persistence of the impoverished coming back into the CBDs in search of jobs and the material droppings and leavings of the wealthy that ensure their survival.

Third, the quality and quantity of material culture, in large part the result of capitalist enterprises, is an indicator of the habits of utilization and wastage inherent in any given society. What gets valued, used, and thrown out by certain segments of the population while others cannot afford the basics, are testimonies to failures in public redistribution and to private investments in goods & services that may be unnecessary, capricious, or even contrary to public interest. It may also be added that such conspicuous consumption may add to the psychological oppression that comes from being deprived of even the most elementary products of society.

Slums and squatters sleeping on the streets next to gleaming skyscrapers in Metro Manila make up the physical testimony of a society and economy that needs to rethink and redo its wealth distribution in the face of high population growth. Asian cities in particular receive upwards of 120,000 new dwellers every day, which would require the construction of 20,000 new affordable houses, being broadly defined as those home-sites which are adequate in quality and location and do not cost so much as to prohibit their occupants from meeting other basic living costs or threaten their enjoyment of basic human rights, and which can specifically be measured by price-to-income, rent-

to-income, and price-to-residual income metrics (UN-HABITAT 2011). An older, but insightful article notes how resettlements of squatters under the Philippine government first took place in the 1930s, but could be seen as the continuation of a long pattern of displacement by colonial governments who made Filipinos "squatters in their own land" (David & Regala-Angangco 1975).In this regard, and because urban migration and the insecurities it engenders continue, it would seem that civil society groups could play a bigger role in trying to shape public opinion, especially because the Philippines has a relatively vigorous NGO sector. Social corrective action to address the plight of the urban poor could at least be made part of the more popular advocacies of promoting environment-friendly, recyclable materials, or of doing charitable acts towards the poor.

But one may pose the counter-argument: even in the best of developed countries, government cannot guarantee that streets will always be 100% free of the homeless and impoverished , as can be seen even in places like Japan (Sorensen 2002), and as witnessed by the author, in Germany. Ergo, when can one say that governments in the developing countries have reached "sufficient" or "substantial" compliance in easing the human insecurities of the homeless? The answer in this case is difficult to define, but it would be reasonable to insist that success has been attained when the relapse rate (returnees who are unable to survive elsewhere despite government and or private/civil-society assistance) has dwindled to zero or at least low, single-digit percentages—as in Singapore or Malaysia, respectively. This would be a surer indicator that solutions being implemented are in fact effective, and would imply that government resources can over the years, bring the incidence of poverty close to null, without fear of the problem recurring because solutions were haphazardly conceived and/or implemented.

6. Conclusion and Looking Ahead

Given the foregoing, the author has made a case for the double-edged effects of urban space on the daily life-challenges of impoverished individuals: it is both capacitating of options and degrading for those whose array of choices is restricted to various survival activities. From a practical standpoint, the author would still affirm the earlier argument that urban space should probably continue to provide some form of informal sustenance to the neglected members of society, even if this is unsightly and undesirable, because it is a temporary situation that awaits more effective state or non-state solutions to the insecurities of homelessness, joblessness, and lack of dignity.

With developing countries' housing needs rising some 3-5% annually, the nature of the housing and employment crises still varies from country to country (Mathur 2013; Ogunshakin 1994), and

needs careful planning to address. At the same time, the usage of living space in unplanned, unexpected ways is part of the natural dynamic of urban existence, and may be regarded as a reflection or index of population dynamics. Areas that are used strictly and solely for predetermined functions are not cities; they are rather more like museums or military schools, affording little flexibility for heterogeneity and multiple claims by different actors across time.

In similar fashion, governments that only clamp down more tightly, or periodically, in the name of tidying and beautifying urban space while denying alternative and dignified means of survival to poor citizens only exacerbate the problem by treating symptoms, rather than the causes of poverty, according to the broader conception of Human Security. Such short-sighted behavior is typical of politicians who are in a hurry to show quick results by eradicating the superficial, but fail to attack the roots of the problem: poor planning, poor administrative coordination, and an overall societal discourse that does not yet recognize or promote inclusive and dignified development for which all sectors must be responsible. Comprehensive and more humane planning and implementation is probably needed instead. In concreteterms that would address the conditions observed without too much difficulty, this would mean designing or re-designing urban spaces and transportation with the poor and insecure in mind: walkable, well-lit neighborhoods with picture-signage, leisure and assembly spaces subsidized by public funds that would not require payment, and refuges for those left out of government's priority projects. This will require sufficient intelligence, responsibility, and empathy on the part of government officials and their partners, in order to become effective in the long term.

Looking ahead, the current round of research is taking this author in the direction of the voids in governmental response and how these result in an insecure urban space for the impoverished. The claims of unreached citizens on the ground and the claims of bureaucrats in city hall seem to be chronically groping in the dark and never meeting, despite good intentions on both sides. In broader, more technical terms,the first steps towards alleviating the insecurities experienced by the respondents would be (1) to identify who exactly fall through the net, so to speak, of numerous government efforts, and even whom the NGOs fail to reach, (2) to determine why present solutions to employ or move out people remain inadequate, especially in the structural sense of not having the right type of institution, laws,and trained agents to reach out to the remaining marginalized, and (3) to coordinate efforts with other entities who may be trying to address other parts of the overall problem of urban poverty, especially in the Philippines, which, as of this writing, still has double the rates of poverty of many of its other Southeast Asian neighbors.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ADB, Resident Mission PRC. 2009. "Resident Mission in the PRC," *Report* for February.

Brata, Aloysius G. 2011. "Vulnerability of Urban Informal Sector: Street Vendors in Yogyakarta, Indonesia." Munich Personal RePEc Archive, no. 35423.

Bromley, Ray. 2006. "Street Vending and Public Policy: A Global Review." *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 20 (1/2): 1–28.

Chi, Vu Le Thao. 2012. "Farmers in a Developing Country: An Inquiry into the Human Security of the Many." *Journal of Human Security Studies*, Volume 1, Number 2, 94-108.

CIA World Factbook. Retrieved 31 May 2016. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.

Coughlin, Brenda, and Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh. 2003. "The Urban Street Gang after 1970."

Earl, Catherine. 2010. "Vietnam's 'Informal Public' Spaces: Belonging and Social Distance in Post-Reform Ho Chí Minh City." *Journal of Vietnamese Studies* 5 (1): 86–125. doi:10.1525/vs.2010.5.1.86.

Ferrell, Jeff. 2006. *Empire of Scrounge*. New York: New York University Press.

Forgacs, Davis (Ed.) 2000. *The Gramsci Reader*. New York: New York University Press.

Gilbert, Alan. 2009. "Extreme Thinking About Slums and Slum Dwellers : A Critique." *SAIS Review* 29 (1): 35–48.doi:10.1353/sais.0.0031.

GIZ. 2011. Recovering Resources , Creating Opportunities. Eschborn: GIZ Publishing.

Hernandez, Jaime, and Celia Lopez. 2011. "Is There a Role for Informal Settlements in Branding Cities?" *Journal of Place Management and Development* 4 (1): 93–109.

Javier, Marissa. (2015) various Informal Interview/s – Officer-in-Charge of Resettlement Program.

Karabanow, Jeff; Hughes, Jean; Ticknor, Jann; Kidd, Sean and Patterson, Dorothy. 2010. "The Economics of Being Young and Poor: How Homeless Youth Survive in Neo-Liberal Times." *Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare* XXXVII (4): 39–64.

Koehler, Gabrielle; Gasper, Des; Jolly, Sir Richard and Simane, Mara. 2012. "Human Security and the Next Generation of Comprehensive Human Development Goals", *Journal of Human Security Studies*, 1, (2): 75-93.

Konzen, Lucas Pizzolatto. 2011. "The City and Its Public Spaces : The Legal Dimension Explored Sociologically." *Dialogos de Saberes*, 273–88.

Kulkki, Seija. 2014. "Cities for Solving Societal Challenges." *Interdisciplinary Studies Journal* 3 (4).

Marcuse, Peter. 2007. “The Threat of Terrorism and Existential Insecurity : Urban Policy Responses The Terrorist Attack in New York City on 9 / 11.” Presented at the Conference, "Architectures of Fear. Terrorism and the Future of Urbanism in the West", May 2007, Barcelona.

Marx, Benjamin, Thomas Stoker, and Tavneet Suri. 2013. “The Economics of Slums in the Developing World” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 27 (4): 187–210.doi:10.1257/jep.27.4.187.

Mathur, Om Prakash. 2013. “Urban Poverty in Asia.” ADB, *Report* for August.

Murphy, Craig N. 2015. “Dignity, Human Security, and Global Governance”, *Journal of Human Security Studies*, 4 (1): 1-12.

Ogata, Sadako. 1999. *Human Security: A Refugee Perspective,* Keynote Speech at the Ministerial Meeting on Human Security Issues of the “Lysoen Process” Group of Governments, Bergen Norway, on 19 May 1999.

Ogunshakin, Lee. 1994. “Urban Housing Policies in the Third World.” *Ekistics* 61.

Sen, Amartya. 1989. “Development as Capability Expansion”, *Journal of Development Planning*. 19: 41-58.

Shani, Giorgio. 2014. “Human Security at Twenty: A Post-Secular Approach”, *Journal of Human Security Studies*, 3 (2): 120-135.

Strassmann, W Paul. 1996. “Limits to Market Empowerment for Housing in Developing Countries: The Case of Land.” *Journal of Economic Issues* XXX (1): 211–23.

Tibaijuka, A. 2010. “Adapting to Urban Displacement.” Forced Migration Review 34, no. 34: 4. http://www.fmreview.org/urban-displacement.

Umegaki, M., Thiesmayer, L. and Watabe, A. 2009. Human Insecurity in East Asia. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

United Nations. 2015. The Millenium Development Goals Report. New York: U.N. Press.

UN-HABITAT. 2011. Affordable Land and Housing in Asia. Design. New York: UN Press. doi:10.1080/04597238108460570.

West, Andrew. 2003. “At the Margins: Street Children in Asia and the Pacific.” ADB: Poverty & Social Development Papers 8 (October). http://www.adb.org/publications/margins-street-children-asia-and-pacific.

Journal of Human Security Studies
Vol.6, No.1. pp.18-37

Human Security and Higher Education: An Examination of North American and European HS Programs and the Interdisciplinary Academy[1]

John Allison[2]

Abstract

The twentieth anniversary of the Ottawa Process and the Landmines Treaty has just taken place with some celebrations in Canada.[3] This event brings one to question how human security and landmarks such as this treaty have impacted world politics. Also, in this scholar's mind, it makes one question how this landmark has impacted higher education. In the period between 1998 and the Landmines Treaty, and 2017, there has been a revolution in the teaching of international relations, international organization and global issues generally, as scholars and instructors re-examined pedagogy and curriculum in the context of higher education. In the eyes of some, contemporary international relations teaching has a long way to go. Some feel there needs to be a greater emphasis on human security education. Others, particularly as 9/11 and the wars in Syria, and the Middle East generally impact the West's consciousness; feel that security studies remain critical. This article will answer the question of where are international practitioner oriented studies at the university headed in North America and Europe; towards human security or somewhere else? It will argue that while teaching human security is an important curriculum development, widespread acceptance of this in the academy remains limited. A variety of obstacles inhibit wholesale acceptance of this area of study. Changing to a human security curriculum remained a considerable hurdle for faculty in the era between 2001 and 2017. This is in part because this approach is reflective of a different paradigm of the international system that many academics are not prepared to adopt. Successful implementation of a human security curriculum also requires a greater awareness of the existing national approaches to teaching human rights and international relations, as well as receptivity to the issues associated with interdisciplinary studies. Lastly, human security programs are buffeted by outside influences in higher education that make their expansion a challenging gambit.

Keywords:
Higher Education, International Relations, and UN Studies

---

[1] An early draft version of this paper was first presented at the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) Annual Meeting and Convention as *Human Security and Higher Education: A Field of Dreams?* in Geneva, Switzerland on Friday July 2nd, 2004.

[2] Dr. John Allison is an Associate Professor of Education at Nipissing University, North Bay, Canada. He can be reached at johna@nipissingu.ca. He teaches Education Foundations and Comparative and International Education. He has a doctorate in the history of education and a M.Sc. in International Relations.

[3] This was celebrated at the Bill Graham Centre for International History (BGCIH) at Trinity College at the University of Toronto in Toronto, Canada on October 27th – October 28th, 2016. Participants included current and former Canadian Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Stefan Dion, Lloyd Axworthy and Bill Graham.

1. Introduction

In the period between 2002 and 2017, many scholars re-examined issues of higher education and the teaching of international relations and international organization(Falk, 2007; Horn, Rubin, & Schouenborg, 2016; Krasno, 2002; Larsen, 2008; Waever, 2005). In the eyes of many, contemporary international relations teaching is diversified, yet continues to face critical questions. For this scholar, who struggled with and eventually mastered the works of Hans Morgenthau, James Rosenau, and others in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a re-examination of the curricula of International Relations is an interesting yet daunting challenge. Some scholars, going back to the 1980s, argue that a re-release of the classical works is simply no longer enough (Holsti, 1985; Schmidt, 1998). In contemporary times, the appeal for different ways of teaching international relations and new standard works has become a clarion call. With the rise of different methodologies, different contexts in which to teach, and different approaches to teaching, this re-examination of international relations pedagogy continues to resonate (Bertrand & Lee, 2012; Prasirtsuk, 2009; Stienstra, 2000). This article will examine human security education. The article will argue that while teaching human security was an important curriculum development, widespread acceptance of this at the program level in the academy remains limited. A variety of obstacles inhibit open acceptance of this as an area of study. Changing to a human security curriculum remained a considerable hurdle for faculty in the era between 2001 and 2017. This is in part because this approach is reflective of a different paradigm of the international system that many are not prepared to adopt. Successful implementation of a human security curriculum also requires a more attuned focus on the issues of interdisciplinary studies. Additionally, human security programs are buffeted by outside influences that make their expansion a challenging gambit. The paper will reference human security programs primarily in Canada, but will also mention in passing other programs from the United States and Europe. One of the limitations of the paper is that it does not address the robust and increasing number of human security programs in Asia, particularly in Japan, China and Australia (Sato, 2016, p. 89.; Tow, Walton, & Kersten, 2016). Another limitation is linguistic in the sense that the paper deals primarily with English-speaking institutions and English language publications (Asante, Miike, & Yin, 2014; Tsuda, 2014).

This project is of significance to this author as the author's background is one that combines the history of education, higher education and international relations studies. Moreover, through employment with academic organizations such as the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) in the early 2000s, the author was able to see first-hand some of the struggles for the emergence of the human security project.

The timeliness of this project is accentuated in the contemporary global environment. The need for human security studies remains acute in current times. The continuing intractable nature of failed states, the ongoing and shocking nature of terrorist activities throughout the world speak to the timely and practice oriented nature of this type of study. Moreover, the return and rise of right wing political parties as exemplified in the politics of Marine Le Pen in France, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, and others; and the populist backed administration of the current US President, Donald Trump, speak to the possibility of developing volatilities in world politics and changes in world order (Niblett, 2017; Patrick, 2017). Finally, the complex and deeply intertwined overlapping nature of environmental and human crises (i.e. global warming, famine, insecurity, failed states) speaks to the importance of human security studies which are timely and focused on problem solving today (Martin & Owen, 2014). Contemporary global political dynamics are tending towards greater instability in the current era. A human security perspective and human security education are now both necessary.

Literature and Definition

Recent years have seen an explosion of human security literature. The prominence of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in the late 1990s spurred this literature forward. The Responsibility to Protect is now a canonical work in the field as near term histories of this doctrine are now being written (International Development Research Centre (IDRC) & International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty(ICISS); MacFarlane & Khong, 2006). Many scholars followed in the footsteps of this leading source of inspiration (Hanlon & Christie, 2016). The development of Human Security programs and courses was the next step being taken by institutions and organizations around the world in the early 2000s (Akuffo, 2016). Indeed, Takasu continues calls for the mainstreaming of human security in the global agenda (Takasu, 2012).

As the international relations professoriate plunged into this area, what exactly was it that they were trying to teach? What do we mean by "human security?" In an early workshop given at Harvard University, the contending definitions of human security were set forth (Harvard School of Public Health, 2002). While Kofi Annan and Sadaka Ogato argued that Human Security refers to the individual, the ICISS definition more broadly took in entire communities (Harvard School of Public Health, 2002). One of the key values that was proposed was the notion of "human dignity." Consequently in the view of the then Rector of the United Nations University, Hans Van Ginkel, human security dealt with emergent threats in the area of fear, conflict, ignorance, poverty, social and cultural deprivation, and hunger (Van Ginkel & Newman, 1999). Elsewhere, the definition of human security remains contentious and contested (Akuffo, 2016; MacFarlane & Khong, 2006; Mathews,

1989).

In addition to the question of definition, turning over the proverbial new leaf and actively embracing a human security curriculum or program is not only not accepted by some; the debate over whether human security represents a new paradigm is far from over within the field. As Jean Krasno noted in her discussion of teaching in the field, "the "I"s (international law and international relations) have it. In many political science departments, making provision for these subjects is challenging enough"(Krasno, 2002; Maliniak, Peterson, & Tierney, 2012). MacFarlane reiterates this with reference to the Canadian Consortium on Human Security webpage (no longer active) in his 2006 history of human security; "The national security paradigm [with its focus on protecting the state] continues to dominate international relations teaching… (CCHS, 2004b; MacFarlane & Khong, 2006)." The ongoing dominance of traditional ways of looking at the international system, it would seem, remains entrenched. The economic, environmental, and societal aspects of a human security program often fall to the side in the rush to fulfill the standard curriculum in political science and international relations(Scheffran, Brzoska, Kominek, Link, & Schilling, 2012).

Not only is the traditional approach deeply rooted but moving further afield. Arlene Tickner, in her examination of teaching of Latin American International Relations, suggests that traditional approaches to international relations teaching are now prevalent in Latin American universities(Tickner, 2003, 2009). This is also apparent in North American countries as well particularly, if one looks to Mexico. In other parts of the world as well there is more interest in the basic "international relations" curriculum and less so in a more abstract presentation of the world. Elsewhere in the world, the influx of tradition approaches to international relations teaching is also affected by local conditions (Acharya & Buzan, 2009). One example of this is Southeast Asia where Chong notes that basic international relations theory scholarship is dominated by Realism in large part – Is this outlook also reflected in the classroom(Chong & Hamilton-Hart, 2009)?

2. Paradigm Debates, Rationales and Definitions - Setting the Foundation for Human Security Programs

Paradigms of the international system are central to the study of international relations. Some scholars are not prepared to adopt new paradigms in their pedagogy and curriculum. Consequently for university professors, the development of human security programs is critically connected to the rationale for human security. Why would faculty be drawn to a human security program or teach a course on the subject? Certainly one of the key considerations in this regard is the level of

government support that was currently available in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Another is the attractiveness of the theoretical perspectives to faculty. Faculty could additionally be drawn to human security by the definitional clarity in this field. This section of the paper seeks to set out some of these factors in the discussion.

The Canadian government funded a series of programs on human security in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007). These include efforts to address questions of governance, public safety and conflict prevention(Foreign Affairs Canada, 2004). In addition to these programs, the Liberal government continued to support the linking of academics and practitioners through organizations such as the Canadian Consortium on Human Security(CCHS, 2004a). In more recent times however, the institutional support that human security programs enjoyed in the past has not been there – particularly under the premiership of Prime Minister Stephen Harper (2006-2015) – Harper wanted all references to the term expunged from foreign ministry documents in 2009 (Chapnick & Kukucha, 2016). The human security program was subject to the political winds in Canada's capital, Ottawa. In 2015, the Liberal Party under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau came to power: preliminary indications are that this may lead to new support for human security programs(Hanlon & Christie, 2016).

Part of the rationale and attraction of teaching human security also came from understanding a theoretical standpoint. At the same time, the theorists who think about human security are very much of the view that we are not yet there in terms of ascribing anything other than the sovereignty of the nation state as the principle guardian of an individual's human security(Bedeski, 2007). Bedeski, among others, recognizes that contemporary moral universalism, as he terms it, the notion of a broader "brotherhood of man" does not yet have the power to sway the entire human population(Bedeski, 2007). He envisages a "Global Commonwealth" that would eventually fulfill this function(Bedeski, 2007). The world however does not have that level of guarantee – and clearly in 2016 this seems further away than ever. Instead the theorists of human security are left looking for other schema and plans that would detail their requirements for human security.

Amongst the core theoretical underpinnings of human security is the notion of the freedom from war. That states are not wracked with ongoing international and intra-national or interstate wars is fundamental to the idea of human security. Definitions also include other ideas as well. The view of the ICISS was very clearly that there should be a broader conceptualization of security

> The meaning and scope of security have become much broader since the UN Charter was signed in 1945. Human security means the security of people – their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and

fundamental freedoms. (International Development Research Centre (IDRC) & International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty(ICISS), 2004).

For Evans, Sahnoun and Annan, the notion of human security focuses on the perfectibility of human beings. Addressing the basic issues of protection are critical first steps in the bigger project of building human societies and ultimately civilization; this is the essence of the Millennium Development Program. Humanity can then proceed along a road towards a better future(Clarke & Feeny, 2013).

Evans, Sahnoun and the Commission also recognized the new nature of international relations. The "old world" was a planet where nation-states were the key actors - this has been replaced by a world that is abundantly populated with many different actors. These include a whole series of small and large organizations. Noticeable by their rise has been the numerous and very diverse non-governmental organizations that continue to flourish in the shadow of the United Nations(International Development Research Centre (IDRC) & International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty(ICISS), 2004). Many of those are well known to most contemporary readers of international relations due to their media profile(International Development Research Centre (IDRC) & International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty(ICISS), 2004). The other critical change that has come out of recent years is the evolution of the security environment. Key to the definition of human security is the considered view that this is no longer the era of the Cold War and Nation States – in 2017, it would appear the nation-state is reasserting its place on much of the stage, but the nature of warfare remains asymmetrical. Warfare in contemporary times is much more localized and power is no longer simply in the hands of the state. As a result of the perceived changing nature of international relations, the Commission was of the view that human security was indivisible. One part of the world cannot simply be written off (International Development Research Centre (IDRC) & International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty(ICISS), 2004).

Definition remains elusive and evermore dubious as a rationale in the minds of those scholars and instructors who are critical of human security. Other scholars and practitioners views underline the muddiness of the concept. Once it is looked at more closely, it emerges that there is more than one way to examine the concept. Waisová is reflective of a group that see human security as simply the brainchild of the Canadian and the Norwegian ministries of foreign affairs and their foreign affairs elites, and it is something that not even they are in agreement about (Waisová, 2003). Edson, in a recent and very comprehensive bibliography of the subject matter, is crystal clear that the term is far from being subject to a common definition,

> There is as of yet, no definitive or agreed upon definition. "Human security" is still being defined. I also wish to present some critical assessment of this material for it is not profitable to embark on the fine analysis of a definition unless we have decided on the purpose for which the definition is wanted. (Edson, 2003)

Further to this question of definition, the issue of the connection between debates about the lexicon and the actual use of human security definitions in the field is a critical question to examine. One of the contemporary challenges in terms of human security studies remains the lack of empirical studies using the term from the field (Murdie, 2014; Paris, 2001). Tanaka advocates for a broader framework of human security (Tanaka, 2015b). He closely links it to work in human development and argues cogently that the absence of empirical studies marks the point where efforts in advancing a human security agenda are at their weakest (Tanaka, 2015a; United Nations Development Programme & United Nations Publications, 2015). Some efforts have been made in this direction (Adger et al., 2014; Elliott & Anthony, 2013; Scheffran et al., 2012). As Newman notes, as well, some regions of the world (i.e. Asia) are the "hardest" empirical test of human security policy (Newman, 2016).

Despite broad contentious definitions, the need for human security studies is clear. It certainly poses challenges in the definitional and theoretical sense. The lack of agreed upon definitions is critical in the establishment of a discipline or area of study. Many of the issues that would be addressed under the rubric of human security would also be looked at under the subject of other programs. For example, Global Studies and Peace Studies are two programs that would have substantially similar course offerings (The Peace Education Centre of Teacher's College of Columbia University, 2004). Similarly, Peace and Conflict Studies would be other area in which there might be a conflict of programs (University of Waterloo & Conrad Grebel College, 2010). Human Rights programs are yet an additional area in which there is substantial overlap. The development of overlapping fields clearly suggests a problem in the establishment of "new" human security programs. Some of the challenges with this will be looked at more fully in the next section of the paper.

3. Obstacles: Entrenched Approaches, Interdisciplinary Problems, and the Human Security on the Outside

Turning now to pedagogy and curriculum, the key questions remain. How do human security programs conform to existing norms and ways in which international relations teaching is defined grosso modo in the contemporary environment and how do they define themselves differently? The

blunt response is with challenges. There are several obstacles in the way of widespread adoption of a human security curriculum. Firstly, existing international relations programs are well entrenched and growing within the university system. Moreover, moving programs in the direction of a human security curriculum is also a matter of attitudes towards interdisciplinarity and overcoming the hurdles to a wide-angle approach to human security questions. Lastly, the experience of university researchers and practitioners setting up Human Rights programs shows some of the tangible challenges to those who are proponents of human security programs.

A glance at contemporary university departments of political science, history and the plethora of interdisciplinary programs springing up around North America and Europe is enough to suggest that expanding with yet another new approach to teaching the international system is at the best tenuous, notwithstanding Hyun's defense of transdisciplinarity(Hyun, 2011). The long time residents of academia, political science and history take the lions' share of resources and personnel. In surveys of international relations departments and the research agendas of professors, Malinak, et al's data also shows the paucity of professors who have human security as principal to their research – instead international political economy, international security and international theory are more dominant(Maliniak et al., 2012).

Already well-established departments also extend to their students socialization to their own field perpetuating the disciplinary divides. The culture of undergraduate and graduate learning is very much oriented towards what Kolb terms disciplinary homogenization(Becher, Trowler, & Society for Research into Higher Education, 2001). Not only do established departments provide socialization for students and complications for the way in which human security programs are received, but these departments are also in expansion. As noted in the introduction, Anne Tickner's discussion of the expansion of international relations programs in Latin America in the early 2000s provides a critical look at this(Tickner, 2003). One of the junctures that she highlighted that is significant in Latin American teaching was the low level of applicability of contemporary American ways of conceptualizing the international system. Tickner also underlined the different factors that have an impact on the teaching of international studies in the Latin American region. Furthermore, Tickner highlighted the problems of international relations becoming a viable field of study in Brazil due to the monopoly of control on foreign affairs by the Brazilian foreign ministry(Tickner, 2003)! One of Tickner's main points clearly illustrates some of the hurdles that human security studies would need to overcome to gain a toehold in the Americas;

> Classical interpretations of IR thus account for 68.5 percent of the texts included in the IR theory course syllabi. This result suggests not only that the teaching of IR theory in Latin America is fashioned largely after U.S. IR, but also, that IR theory courses in the region fail to treat non-classical approaches on equal footing and fall short of being ‘‘international’’ in scope(Tickner, 2003).

It is clear then that the existing way of doing things remains persuasive and a daunting obstacle to human security programs.

Human security programs not only face obstacles from expanding and entrenched disciplines, but also from the attitudes towards interdisciplinary studies. As Henry and Augsburg note, political risk is perpetual with interdisciplinary studies programs(Augsburg & Henry, 2009). Those who have attempted to establish interdisciplinary studies programs in other fields and in International Relations have encountered problems that the supporters of human security studies are facing in contemporary times(Yetiv, 2011). The efforts of those involved in the development of a global studies curriculum are representative of many. Roscow notes early on that established disciplines have influence in terms of appointments and the running of departments(Roscow, 2003). The balance of forces in a university, unless benevolently enlightened, is very much against the establishment of interdisciplinary programs. Roscow again notes that the faculty members of established departments sit on the committees that approve the creation of new departments. Critical here as well is the notion that human security, like the disciplines that Roscow discusses, is overtly political in a way that the traditional disciplines are not. A “Department of Political Science” and a “Department of History” can putatively provide a degree of neutrality, objectivity, discretion, grace, and granite like permanence that often politicized programs like “Global Studies, Interdisciplinary Studies, and Human Security Studies” cannot(Roscow, 2003).

The politics of interdisciplinarity also strikes at the heart of human security studies in a very real sense as all disciplines go through waves of what Henry calls “disciplinary hegemony” and efforts to co-opt, absorb, regularize and normalize interdisciplinary experiments(Henry, 2005). Additionally, as the energy of any department is closely focused on teaching, research and significantly, effective grantsmanship, they can be sideswiped by these efforts(Augsburg & Henry, 2009). Teaching human security is much more challenging when the limits of that teaching are being tested at the departmental level by the different researchers involved in the program. There is a distinction to be drawn between disciplinary departments where the primary object of interest is in more or less agreement by the entire faculty and those departments that are much less centrally oriented. One of the critiques of interdisciplinarity is the question of “cosmetic interdisciplinarity.” In his analysis of the question,

Dan Sperber, Director of Research at the Centre Nationale de Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in Paris, grapples with the question of researchers that come together, but don't really have a clearly interdisciplinary focus. He laments the lack of funding for interdisciplinary teaching and training(Sperber, 2004). Sperber's view is that grant committees should go with proposals that are slightly less interdisciplinary, but stronger in terms of their potential. This is better than proposals that are interdisciplinary in name only and weaker(Sperber, 2004).

The problems of establishing new interdisciplinary programs such as human security are not simply a matter of curriculum and definition; rather new and politically charged courses of study are also limited by physical considerations. Long set-up departments have a lock on office space, classroom availability and many of the facilities that make students more interested in their programs. Very deep challenges exist for new departments attempting to break into that matrix. Both Adams and Becher also demonstrate the ability of groups of academics to become very entrenched in terms of the departmental system that they foster(Becher et al., 2001). Funding for new faculty office space is often non-existent. Hence new programs are often placed in far from ideal locations on campus, if they are "on campus" at all. For a full discussion of academic spaces, see Coulson, Taylor, et al's works(Coulson, Roberts, & Taylor, 2014, 2015)

4. Paradigm Shifts: Existing Programs and the Experience of Human Rights Programs

While the expansion of human security programs comes up against questions of interdisciplinarity, a critical examination of existing programs and Human Rights programs also reveals some of the unique challenges that administrators and sponsors of these programs continue to face. One of the challenges that appeared at the outset was government centric sponsorship of human security programs in academia. Another was the distribution of these programs worldwide. Lastly, the McMaster University Human Rights theme school provides examples of other problems uniquely linked to this type of school.

Canadian Government Sponsorship and Programs

A brief glance at the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs website in the early 2000s was sufficient to illustrate the depth of government involvement in this field – not simply because it is an important policy option, but also in the sense of being a supporter of higher education in this subfield(Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2004). While government funding for human security research and teaching was critically important to emergent scholarship and innovation,

particularly so in the social sciences, it did not provide a stable long-term footing for these programs(Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2004; Evaluation Division (ZIE), 2007). Additionally, there was less than flourishing external support in the private sector for post-secondary programs in human security. Understandably this was in part due to the recent development of human security and the ways in which human security had an impact.

In more recent times, with changing administrations in Canada, funding for human security has mostly dried up. Consequently, many of the ongoing programs exist only in other Western states and have institutional anchors that have withstood the changing political winds. The worldwide spread of human security programs is however increasing. Amongst their number, can be included Harvard University's Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR), Royal Roads University, and the Institute for Human Security was formally established at The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy(Harvard University & T.H. Chan School of Public Health, 2016) (Royal Roads University & Humanitarian Studies Program, 2016; Tufts University & The Fletcher School, 2016). In Canada, human security courses have been taught at a variety of institutions including; Canadian Forces College, Toronto, the University of British Columbia and the Université de Québec à Montréal among several others(CCHS, 2016; Dorn, 2001) Another location in the United States is the Center for Unconventional Security Affairs at the University of California, Irvine(Center for Unconventional Security Affairs & University of California Irvine, 2016). In Norway, Denmark and amongst other European states, there has been a focus on the problems of human security in Europe, notably at the Universitetet i Tromsø (the University of Tromso) with Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv among others(Gjørv, Bazely, Goloviznina, & Tanentzap, 2013; Human Security Prosjektet, 2004). Aarhus University in Denmark has recently developed a M.Sc. program in the field(Aarhus University, 2016). One other very important node of human security studies dating back to the early 2000s is to be found in Japan(Martin & Owen, 2014). Increasing human security studies in other parts of the world is an important priority.

The Experience of Human Rights Programs

Human Rights programs have a longer track record than human security programs and can give an excellent window into some of the challenges unique to these fields. The establishment of the first human rights programs took place in the early 1970s. At this time, the first generation of descendants of the Holocaust survivors came to positions of influence in the academy(Perl, 2012; Totten, Bartrop, & Jacobs, 2004). The role of these instructors was to make students critically analyze and develop an

awareness of oppression. They were also taught to question the institutions in their lives(Meintjes, 1997). Several issues came up in the establishment of these programs. They included questions of what content to include in the program. Human rights programs are interdisciplinary by nature(Steiner, 2002). What subjects should be included in this type of program and where is a human rights program "at home" in a university(Maran, 1997)? Certainly, the past had a most important bearing on the development of these programs, consequently including history was an absolute requirement(Apsel, 2011). One of the stages of genocide has been described as the dehumanization of people one step at a time (Stanton, 2016). This also speaks to basic attitudes and the issue of ignorance(Totten, 2004b). A human rights curriculum then must shine a strong light on ignorance(Eisner, 2002; Totten, 2004b). The critical questions continue and, as Totten notes, they are for both the instructor and the student(Totten, 2004a). There is also an issue of ethical philosophy. The system of values that individuals adhere to have a critical role to play in the development of this type of program(Geddes, Roth, & Simon, 2009).

McMaster University Human Rights Program

This type of school and these types of questions also came with the opening of the McMaster University theme school in International Justice and Human Rights in the early 1990s as Rhoda Howard-Hassman has recorded in her work(Howard, 1997). This school aimed to address the questions of human rights and international relations in such a way that would allow the students who completed the program to have a greater awareness of the applicability of Human Rights versus the cynicism that had been previously inculcated by preceding generations when required to address human rights questions(Howard, 1997). As the directors of the school worked to establish their program they set out to get an agreed upon number of themes(Howard, 1997). Another issue that was raised and difficult to deal with in the interdisciplinary context was the scheduling of classes. Many of the schedules across faculties did not line up allowing for students to take the classes that they wanted to take(Howard, 1997). Clearly, scheduling and the challenge of fitting in with existing programming echoes earlier discussions of interdisciplinarity and established fields.

Consequently, there are many challenges that appear simply in the setting up of a human rights program that provide lessons to human security programs. To standardize their approach human rights program directors established a basic undergraduate schedule of core courses. Courses were established but often were one-time events. In the case of McMaster, courses in comparative genocide were taught(Howard, 1997). Another issue that became apparent in the case of faculty was the variety of different levels of knowledge that the faculty had(Howard, 1997). Establishing a definitive

curriculum along with a path to further studies was a challenging but worthwhile goal.

One of the areas in which the McMaster curriculum excelled was through oral participation(Howard, 1997). This provided invaluable skills for students, as they quickly became proficient public speakers. Many of these skills, in addition to the writing skills, would serve them well later in life. The McMaster program also stressed the hands-on nature of human rights learning. This might have valuable consequences for future programs in the field of human security. Graduates of human rights studies programs have gone on to careers in law as well as other fields that play a role in the judgment of human rights cases.

5. Human Security Studies and the direction of Higher Education

The challenge for supporters of human security programs and interdisciplinarity is to continue to make what they teach relevant in the real world. Western higher education is perhaps heading in a direction that is in many ways different to that of human security and approaches to teaching international relations are continually buffeted by outside influences. Modern mass culture, while somewhat sympathetic to the issues of failed states and needs of their citizenry, is simply not invested in these issues. Witness the ongoing peripatetic attention paid to some of the world's worst humanitarian crises in contemporary times. Some North Americans still are hard pressed to locate these crises on a map of the world. In this last section of the paper, the question of the direction of higher education will be examined.

Human security studies face additional outside influences above and beyond the ability of educated people to place world crises on a map particularly if they are to flourish in universities. Contemporary Western academic culture has seen great growth in some aspects of the university at the expense of others. Former Harvard dean Harry Lewis questions the future of liberal studies in the academy(Lewis, 2007). His concerns are well taken. Elsewhere, US Statistics on growth in undergraduate teaching in the early 2000s are very interesting and arguably representative of broader trends in the academy. In the period between 1971 and 2001 in the United States there has been an inversion in terms of the numbers of students studying in fields related to human security. In 1971, of the 839,730 degrees awarded in institutions covered in US Census Bureau Statistical Abstract of the United States, 114,729 were in the field of business and management. Education and social sciences were the other two main contenders coming in at 176,307 and 155,324 degrees respectively. By 2001, there had been a sea change. Business degrees had soared to 265,746 while social sciences had declined to 128,036 and Education had similarly declined to 105,566. The statistics in 2008 continue

to reflect this trend – twenty-one percent of all bachelors' degrees were in business, marketing and allied fields, while social science degrees (under which human security programs would fit) constituted nine percent and education seven percent of all degrees awarded. The growth continues in other programs, but not in human security programs(United States & Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008). This is not to say that the numbers of students in the related fields has not gone up; rather it has increased at a much slower rate than has been the case of business and allied fields(United States Census Bureau, 2003). These figures represent a substantial and ongoing challenge to those who would be supporters of expanding human security studies in higher education.

6. Conclusion

It is clear from the forgoing that human security programs, and the provision of a more prominent place in the international relations curriculum, continue to have a long way to go in 2017 in North America and Western Europe. There are a large number of logistical and other obstacles to this kind of program. Most fundamental of these is obviously the question of definition. There also remains a significant degree of disagreement as to what is the best way of conceptualizing human security. Is definitional solidity necessary? Many would argue that we should "let a thousand flowers bloom." This is perhaps one direction, but it seems much more logical to maintain some sort of disciplinary boundary around the question of what constitutes human security.

That being the case, there is also the question of prevailing academic cultures. It is clear to this author that developing anything beyond the traditional departmental and disciplinary structure will require a significant degree of effort. The observations of Roscow are instructive in this manner. Moreover, the nuts and bolts of establishing a new department or program take time, the cooperation of others and money. It is also difficult to find the time that can be put into establishing new programs. The key element of money is often missing.

Lastly, the changing nature of university curricula and programs continue to be an important problem in the development of human security programs. In the contemporary world, social science programs remain under pressure from programs in the area of applied and professional studies, such as business administration.

The development of more human security programs in higher education remains a critical goal. The challenges to this goal are surmountable, but only with time, patience and an eye to outcomes. The end result will be a better world, not only for human security graduates, but also for generations to come. It is most importantly that longer-term future that we need to be concerned about.

References

Aarhus University. (2016). Human Security. Retrieved from http://kandidat.au.dk/en/humansecurity/.

Acharya, A., & Buzan, B. (Eds.). (2009). Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives On and Beyond Asia: Taylor & Francis.

Adger, W. N., Pulhin, J. M., Barnett, J., Dabelko, G. D., Hovelsrud, G. K., Levy, M., . . . Tarazona, M. (2014). Chapter 12: Human Security. In Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Ed.), Climate Change 2014 – Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Regional Aspects: (pp. 755-791). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Akuffo, E. A. (2016). Canadian Foreign Policy in Africa: Regional Approaches to Peace, Security, and Development: Taylor & Francis.

Apsel, J. (2011). Educating a New Generation: The Model of the "Genocide and Human Rights University Program". Human Rights Review, 12(4), 465-486.

Asante, M. K., Miike, Y., & Yin, J. (2014). The Global Intercultural Communication Reader: Taylor & Francis.

Augsburg, T., & Henry, S. (2009). The Politics of Interdisciplinary Studies: Essays on Transformations in American Undergraduate Programs: McFarland, Incorporated Publishers.

Becher, T., Trowler, P., & Society for Research into Higher Education. (2001). Academic Tribes and Territories: Intellectual Enquiry and the Cultures of Disciplines. London: Open University Press.

Bedeski, R. E. (2007). Human Security and the Chinese State: Historical Transformations and the Modern Quest for Sovereignty: Taylor & Francis.

Bertrand, J. L., & Lee, J.-Y. (2012). Teaching International Relations to a Multicultural Classroom. International Journal of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education, 24(1), 128-133.

CCHS. (2004a). Homepage. Retrieved from http://www.humansecurity.info/CCHS_web/Home/en/,

CCHS. (2004b). What Is Human Security? Retrieved from (no longer available online) http://www.humansecurity.info/CCHS_web/About_Human_Security/en/ index.php,

CCHS. (2016). Teaching Human Security - Canadian Consortium on Human Security. Retrieved from http://humansecurity.moonfruit.com/ - /teaching-human-security/4527270214

Center for Unconventional Security Affairs, & University of California Irvine. (2016). About CUSA Center for Unconventional Security Affairs. Retrieved from http://www.cusa.uci.edu/about-cusa/.

Chapnick, A., & Kukucha, C. J. (2016). The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy: Parliament, Politics, and Canada's Global Posture: UBC Press.

Chong, A., & Hamilton-Hart, N. (2009). Teaching international relations in Southeast Asia: historical memory, academic context, and politics–an introduction. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 9(1), 1-18.

Clarke, M., & Feeny, S. (2013). Millennium Development Goals: Looking Beyond 2015: Taylor & Francis.

Coulson, J., Roberts, P., & Taylor, I. (2014). University Trends: Contemporary Campus Design: Routledge.

Coulson, J., Roberts, P., & Taylor, I. (2015). The future of the campus: Architecture and master planning trends. Perspectives: Policy and Practice in Higher Education, 19(4), 116-121.

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. (2004). Human Security Site. Retrieved from http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/menu-en.asp

Dorn, W. (2001). Human security: An overview. Retrieved from http://walterdorn.net/23-human-security-an-overview

Edson, S. (2003). Human Security: An Extended And Annotated International Biography. Retrieved from http://www.neilarya.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/HumanSecurity.pdf

Eisner, E. W. (2002). The educational imagination: on the design and evaluation of school programs: Merril Prentice Hall.

Elliott, L. M., & Anthony, M. C. (2013). Human Security and Climate Change in Southeast Asia: Managing Risk and Resilience: Routledge.

Evaluation Division (ZIE). (2007). Canadian Consortium On Human Security: Formative Evaluation. Retrieved from http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/oig-

Falk, R. (2007). Academic Freedom under Siege. International Studies Perspectives, 8(4), 369-375.

Foreign Affairs Canada. (2004). "Human Security Program: Project Profiles," Retrieved from http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/psh_projects-en.asp

Geddes, J., Roth, J., & Simon, J. (2009). The Double Binds of Ethics after the Holocaust: Salvaging the Fragments: Palgrave Macmillan US.

Gjørv, G. H., Bazely, D., Goloviznina, M., & Tanentzap, A. (2013). Environmental and Human Security in the Arctic: Routledge.

Hanlon, R. J., & Christie, K. (2016). Freedom from Fear, Freedom from Want: An Introduction to Human Security: University of Toronto Press, Higher Education Division.

Harvard School of Public Health. (2002) Comparison of Human Security Definitions. Vol. 2004. Cambridge: Harvard School of Public Health.

Harvard University, & T.H. Chan School of Public Health. (2016). Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research. Retrieved from http://www.hpcrresearch.org

Henry, S. (2005). Disciplinary hegemony meets interdisciplinary ascendancy: Can interdisciplinary/integrative studies survive, and, if so, how? Issues in integrative studies, 23, 1-37.

Holsti, K. J. (1985). The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory: Allen & Unwin.

Horn, L., Rubin, O., & Schouenborg, L. (2016). Undead Pedagogy: How a Zombie Simulation Can Contribute to Teaching International Relations. International Studies Perspectives, 17, 187-201.

Howard, R. (1997). Curriculum Development for an Interdisciplinary Minor - Human Rights Education for the Twenty-First Century. In G. Andrepoulos, R. Claude, & Anonymous (Eds.), Human Rights Education for the Twenty-First Century. Philadephia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Human Security Prosjektet. (2004). Norwegian Human Security Project. Retrieved from http://uit.no/statsvitenskap/humansecurity/

Hyun, E. (2011). Transdisciplinary higher education curriculum: a complicated cultural artifact. Research in Higher Education Journal, 11, 1.

International Development Research Centre (IDRC), & International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty(ICISS). (2004). The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty Ottawa: International Development Research Centre(IDRC).

Internet Archive Wayback Machine. (2011). Peace Education Center at Teacher's College at Columbia University Retrieved from "The page cannot be found."

Krasno, J. (2002). US Colleges and Universities are Not Meeting Student Demands International Relations Curriculum Challenges New Haven: Academic Council on the United Nations System.

Larsen, M. A. (2008). North American insecurities, fears and anxieties: educational implications. Comparative Education, 44(3), 265-278.

Lewis, H. (2007). Excellence Without a Soul: Does Liberal Education Have a Future? : PublicAffairs.

MacFarlane, S. N., & Khong, Y. F. (2006). Human Security and the UN: A Critical History: Indiana University Press.

Maliniak, D., Peterson, S., & Tierney, M. J. (2012). TRIP around the world: Teaching, research, and policy views of international relations faculty in 20 countries. Report, The Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations, The College of William and Mary, VA.

Maran, R. (1997). Teaching Human Rights in the Universities: Paradoxes and Prospects. In G. Andreopoulos & R. Claude (Eds.), Human Rights Education for the Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Martin, M., & Owen, T. (2014). Routledge Handbook of Human Security: Taylor & Francis.

Mathews, J. T. (1989). Redefining Security. Foreign Affairs, 68(2), 162-177.

Meintjes, G. (1997). Human Rights Education as Empowerment: Reflections on Pedagogy. In G. Andrepoulos, R. Claude, & Anonymous (Eds.) (Eds.), Human Rights Education for the Twenty-First Century. Philadephia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Murdie, A. (2014). Help Or Harm: The Human Security Effects of International NGOs: Stanford University Press.

Newman, E. (2016). The Challenging of Human Security Policy Making. In W. T. Tow, D. Walton, & R. Kersten (Eds.), New Approaches to Human Security in the Asia-Pacific: China, Japan and Australia. Oxford: Taylor & Francis.

Niblett, R. (2017). Liberalism in Retreat. Foreign Affairs, 96(1), 17-24.

Paris, R. (2001). Human Security Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? International Security,, 26(2).

Patrick, S. M. (2017). Trump and World Order. Foreign Affairs, 96(2), 52-57.

Perl, S. (2012). On Austrian Soil: Teaching Those I Was Taught to Hate: State University of New York Press.

Prasirtsuk, K. (2009). Teaching international relations in Thailand: status and prospects. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 9(1), 83-105.

Roscow, S. J. (2003). Towards an anti-disciplinary Global Studies. International Studies Perspectives, 4(Fall 2003).

Royal Roads University, & Humanitarian Studies Program. (2016). Program Description | Royal Roads University Victoria, BC. Retrieved from http://www.royalroads.ca/prospective-students/ma-human-security-and-peacebuilding/overview

Sato, Y. (2016). Human Security and Disaster: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake. In W. T. Tow, D. Walton, & R. Kersten (Eds.), New Approaches to Human Security in the Asia-Pacific: China, Japan and Australia. Oxford: Taylor & Francis.

Scheffran, J., Brzoska, M., Kominek, J., Link, P. M., & Schilling, J. (2012). Climate change and violent conflict. Science(Washington), 336(6083), 869-871.

Schmidt, B. (1998). The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations. Albany: SUNY Press.

Sperber, D. (2004). Why Rethink Interdisciplinarity?," Rethinking Interdisciplinarity. Retrieved from http://www.interdisciplines.org

Stanton, G. (2016). Genocide Watch: The Ten Stages of Genocide. Retrieved from http://genocidewatch.org/genocide/ten

Steiner, H. J. (2002). The University's Critical Role in the Human Rights Movement Essay Section: Pedagogy and Human Rights. Harvard Human Rights Journal, 15, 317-328.

Stienstra, D. (2000). Cutting to Gender: Teaching Gender in International Relations. International Studies Perspectives, 1(3), 233-244.

Tadjbakhsh, S., & Chenoy, A. (2007). Human Security: Concepts and Implications: Taylor & Francis.

Takasu, Y. (2012). Mainstreaming Human Security in the Global Agenda. Journal of Human Security Studies, 1(1), 2-7.

Tanaka, A. (2015a). Human Security: A stronger framework for a more secure future | Human Development Reports. Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-security-stronger-framework-more-secure-future.

Tanaka, A. (2015b). Toward a Theory of Human Security. JICA Research Institute Working Paper. Japanese International Cooperation Agency Research Institute. Tokyo.

The Peace Education Centre of Teacher's College of Columbia University. (2004). Peace Education. Retrieved from http://www.teacherscollege.edu/PeaceEd/philosophy.htm

Tickner, A. (2003). Hearing Latin American Voices in International Relations Studies. International Studies Perspectives, 4(4), 325-350.

Tickner, A. (2009). Latin America: Still policy dependent after all these years? In A. B. Tickner & O. Wæver (Eds.), International relations scholarship around the world: Worlding beyond the West. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Totten, S. (2004a). Issues of Rationale: Teaching about Genocide. In S. Totten (Ed.), Teaching about Genocide: Issues, Approaches, and Resources. Greenwich, Connecticut: Information Age Publishing.

Totten, S. (2004b). Teaching about Genocide: Issues, Approaches, and Resources: Information Age Publishers.

Totten, S., Bartrop, P. R., & Jacobs, S. L. (2004). Teaching about the Holocaust: Essays by College and University Teachers: Praeger.

Tow, W. T., Walton, D., & Kersten, R. (Eds.). (2016). New Approaches to Human Security in the Asia-Pacific: China, Japan and Australia. Oxford: Taylor & Francis.

Tsuda, Y. (2014). The Hegemony of English and Strategies for Linguistic Pluralism: Proposing the Ecology of Language Paradigm. In M. K. Asante, Y. Miike, & J. Yin (Eds.), The Global Intercultural Communication Reader. Oxford: Taylor and Francis.

Tufts University, & The Fletcher School. (2016). Institute for Human Security | Tufts Fletcher School. Retrieved from http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Institute-for-Human-Security

United Nations Development Programme, & United Nations Publications. (2015). Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development: United Nations Publications.

United States, & Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2008). Occupational projections and training data: U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

United States Census Bureau. (2003). Table 301. Bachelor's Degrees Earned by Field: 1971 to 2001. Statistical Abstract of the United States. Retrieved from http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-03.html

University of Waterloo, & Conrad Grebel College. (2010). About Peace and Conflict Studies | Peace and Conflict Studies. Retrieved from https://uwaterloo.ca/peace-conflict-studies/about-peace-and-conflict-studies

Van Ginkel, H., & Newman, E. (1999). In Quest of" Human Security". Japan Review of International Affairs, 14(1), 59-82.

Waever, O. (2005). The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations. International Organization, 52(04), 687-727. doi:doi:null

Waisová, Ŝ. (2003). Human Security -the Contemporary Paradigm? European Review of International Affairs, 20, 58-72.

Yetiv, S. (2011). History, international relations, and integrated approaches: thinking about greater interdisciplinarity. International Studies Perspectives, 12(2), 94-118.

Journal of Human Security Studies
Vol.6, No.1. pp.38-65

Articulating Risk(s): Economic and Demographic Challenges in A Nuclear Town

Tarek Katramiz[1]

Abstract

This article investigates the risks and human insecurities existing in the local community of Omaezaki City, where the Hamaoka nuclear power plant (NPP) is located. While it had not been physically affected by the events of 3.11 triple disaster, the Omaezaki community was faced with unanticipated crisis. In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear meltdown, the operation at the Hamaoka NPP was suspended and has since remained so, upon a request from the government on 9 May 2011. To many local residents, including the municipality and pro-nuclear lobbyists in Omaezaki, the suspension was a *source of disruption* in their everyday lives. This qualitative research based on multiple rounds of fieldworks examines the complexity of risk(s) understanding among local residents beyond the bipolar pro/anti nuclear framework. A key concern is how local residents articulate nuclear risk in the context of everyday life. At this local level, pro-nuclear attitudes are being shaped in a climate of mounting economic and demographic uncertainties. The paper discusses aspects of human security in a developed country by focusing on these uncertainties existing long before the Fukushima nuclear disaster.

Keywords: risk, nuclear power, ageing, host community, Hamaoka, human security

1. Introduction

While the aftermath of the 3.11 triple disaster still looms large over Japan, it has triggered a different, unanticipated crisis for some communities not living in the vicinity of the Fukushima Daichi NPP. Around four hundred kilometers away, in the City of Omaezaki (Omaezaki-shi) — located in Shizuoka Prefecture, at the tip of the Omaezaki Peninsula on Japan's Pacific coast — local residents were suddenly faced with a dilemma that touched upon the survival of their own community. The residents of Omaezaki did not experience any of the horrifying sequence of events on 11 March 2011. There was no tsunami and no radiation fallout from Fukushima, despite the brief panic among local green-tea farmers and fishermen in Shizuoka prefecture over the slightly higher measurements of radioactive cesium in their local products following the disaster. Omaezaki, where challenges of depopulation and of weak economic foundations are chronic, is not however any other traditional fishing and farming locality in rural Japan. In a strikingly similar setting to Okuma and Futaba towns where the Fukushima Daichi NPP is located, Omaezaki hosts the Hamaoka NPP, operated by Chubu

[1] Ph.D. Candidate, Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University.

Electric Power Company (Chuden) since 1976.

In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, the operation at the Hamaoka NPP was suspended and has since remained so, upon a request from the government on 9 May 2011. The decision was based on the possibility that an earthquake of 8.0 magnitude or higher might hit the Tokai region within the next 30 years (*BBC*, 9 May 2011). This sudden attention from the government was not limited to the Hamaoka NPP, as all of Japan's fifty nuclear reactors were closed, and/or their operations suspended for maintenance and safety inspection, within a year following the disaster.

To many Omaezaki residents, including the municipality and pro-nuclear lobbyists, the suspension of the Hamaoka NPP was a *source of disruption* in their everyday lives. While the Fukushima nuclear disaster suddenly highlighted the danger of living in the shadow of a nuclear facility, the immediate threat seemed to stem more from the widespread uncertainty caused by the suspended nuclear industry, on which the community has been structurally dependent for decades. In other words, local residents realized how vulnerable their lives have been and still are now more than ever. As one resident told me, "I am worried about living near the [Hamaoka] plant, but I will be even more worried if the plant is not restarted soon."

Furthermore, the central government's decision made this local community a topic for conversation and media attention at both the national and international level. Besides highlighting the role of anti-nuclear activists emerging inside and around Omaezaki, national media intently focused on the municipality's mayoral election in April 2012, which was presented as a battle between an anti-nuclear candidate and the pro-nuclear incumbent (*Asahi Shinbun*, 16 April 2012). However, framing of this sort poses an underlying problem. It significantly excludes the ordinary local resident who is caught between opposite campaigns and has to *make a decision* (such as, voting for a specific candidate) *under risk(s) and uncertainty(s)*. Therefore, not only the voices of the anti-nuclear activists, but also those of local residents and pro-nuclear lobbyists, are equally significant in order to contextualize the rigid dichotomy of being 'for' or 'against' the nuclear program. In particular, the anxious and uncertain voices of local residents who still support pro-nuclear politicians after the Fukushima disaster deserve our attention.

The aim of this paper is to explain the different and complex risk understandings of residents living in close proximity to the NPP. In the late 1970s, the Hamaoka community embraced nuclear power somewhat willingly, hoping for better and improved living standards. After the operation of the nuclear facility began, the majority of the local residents rarely questioned the industry or opposed its potential hazards. That being said, I do not argue that the majority of residents were ignorant of the risks that it posed. Rather, they were more concerned with pursuing the demands of their everyday

lives.

While the nuclear risk, *invisible* in the past, has become *visible* in the wake of the Fukushima disaster, many residents living near the plant still downplay its potential threat and continue to support the restart of the nuclear facility. What is it that is blurring the risk of living in the shadow of the nuclear facility? The answer to this question lies within the social reality of the community, within the articulation of other risks significantly affecting the course of everyday life. In particular, socio-economic risks that have persisted long before the Fukushima disaster are playing out and competing against the risk of a nuclear failure.

In this paper, I make use of some of the qualitative data collected for an ongoing research project in the local community of Omaezaki City where the Hamaoka NPP is located. Local residents' accounts provide a powerful and detailed critique of current thinking in national nuclear policy and debate. In particular, they demonstrate how the current debate on nuclear power revolving around a pro and against rhetoric is too simplistic, failing to capture the complexities locals face in their decision making process.

Furthermore, I intend to demonstrate how national or economic interests have been prioritized over people's security, or human security. Through its analytical perspective that focuses upon the conditions for "informed decisions" (Kaldor 2007; Lautensach and Lautensach 2013), the notion of human security is helpful in order to closely examine the source of threat — a nuclear accident — against a vast array of concerns which dictate the life of ordinary citizen. Human security (Commission on Human Security 2003, 4) is indeed defined "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. […] It means creating political, social, environmental, economic […] systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity." What is noteworthy in this definition is the shift from a state security perspective to an individual human security one. Human security is achieved when individuals, presented with multiple equally realistic choices, can be considered free in their decision making-process.

In this study on risk(s) articulations in a post-Fukushima context, I found that local residents cannot be always consumed by a probable nuclear accident. This perspective of human security thus offers an explanation as to why residents are ignorant of the apparent threat of the nuclear failure. For the pursuit of energy resources, the nuclear industry began constructing NPPs, exploiting socio-economic vulnerabilities in host communities (Bacon and Hobson, 2014). Lacking viable alternatives, communities tend to accept more readily hosting NPPs that offer sources of revenues and employment opportunities, if less in the plant itself than in secondary industries such as construction and services.

Even after the Fukushima meltdown, the community maintains its support while many local residents stay silent so that their livelihoods will not deteriorate. The Fukushima disaster has only helped us identify these long existing issues. Human security deals with the manner in which the weak confronts the limited choices in their life.

2. Components of Risk(s) Understanding

The ubiquity of risks has become a feature of modern life. As Ulrich Beck analyses in *Risk Society*, "[risk] is a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself. Risks, as opposed to older dangers, are consequences which relate to the threatening force of modernization and its globalization of doubt" (Beck 1992, 21). It could be argued that Japan has become an example of a risk society; it is organized around the distribution of wealth, products and goods, but is also increasingly organized around risks. The Japanese nuclear energy program is a case in point that calls attention to this paradox. The nuclear technology has extensively contributed to the economic growth and yet it has always involved a great amount of risks and uncertainties.

However, this stage of modernity defined by risk is beyond the capacity of the ordinary citizen to manage. According to Beck, the process of *individualization* involves the privatization of risks in ways that affect residents' everyday lives on a large scope. In other words, within individualization, each individual is held responsible to choose among multiple risks, while simultaneously remaining dependent on conditions beyond his/her control (Lupton 1999, 70). Individuals, therefore, have no choice but to retreat into self-protection and constant negotiation among multiple insecurities. This leads to decision-making behaviors that are dictated by *future* issues rather than the present ones at hand, affecting the conduct of everyday life. Consequently, residents are caught in a complex chain of causes and effects, and are increasingly incapable of recognizing the consequences of their own action with certainty. Even when the decision for action *is* their own, they are likely to be left with insecurity, as they do not fully control the impact of their own choices.

Risk research on communities hosting NPPs found that proximity is associated with higher levels of support for the nuclear industry (Eiser *et al*., 1995). The usual explanation is that the perceived economic benefits brought to a host community shape the attitude of the community towards the nuclear industry, especially if that community is economically a marginalized one (Blower and Leroy, 1994). In line with the above-mentioned studies, my research has found that economic benefits indeed play a significant role in shaping the attitudes towards the local nuclear industry. However, as I will

show below, supporting or opposing a NPP is not simply a decision made by the individual based merely on economic calculations.

Furthermore, before discussing risk understandings among local residents in a host community, it is important to point out the difference in responses generated in host and neighboring communities of areas where NPPs are located.[2] Local communities located in a close proximity to nuclear facilities have different responses according to their geographical, administrative and economic ties to the nuclear industry. The distinction between direct or hosting communities and neighboring communities is thus crucial in order to understand the discrepancy in the local response.[3] While the host community and neighboring localities similarly share the risk of exposure to a nuclear catastrophe, it is only the former that continues to support the nuclear program after the Fukushima accident, while the latter have become increasingly opposed to the industry. This shows how the economic incentives, among other factors, play a powerful role in shaping the attitudes of such communities in regard to nuclear energy.[4]

Host communities do receive billions of yen in new facilities that also create jobs and better infrastructure. However, recent research suggests that individual economic benefits are mixed and the per capita income coming from hosting NPPs has been various (Ando 2012). A host community cannot therefore be considered as one entity with a homogeneous response to the nuclear threat. This important point is often lost in the discussion regarding the attitudes of host communities, particularly in the way it is often framed as a unilateral relation between a incentive-provider (government and nuclear industry) and a incentive-recipient (host community).

Moreover, reactions to economic incentives vary according to individuals' biographies and priorities. Other factors thus play an equally important role within the informants' decision-making process: population shrinkage, and social pressures among others. Therefore, This paper emphasizes the importance of paying attention to the attitudes of local residents living in a close proximity to a NPP, rather than to the general public and the response of local government officials. In particular, analyzing the concerns local residents voice and how such concerns shape the decision-making

[2] The Japanese government cannot ignore the changing responses of such communities hosting NPPs as they play a role in the decision-making process surrounding the operation of the NPPs. Indeed, electric companies like TEPCO and Chuden must seek the approval of local communities and local officials (town councils and mayors) for nuclear restarts and future siting of new nuclear reactors. These local representatives can potentially use a veto power in the decision making process for nuclear restarts (Hymans 2011, 154).

[3] Direct host communities are the villages, towns and cities directly connected to Japan's nuclear program. Host communities receive vast economic rewards (jobs, tax revenues, subsidies, among others) for accommodating nuclear facilities. Neighboring communities are located in a close proximity to nuclear facilities yet they receive far less benefits from hosting nuclear facilities. One may argue that the position adopted by neighboring communities tends to correspond to the national view on nuclear power as the NPPs have less bearing upon their livelihood (Aldrich 2013, 263)

[4] Ibid.

process for voting in local elections is of great significance for understanding the situation of nuclear host communities around Japan.

The various components for understanding how local residents come to terms with the fact that they are exposed to risk are a result of specific social, economic, geographical, historical and political characteristics (Bickerstadd, 2004). The necessity to combine this array of factors in order to reach an understanding of risk perception is neatly summed up in Elyes *et al*.'s statement:

> "Risk is now widely recognized to be socially constructed; appraisal and management are determined by people's place in the world and how they see and act in the world. All ideas about the world are in fact rooted in experience and different forms of social organization and their underlying value systems will influence risk perceptions" (1993, 282).

It is indeed through constant interactions with his or her environment that an individual builds his or her own risk understanding. Essential components such as local context and place are intertwined with people' values and identities. This means that an important part of risk perception revolves around the role of the individual and the way the individual articulates his or her vision of this role. Examining people's "risk biographies" and risk perception in the context of everyday life is thus necessary in risk research (Tulloch and Lupton, 2003).

3. Nuclear Power in the Economic Life of the Local Community

The host communities did not suddenly discover with the Fukushima accident that nuclear power reactors are high-risk facilities. They always knew that hosting a nuclear reactor comes with a cost. This is why a range of financial incentives is offered to them, in the form of compensations, in return for accepting such a facility. One informant put it very bluntly:

> Why would [Chubu Electric] give money and compensation if there was no risk? There was always risk [at the Hamaoka NPP]. The Fukushima accident is when this risk was actualized. There is no reason to complain.

For host communities, accepting the potential threat(s) to their safety therefore represents the cost, while the nuclear-related subsidies are the benefit. The host communities are aware of this cost-benefit balance since the installment of the first reactor in their backyard. However, the absence of

major accidents prior to 2011 has attenuated the visibility of the cost. In other words, local residents failed to see the nuclear risk posed by such a facility in their everyday life. The Fukushima accident has highlighted a facility that suddenly appeared risky, shifting the outlooks of local residents in regards to the nuclear power plants.

On the host community level, where the concern of this research lies, benefits brought by a NPP are two fold. First, it creates employment. This is an important benefit for marginalized rural areas that face stagnant economy and unstable employment rate. The plant provides employment not only during its construction, but also during normal operation and maintenance. Secondly, economic benefit comes from financial incentives that are provided to the prefectures, cities, and towns that host NPPs. The Three Power Source Development Laws ensure that municipal budgets are significantly improved for communities accepting to host NPPs.[5] Besides subsidies based on these laws, financial incentives include various taxes related to property, local corporations, nuclear fuel and spent fuel.[6] Donations are another important benefit that communities receive for hosting NPPs.[7] These incentives contribute to the local government financially, while employment entails greater economic impact. With the depreciation of NPPs, however, financial incentives do not guarantee permanent stability, since annual values from fixed-assets taxes will fall annually. This creates what activists from civil society call a "cycle of addiction" (Hasegawa 2004, 26): the taxes and side contributions coming from the facilities create dependency in host communities. The community will lose the subsidies if local politicians opposed the operation of the nuclear facility. This will cause local politicians to either decrease public spending on local infrastructure and services, or increase local taxes. Moreover, in addition to the benefits from the public sector, host communities receive enormous financial and physical contributions from power utility companies. Thus, a NPP generates much more than electricity. It creates jobs, business, municipal revenue, and charitable donations. It is a source of local employment and, over the years, becomes a source of local identity for better or worse.

As the main cost of hosting a nuclear power plant affects primarily the immediate local area, the

[5] To facilitate siting new projects or adding new reactors to the ones already in operation, the Japanese government passed the Three Power Source Development Laws system (*dengen sanpo*) in 1974, aiming at subsidizing local municipalities willing to host nuclear facilities. The new system provided a powerful incentive as it produced a flow of cash by requiring all Japanese power consumers to pay a tax that was funneled to hosting communities. This played a major role in promoting and developing nuclear power as an alternative to oil.

[6] According to the Agency of Natural Resources and Energy (2010), the sum of national subsidies passed to local communities hosting nuclear facilities reached 44.9 billion yen during the construction period (that usually lasts 10 years). The same agency estimates an extra 76.6 billion yen that would be channeled to the local governments during the operation of the nuclear facilities over at least 35 years.

[7] Donations are given on an irregular basis and usually are not disclosed to the public. The Asahi Shimbun (2016) reported that Chubu donated a total of 3 billion yen to the Sakura District Council in Hamaoka-cho over two decades (1969-1989). The same newspaper (2011) reported that TEPCO paid 39.7 billion yen in donations since 1990 to the municipalities hosting its four NPPs.

benefits are particularly high for the hosting community. As a result, host communities rely considerably on the nuclear plant's local and regional socioeconomic benefits. When the government announces the suspension of a NPP, not much consideration is given to the impact this decision would entail on the local area. For example, the Hamaoka community realizes that the possible closure of the nuclear plant can cause much more than a decline in tax revenues. In particular, the local community has to confront the socio-economic impacts of the plant's suspension and possible closure. In the event of a plant closure, the host community will be left on its own. It would have to find alternative resources to replace the good-paying jobs that would leave the area, the municipal revenue that would drop and the major economic engine.

Moreover, the community will have to deal with many social challenges that would result from such a decision. Rapid depopulation and the weakening of the community's social fabric are some of the deep-running concerns that influence the decision-making process among residents. For many residents who have been coexisting with the physical presence of the plant for a period that spans a generation, the threat of closure appears therefore more disruptive to the economic and social life of the whole community than a potential nuclear threat.

3.1 Voicing Economic Concerns

How do local residents perceive this risk in terms of the economy? All informants, including those who have clear anti-nuclear stance, admit that economic concerns weight heavily. Mr. Igarashi[8] (50s), who runs a small and old-looking hostel in Omaezaki-cho, does not receive any benefit from the nuclear industry and have recently become opposed to the nuclear industry. Yet, he is particularly concerned about how the municipality would cope in the event of a shutdown and the implications it would have on his business.

> I don't know how the municipality is going to function if the plant is closed. I didn't know that the city depends so much on nuclear revenues until last year [2011]. People around here are saying that we would have to pay more taxes… I really hope we won't. This place [his hostel] has not been doing well recently and my family and I are barely getting by.

Mr. Igarashi's account indicates a state of uncertainty that came up amidst an already difficult

[8] To maintain confidentiality, the informants' names have been changed.

time for his business. While he did not benefit from the plant nor paid attention to the nuclear risk in the past, he feels suddenly exposed to the reality of the current municipality that heavily depends on the nuclear industry. He says that he feels "things will get worse in the future" and that he is only looking forward to the day his son completes his university studies and becomes financially independent.

Mrs. Sugiyama (40s) is a single mother who works as a district nurse in the town. She explains that what happened in Fukushima changed her views about the NPP. "If I have the choice, I would not opt for a restart. But when I think about the city budget, I fear unexpected outcome." Depending on the city budget for her livelihood, Mrs. Sugiyama is worried that the shutdown of the nuclear station will negatively affect her income. "My two children and I live off one salary. I cannot imagine what would happen if I lose it." She says that her life has been going through a rough patch since the death of her husband:

> My husband and I had a salary that enabled us to lead a decent life. Now that he passed away, my salary is barely enough to meet the needs of my two children and myself. Since his death, I have been in a state of insecurity trying to keep my head above water. With the recent nuclear issue, we [medical staff] have been told that the budget might be reduced.

Mrs. Sugiyama explains that she suddenly found herself on her own, fully responsible for the welfare of her sons. "I never thought seriously about it [NPP]," she adds. A medical worker like Mrs. Sugiyama is personally threatened by any potential austerity measures resulting from the shutdown of the Hamaoka NPP. Similarly to Mr. Igarashi, who did not notice the nuclear risk in the past, she is overwhelmed by the socioeconomic risk looming on her personal security. Mrs. Sugiyama is probably not the only medical staff that is facing such dilemmas. Moreover, when it comes to the public sector, the municipality funds the salaries not only of medical staff but also of fire department personnel and other public service employees, including kindergarten and elementary school teachers.

Both accounts do not stress the significance of the nuclear risk as much as the future impact on personal lives. In this sense, it shows how residents face a risk that is multifaceted and constantly changing, and therefore have to consider the multiple short and long-term effects of their decisions. This situation reaffirms the way Giddens describes risk society as "a society increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which generate the notion of risk." (Giddens 1999, 2).

Mr. Iwata (76), a retired teacher who lives in Hamaoka-cho, explains how many public sector workers have traditionally been part of the middle class and have been enjoying relatively secure

employment conditions that would be negatively affected by any potential structural reform measures. He adds,

> Actually things have been deteriorating for over a decade now… The merger with Omaezaki-cho resulted in a reduction of jobs in public service, so that new ones did not replace retired people like me.

When asked how could the municipality face financial troubles when it had received generous revenues over the years, Mr. Iwata critically replies:

> Local officials have gotten used to public spending in a wasteful manner. They always spend money on public projects like roads and other things that don't generate any profit. They [officials] rarely work on creating some sort of sustainable alternatives and people just discovered the problem.

While the lack of alternatives in the past has undoubtedly made the municipality heavily dependent on the nuclear industry, local residents have become aware of this unhealthy dependency and started looking for a solution in order to reverse the situation. Attracting other industrial companies to the area, however, is not an easy task and has proved unsuccessful in the past.[9]

As shown above, despite not benefitting from the nuclear industry, many informants are aware of the uncertainty surrounding the future of their locality in the event of a permanent shutdown of the Hamaoka NPP. While becoming opposed to the restart of the NPP in the wake of the Fukushima disaster, many residents seem to be constrained by time and resources and therefore to not see the nuclear risk separately from the reality of everyday life.

3.2 Direct Operational Impacts

In Omaezaki, the Hamaoka NPP provides a sizable number of permanent and full-time jobs. According to the data provided by the municipality's website (Oct. 2010), there were 765 people directly employed full time by Chubu Electric prior to the suspension. Most of those employed have skills specific to the nuclear industry, while others have management and supervisory responsibilities. 41% of the employees were from Omaezaki City while the rest were employed from neighboring

[9] New industries tend to be small in size compared to the nuclear industry. For example, Idemitsu Kosan's liquid crystal plant started operation in 2006. This plant is a relatively small operation, hiring only 20 people, so its impact on the local economy is small. One drawback is that it is far from Shinkansen bullet train station and the Tomei Highway interchanges (interviews 2012).

cities: Kakegawa, Makinohara, Kikugawa, and other areas in Japan. Additionally, there were 2.502 people employed by subcontractors at the same facility. The workforce provided by subcontractors varies in size depending on factors such as the construction of a new reactor, the scale of operation and the frequency of inspection activities.

Because many of these jobs require specialized skills, wages tend to be above averages. Residents who work at the plant therefore maintain relatively better living standards; many can achieve home ownership and, above all, enjoy a good social status among their peers in the community. As mentioned above, not all employees come from the area. The highly specialized nature of the nuclear industry requires skilled workforce that cannot be provided by a small area like Omaezaki. Therefore, other regions help supply the needs of the plant.

During the fieldwork in Hamaoka, I managed to conduct an interview with one resident who is directly employed by the Chubu Electric. Hoping to avoid the official narrative usually provided by the corporate's public relations division, I asked the informant to meet me outside his office environment. The interview took place in a casual setting at a coffee shop in Hamaoka, over the weekend.

Born in Hamaoka, Mr. Tamura (45) lives with his family in a house 2 km away from the plant. One might think that he and his family are constantly worried about their safety. "We are not worried at all", he says, and adds, "It is something we have gotten used to." A civil engineering major, Mr. Tamura has been working at the Hamaoka NPP since 1995. "I'm extremely lucky to have found such a good job and stable income in this area", he says. Mr. Tamura looks indeed very satisfied. Unlike many local people who still have to some extent a laborious lifestyle that comes from living in rural Japan, my informant has the look of an urban middle-age man that one could encounter in any big city. "My work is stressful so I am glad to be living in the countryside. I can relax after work", he says. He complains though that there are not many recreational activities available in the area, and says that he usually takes his family to Kakegawa City or Shizuoka City for fun on weekends. "Our town is far from everything and not everyone can have a stable job like me. My friends moved out after high school in search of jobs and never came back. Now they visit once a year to see their families during the New Year holiday. They always tell me how jealous they are of my position." It is not very common to meet highly educated, relatively young people in the area. The nuclear industry is one of few places that still attract people like Mr. Tamura to stay.

Being familiar with the operation of the nuclear plant, he and his wife have always spoken positively of the benefits of nuclear energy. When asked about his opinion on the Fukushima meltdown, Mr. Tamura declares, "the accident should not have happened. Nuclear energy

is not supposed to inflict such pain on people's lives." Living and working in a similar environment, he understands well how it feels to experience such a catastrophe not only from the position of the nuclear industry but also as a local resident living with his family in the immediate vicinity. Yet Mr. Tamura thinks that the Hamaoka plant should be restarted once the new security measures come into effect. "I think I will be made redundant if the plant closes down. Although I will receive a small payout, it won't be very much, and my wife and I are worried because we bought our house 10 years ago. I need my salary to pay my mortgage installments."

Asking Mr. Tamura if local life has undergone changes since the suspension of the nuclear facility, he says that nothing much has changed and life is the same for almost everyone. The suspension of the plant created different kinds of jobs related to inspection activities and the construction of the embankment. In other words, the Fukushima disaster and the subsequent suspension of the Hamaoka facility did not cause major disruption in the local employment sector according to him. He admits though that the suspension increased the sense of uncertainty about the future among local residents. It was thus disruptive in the sense that more people started worrying about the future. He tells me how suddenly the local community became divided in regards to the nuclear facility, but yet hopes that people will support the restart of the nuclear plant eventually.

This account shed a particular light on some of the concerns and positions of those directly employed by the nuclear industry. Despite his positive attitude, Mr. Tamura's awareness of being caught in the cycle of dependency created by the nuclear industry is apparent. Ultimately, his justification for supporting a restart comes down to the greater risk of losing a good job and his relatively confortable lifestyle.

3.3 Secondary Operational Impacts

The Hamaoka NPP also contributes indirectly to the creation of jobs in the region when relying on local and regional contractors. In what follows, I will show how three local residents rely on the operation of the Hamaoka NPP, and how the threat of the shutdown looms negatively on what they have come to know as the normal conduct of everyday life. The decision to interview these residents was based purely on their willingness to talk to a stranger; I had no prior knowledge of their links to the NPP. However, it turned out that all of them had something to say about how their lives had been affected, for better or worse, by them hosting a NPP in their backyard.

Mrs. Yamamoto

Mrs. Yamamoto (50s) owns an inn with a capacity of around 20 clients located in the vicinity of

the Hamaoka NPP. It is not the only inn of the kind but hers is one of the closest, being only around 2 km from the NPP. Relying mainly on clients affiliated with the nuclear facilities, she managed to turn her small family property into a good business 20 years ago. During the operation of the plant, her hotel relied on technicians, engineers and businessmen coming from big cities like Tokyo and Osaka. Today, following the Fukushima disaster and the subsequent suspension of the Hamaoka NPP, Mrs. Yamamoto is uncertain about the future. She has no alternative business plan for her hotel in case the NPP is pushed toward a shutdown. For the time being, however, the suspension of the NPP has not yet badly affected Mrs. Yamamoto's business. The hotel has been quite busy with clients of different purposes: journalists, professionals and workers involved in the building of the tide embankment. "I live in confusion and so does everyone in this town", she tells me.

I start with Mrs. Yamamoto's narrative because it captures the uncertainties residents whose livelihoods indirectly depend on the nuclear industry face on a daily basis. Mrs. Yamamoto has one son (22) and one daughter (19). Her son did not continue his studies after finishing high school and decided instead to work with his mother running the inn business. Before 2011, they both were planning to expand the inn by building a small annex that would accommodate to the growing nuclear industry at the time. The plan was shelved amid the climate of uncertainty that emerged after the Fukushima disaster. As for the daughter, she had to move out from Omaezaki when she was accepted in an undergraduate program at Shizuoka University. When I ask Mrs. Yamamoto for which candidate she voted in the mayoral election conducted in the summer of 2012, she says: "I voted for Ishihara because he promised to restart the Hamaoka NPP. The other candidate was too radical and did not know what he was saying. You could argue that restarting Hamaoka is a wrong decision and I would agree with you. But let's not fool ourselves here. There are no other alternatives for now or in the near future." Mrs. Yamamoto thus justifies her political choice out of pragmatism. She believes that her business will not survive without the restart of the NPP. She tells me that she wishes there was a better alternative where clients would come to her hotel for other purposes. Then she adds:

> My business depends on this plant. I have been doing this job for 20 years and nothing bad had happened. Why would we suddenly stop now? Who is going to pay all the hefty monthly bills and my daughter's tuition fees? You know, it gives me a headache.

Mr. Tanaka

Mr. Tanaka (63) is the head of a family-run guesthouse in Hamaoka. The place is smaller than Mrs. Yamamoto's inn and looks rather old. After the construction of the NPP, a large number of people

would come and stay in the town for the regular facility inspection, but the town did not offer convenient accommodation facilities. Mr. Tanaka took this opportunity by opening the guesthouse in 1981. He proudly says that he established long-lasting friendships with his clients affiliated with the nuclear industry. He tells me that in the past, nothing came through this town except the diesel locomotive running between Fujieda and Fukuroi. The local residents including Mr. Tanaka had hopes of a prosperous town so they accepted hosting a NPP. Landowners sold their lands and those who did not want to establish their own businesses ended up receiving jobs and employment from Chubu Electric at the nuclear facility.

Mr. Tanaka's business relies mostly on the regular inspection activities at the Hamaoka NPP. Since the beginning of its operation, there have been regular inspections at the facility every six months. Every inspection would last for 90 days and a large number of workers would move in the town. Mr. Tanaka's guesthouse was bustling with people. The best time, according to him, was during the construction of unit 3 and the construction of unit 6, which came to a halt in 2011. Many workers were staying at his guesthouse during these two periods although he complained that the number of guests have decreased over the last 10 years. It is because of the reduction in the number of regular inspections and personnel following the shutdown of reactor 1 and 2. He also blames it on the creation of several new business hotels. At the moment, things are slightly better for his business with workers flowing the town again for the construction of the tide embankment.

During our conversation, Mr. Tanaka says that there are many residents like him whose livelihoods depend on the NPP. "After the construction of the plant, not only business hotels and guesthouses, but also gasoline stations, restaurants and bars started appearing in the small town." Takeda jokingly adds that at one point Hamaoka had the highest number of restaurant per capita. He admits, though, that the town economy is declining. He fears a sudden change that would bring unforeseeable consequences in his life.

Mr. Horikawa

Mr. Horikawa (56) runs a restaurant located in the vicinity of the Hamaoka NPP. As the restaurant depends on clients employed by the nuclear station, Mr. Horikawa believes that he will be facing troubles if the NPP is shut down permanently.

> Shutting down the power plant would not be an issue for people whose livelihoods are not dependent on the industry. Many people, including myself, support the power plant today because we are dependent on

it. With the suspension of the operation, the economic situation of this town is uncertain. I know for sure that my business would not survive unless the nuclear reactors are restarted.

The restaurant is Mr. Horikawa's only source of income. He tells me that it is not always profitable and he barely makes ends meet, particularly with increasing bills and expenses for his two sons who are high school students. To boost their business, Mr. Horikawa and his wife started preparing bento [lunchboxes] and offer catering services to the workers at the NPP.

In the event of a shutdown, my business will be negatively affected and I might have to find an alternative. I am turning 60 soon and I have no plan for retirement. I don't think I can start any new business at this point. You know, I have to keep a hold of what I've got.

These narratives highlight the perverse effects of the benefits brought by the NPP: they are seen by the residents as the sole and only resources they can count on to sustain a decent living. Therefore, to many residents whose livelihoods coexist with, and to a great extent, depend on this one single industry, the 2011 accident came with an acute feeling of powerlessness, of being unable to reinvent their life without the NPP. In other words, they see no other choice but to keep with the *status quo*.

The main risk the residents fear seems to be unemployment, or the prospect of a less decent job. This fear looms all the more darkly over their everyday life that the local area suffers from chronic economical issues that make the NPP a providential source of benefits within a profoundly distressed, economically and demographically affected landscape. In order to understand what is at stake in the community's everyday life, it is thus necessary to look at the broader context of a shrinking, aging society.

3.4 Persisting Economic Uncertainties

Despite the municipal revenues and the employment impact generated by the Hamaoka NPP, the area still fails to attract businesses and industries that would provide an alternative source of income and employment and decrease the dependence on the local nuclear industry. Indeed, despite the Hamaoka NPP, economic conditions are still difficult and Omaezaki City has a relatively low rate of

labor participation.[10] Moreover, jobs that offer low income and require physical labor do not attract young population. Young people retreat to migration when they do not find stable full-time jobs with fixed contracts and decent income. This problem, as it will be shown in the following section, in part leads to sustaining another chronic problem, i.e., population shrinkage.

In order to understand the economic struggle that the working age population of Omaezaki City is faced with, it is important to mention other employment sources in the area. For example, in small factories, many workers such as farm wives are on a part-time base. Lacking legal status, these workers, regardless of their skills, earn very little wages that do not exceed the legal minimum per hour. For small-scale farming families, the working pattern is usually characterized by elderly members working at the farm while the housewife works at a local factory and young members of the family working in bigger cities or for a local construction company. Some family members might have jobs in the public sector (town office or agricultural cooperative).

Moreover, real wages at such factories in the area continue to fall because of the cost competition with developing countries. Mr. Iwata, the retired high school teacher who lives in Hamaoka-cho, explains how a small clothing and textile subcontractor in the area announced plans to shift its supply route to a South Asian country. Families who were involved in the business appealed to the management to keep at least part of the production in the area. The management eventually agreed on the condition of lowering subcontract costs.

4. The Risk of An Aging Community

Aging and population shrinkage is a chronic problem that the community has been facing for over half a century. While the acceptance of the nuclear industry helped the community maintain the population intact at the time and even achieved growth in population number during the 1970s and 1980s — as will be shown below —, it has never brought the desired outcome on the long term; the community is still facing population shrinkage and aging. Despite the expansion of the nuclear facility (the 5th reactor started operation in the late 1990s), local population has indeed been experiencing renewed shrinkage since 2000 and Omaezaki's population lost around 4.000 persons, from a peak of 36.059 in 2000 to 32.433 in 2015 (see Figure 1).

[10] The participation rate is a measure of the active portion of an economy's labor force. The rate refers to the number of people who are either employed or are actively looking for work. During economic recession, many workers often stop looking for employment, resulting in a decrease in the participation rate. As of December 2012, labor participation rate was at 55.5 percent. This is lower than the prefectural and national rates of 57.5 percent and 58.50 percent respectively.



Figure 1. Population Trends from 2000 to 2040 in Omaezaki City[11].

Compared to other rural and urban areas facing depopulation in Japan, it could be argued that the drop in population in Omaezaki is not as substantial. However, it is not the actual numbers of the population per se, but the breakdown of the demographic pyramid that deserves our attention here (see Figure 2). As of 2015, residents aged over 65 constituted around 27% of the population, compared to less than 16% in the 1960s. This has many implications for the community: decreased working population; increased pressures on government to provide pensions; strain on the local government to provide adequate health care to support the elderly (i.e. care and medication); larger tax bills borne by the working population; and decreased rate of economic growth.

[11] Chart made by the author based on the data from the official statistics webpage of Omaezaki City (2015).



Figure 2. Population Structure in Omaezaki City (2016)[12].

These demographic challenges are therefore having a significant impact on the everyday life of the residents and the community as a whole. To juxtapose this risk against the probability of a nuclear failure, the former is more difficult to neglect than the latter, which has only recently amplified in the wake of the Fukushima disaster.

4.1 A Long History of Population Loss

In the 1960s and 1970s, both Hamaoka-cho and Omaezaki-cho were lagging behind compared to other towns in Shizuoka prefecture. Primary industry stopped becoming a sufficient source of livelihood and many locals started taking a second job to increase their quality of life. Hamaoka was losing around 300 young people every year as the lack of economic activity pushed many young people to urban areas (Lesbirel, 1998, 82). The community was facing an existential crisis as shrinkage was deepening and broadening at unprecedented rates. According to Matanle and Rausch, who tackled the issue of depopulation and ageing in *Japan's Shrinking Regions in the 21st Century: Contemporary Responses to Depopulation and Socioeconomic Decline*,

[12] Chart made by the author based on the data from the official statistics webpage of Omaezaki City (2016).

> Population shrinkage is multidimensional and is a process that normally occurs within a cumulative self-reinforcing pattern of depopulation, economic disruption, and social deterioration, the outcome of which is a renewed — if not strengthened and accelerated — cycle of the emptying of local communities, the gutting of local economies, collapse in local reserves of social and human capital, and a decline in the quality of life experienced by those who remain. (2011, 19)

For the community, population shrinkage is thus more than a demographic phenomenon, and is accompanied by the deterioration of the financial landscape and other foundations of the community. Two general factors are to blame for the population shrinkage: low fertility rate[13] and the out-migration of young people drawn to metropolitan areas.

The majority of the migrants go to metropolitan areas while some people migrate inside the same prefecture to urban centers such as Shizuoka City and Hamamatsu (Kiuchi, 1963). Once young people leave their villages and hometowns, very few return. There are many factors that cause this outmigration. First, differences in income levels between farmers and industrial workers influenced the outmigration of young people from a rural area such as Hamaoka-cho (Kakiuchi and Hasegawa, 1979, 47-61). Second, the rapid economic growth of the manufacturing, construction and service sectors created a demand for labor, and consequently the out-migration from rural regions accelerated, especially in isolated places like Hamaoka-cho and Omaezaki-cho.

Lack of income is not the only reason for the outmigration. Kakiuchi and Hasegawa (1979) reported that rural communities were increasingly worried about the lack of public services and facilities such as schools and hospitals. Both Hamaoka-cho and Omaezaki-cho lacked educational and transportation facilities, and were characterized with poor social environment. Town municipalities were facing such deteriorating socio-economic conditions that METI officials at the time designated the area as depopulating and underdeveloped. In Hamaoka, bad living conditions and the difficulty of maintaining public services are some of the memories that are still present in the psyche of the elderly generation. According to one farmer (70):

[13] As we know, low fertility rate is a national problem in Japan. A developed country would experience depopulation when the total fertility rate (TFR) – the average number of children born to woman over her lifetime – drops and remains below the population replacement level of 2.1 children per woman over a period of time. If TFR remains low over a prolonged period of time, depopulation eventually occurs as a result in a surplus of deaths over birth (Matanle and Rausch, 2011: 19). In the case of Japan, this phenomenon began following a brief baby boom phase between 1947 and 1949. While urban Japan's population has increased during the period of rapid industrialization, rural areas were rapidly facing a depopulation crisis. The total fertility rate was 3.65 in the 1950s, but has continuously declined to stand at 1.26 in 2005. As of 2015, the fertility rate stands at 1.41. According to a recent report by United Nations Development Program, the fertility rate in Japan is estimated to rise to 1.72 per woman in the next 30 years. However, this will remain below the replacement level of 2.1, which means that depopulation is expected to continue (UNDP, 2015). The fertility decline will add more pressures on Japan's rural communities.

> Life was very different back then and young people did not see any prospect in remaining. You look for jobs outside when your family does not own a land or at least a good business to take over in the future. Many of those who left Hamaoka were young. They would leave immediately after graduating from junior high or senior high schools. Only those who wanted to be farmers remained. I was one of them. But we were becoming a minority.

He tells me that before the construction of the NPP, many residents were becoming increasingly anxious about the lack of services, such as medical facilities, and the lack of cultural and social opportunities:

> The nearest dental clinic was in Kakegawa. It took more than an hour to get there at the time. Also, many people started comparing the area to other places they visited, and they would complain about not having social amenities and recreational opportunities like coffee shops or movie theaters.

4.2 Persisting Risks: the NPP in a Shrinking Locality

What is striking about a community like Omaezaki's today is that it continues to face the aging and depopulation-related problems that were at the core of the narratives justifying the installation of the NPP. In the late 1990s to 2010, local population was going through double-negative population disequilibrium. This pattern is characterized by both negative natural reproductive balance and continuing rural-urban migration (Matanle, 2010, 196). Out-migration among young adults reduces the aggregate reproductive capacity of the community and contributes to further population aging and shrinkage. In Omaezaki City, the largest proportionate population drop in the recent years has been among the 0-14 of age, which fell from 20% in 1990 to 13.2% in 2015 (See Figure 3).

Distribution of the Age Specific Population in Omaezaki (%)							
	1990	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035
0-14 years old	20	14.0	13.2	12.1	11.3	10.6	10.3
15-64	65.8	63.3	60.2	58.3	56.9	56.0	55.2
65 and over	14.2	22.7	26.6	29.6	31.9	33.4	34.5
75 and over	6.1	12.2	13.2	14.6	17.9	20.3	21.8

Figure 3. Distribution of the Age Specific Population (%) in Omaezaki City.[14]

On the other side of the demographic pyramid, the over-65 group has almost doubled, from 14.2% in 1990 to 26.6% in 2015, showing that Omaezaki has become an aging community. Moreover, Figure 1 demonstrated that population shrinkage is increasing. Since 2000, the rate of out-migration of 15- to 29- year olds has also accelerated due to the economic growth in the metropolitan areas. The population of Omaezaki declined by approximately 10% between 2000 and 2015.

Now, how do the residents perceive the implications of population shrinkage in their everyday lives, and how is this perception interacting with the risk of a nuclear failure? Nearly all informants mentioned ageing and population shrinkage as major risks their community is facing. Many are aware of the social and economic challenges this problem is already bringing to the community and how the shutdown of the NPP would further deteriorate the situation. Mr. Tanaka, hostel owner in Hamaoka, expressed the disadvantage of an aging community in very clear words:

> There are many old people around here. Even when it comes to the working force, a major portion is of men in their late 40s and 50s. Young people would work here only if there are stable and well-compensated jobs. The situation is not bad now but people fear their children would leave if good jobs become scarce. It is very similar to the situation in the 1960s when many young people left their families behind for better jobs. I think if this happens, this local area will be mostly older people who do not produce nor buy very much.

Mr. Tamura's account, despite being from an employee at the NPP, makes apparent the system of dependency hosting the NPP has created in Hamaoka:

> Employment is a central component of the local economy. I think many people are not comfortable with the nuclear [plant] here, but they know that there is no alternative for now. To oppose the NPP is like saying no to jobs and stability. It is like telling young people: "go away". I don't think people want to experience more hardship in their life… You know, some jobs offer so little pay that I personally know many people who are forced to take up two or three temporary jobs to increase their income.

Some residents, in particular the elderly, are paying close attention to the recent deterioration of

[14] Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR).

living conditions and the difficulty of maintaining public services. While busily working on his farm located 2 km away from the Hamaoka NPP, one farmer (76) hurriedly mentioned to me that doctors avoid staying in the area:

> I did not know that Chubu Electric contributes to medical facilities until I heard about it from my neighbor the other day. It is really nice facilities and all that but not many staff working there. Specialized doctors are gradually decreasing and many avoid working in this area. I suffer from rheumatism and have to regularly drive my car to a clinic in Kikugawa.

Furthermore, the level of education is significant in shaping out-migration of young people from Omaezaki. To many young people, this remote area does not live up to their expectations, especially after honing up their skills and knowledge at the university. The elderly farmer I talked to lamented that almost no one wants to work on farms. Only major employers like Chubu Electric still offer jobs attractive to the newly graduates.

Thus, nuclear power has a far-reaching impact on many aspects of the local economy. It is estimated that 42% of the city's revenues come from property taxes on the NPP and subsidies related to the facility. Besides public works on roads, schools and hospitals, sound finance means more jobs in the public service, which includes local agricultural cooperative, local administration and school teaching. For example, it is common for the eldest sons to enter the public sector if he is expected to take over the household farm or business. Such route, however, would be difficult if the city's finance decreased, which will bring in return more municipal rationalization measures.

Due to the suspension of the NPP in May 2011, the municipal assembly had to pass an extra budget bill in June of the same year to cut 600 million yen ($7.7 million) in spending (*Asashi Shimbun*, 11 July 2011). This meant fewer job openings in the public service than the previous year. One informant, a ramen shop owner in his 60s from Omaezaki, referred to the municipal merger as a case in point:

> The 2004 municipal merger resulted in a reduction of the jobs in the public service, as the city did not replace many retired officials. Also, the number decreased when some jobs moved to the new city office in the Hamaoka area [in reference to the location of the Omaezaki City office building]. There used to be more people moving here around lunchtime or in the evening when the old town building was still in use. Today

> the building is deserted and the city office does not care to send someone to mow the wild grass around the building.

As evidenced by these narratives and the preceding data, the population shrinkage has been one of the most urgent challenges for the community. Local residents have accepted hosting the nuclear facility more than four decades ago as an attempt to halt outmigration of young people. While the nuclear facility has ameliorated this unaddressed situation, it was not sufficient to wholly prevent it. The Fukushima accident occurred at a moment when the Hamaoka community was already caught up in a new wave of aging and population shrinkage. When discussing the possible shutdown of the Hamaoka NPP, the past experience of depopulation has become a point of reference for many residents, posing as a reminder of the bad consequences this phenomenon brings to the community.

Moreover, some of my informants referred to cases in other regions of Japan where communities have been struggling to regenerate their localities following the disappearance of a major industry. In this regard, the case of Kamaishi City in Iwate Prefecture is exemplary. Once called the "town of steel", Kamaishi played a major role in Japan's postwar economic growth as it hosted Kamaishi Works of the Nippon Steel Corporation. More than 20 years have passed since the steel mills were closed, and Kamaishi is still trying hard to attract manufacturing firms while promoting local foodstuff. The efforts proved fruitless as the city's population was halved from 87.000 people in 1960 to 43.000 people by 2005. The community is facing serious problems with population aging, as the share of elderly-single households was at 12.4% of the city's households in 2005 (Thompson, 2010). Mrs. Yamamoto, the inn owner, is afraid of a similar outcome:

> As long as there is no alternative, we cannot just simply oppose the nuclear facility and request its closure. What would be the alternative? Those who are running the municipality seem not to have a clue about what would keep this place [Omaezaki City] moving in the event of a shutdown. I think it will be hard for many people including myself, and I'm sure the media will call Hamaoka the new Kamaishi.

The archetypal case of Kamaishi thus acts as a point of reference to my informant. Yubari, a former coal-mining town in Hokkaido, is another example that demonstrates how the collapse of a major industry constitutes another factor of population shrinkage in Japan. Depopulation occurred in Yubari after the collapse of the mining industry and an attempt of restructuring the town into a touristic destination (coined: "*tanko kara kanko e*" – "from mines to tourism") resulted in a disappointing failure (Seaton, 2010). Mr. Iwata is a former high school teacher (76) who thinks the future of

Omaezaki would be better without the nuclear facility and believes that today is the right time to step up discussions on how to build a future without dependency. His position is explicitly based on taking into account a broader context than the immediate surrounding he lives in. He says:

> I think the town can survive without the nuclear facilities. I know many people who share the same view and many started thinking about developing the town without the plant. But also, unfortunately, many people still think that Omaezaki would be poor without the nuclear industry. There are examples from the past that support their arguments. Historically, when Japan changed its energy policy and shifted from coal to oil, many towns such as Yubari in Hokkaido, and other towns in Kyushu, were subsequently impoverished following the closing of coalmines.

The comparison with the case of Yubari is interesting: the locality is now well known for being one of the poorest in Japan. Mr. Iwata thus seems to acknowledge how such an example could represent a strong argument in favor of those supporting the Hamaoka NPP.

5. Conclusion

The ongoing predicament of Omaezaki is not simply a result of the tragic events that happened in the spring of 2011. These have only intensified an unaddressed situation that goes back to the 1960s, when Hamaoka emerged as the targeted site for the construction of the Hamaoka NPP (Lisberel, 1998). At the time, the dream of development, or "*machi-zukuri*" (town-making), was framed for local residents in terms of risks such as continuing depopulation and loss of identity, which were looming over the community larger than the risk of a nuclear failure. In the wake of Fukushima, the same risks have risen up to the surface once again, but this time with more intensity, due to the unprecedented nature of the nuclear accident. Such risks played out heavily in the decision-making process of the voters ahead of the mayoral election of 2012, in which local residents casted their vote to re-elect the pro-nuclear incumbent (on a 76.69% turnout).

It is important to note that this was not *only* a vote on the local nuclear program as the media and other outsiders tend to frame it. It was rather about *bringing life back to normal*. While most outsiders are justifiably spawning their criticisms against the post-Fukushima mismanagement by the closely tied nuclear industry and central government, the Hamaoka residents have still been unable to pay attention to such failures that are almost insignificant in comparison to the deep-running concerns of everyday lives. Ordinary citizens have to face more than the sole issue of a nuclear facility that

suddenly became *risky*. The realization that a risky nuclear facility was sitting in their backyard indeed happened amidst an array of grave economic and social insecurities.

Nuclear power has thus brought strong social and economic benefits to host communities, but also human insecurities produced by the complex nature of the technology. Long before the Fukushima nuclear disaster, the experts, with their objective discourses and technical skills, defined an official way of dealing with the nuclear risk. However, residents of host community cannot always act upon such prescriptions. On an individual level, risk is a multifaceted, constant and changing issue, operating on different levels, ranging from personal, familial, and emotional ones. In the language of human security, the development of nuclear power undermines the "freedom from fear" pillar due to high levels of anxiety directly affecting the psyche of residents in host communities. Moreover, it impairs "freedom to make an informed choice of one's own" (Commission on Human Security, 2003). Indeed, the Hamaoka residents have to consider the multiple, short and long-term risks, including a probable nuclear failure, in their everyday lives. Consequently, this multiplicity of risk(s) leads to a surge of incapacities and insecurities among individuals, which makes the possibility of exercising one's choice limited.

More than five years have passed since the catastrophe and the nuclear disaster at Fukushima is far from over. In Omaezaki, Chuden is still aiming at restarting the idled reactors of the Hamaoka NPP. Meanwhile, the municipality had its second mayoral election since 3.11. Interestingly, during the election campaign, each of the two candidates was willing to grant a restart, after consultation with local residents, if elected. While this mayoral election has received less attention from the media, this seemingly unanimous pro-nuclear stance still came as a surprise for outsiders, as articles failed to capture the whole picture and continued to focus on the nuclear power as a decisive local issue (*Mainichi Shimbun*, 8 April 2016, and *Shizuoka Shimbun*, 11 April 2016). When examining the Hamaoka NPP from afar, the nuclear risk may appear as unequivocally dominant over the other risks. However, when attempting to examine closely, from the viewpoint of the local residents, one starts seeing an array of other risks that lead to downplay the nuclear risk within the residents' understanding of their everyday lives.

Bibliography

Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. 2010. *Dengen Richi Seido no Gaiyou*. Tokyo: Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

Aldrich, Daniel P. 2013. “A normal accident or a sea-change? Nuclear host communities respond to the 3/11 disaster.” *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, Vol.14, No. 02: 261-276.

Asahi Shimbun. 2011. Municipal Assembly Passes an Extra Budget Bill to Cut 600 Million Yen in Spending. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ2011110716746/ (accessed on 11/22/2016).

Asahi Shimbun. 2011. TEPCO quietly paid 40 billion Yen to areas near nuclear plants. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/recovery/AJ2011091510558/ (accessed on 11/22/2016).

Asahi Shimbun. 2012. Mayor reelected in Host City of Hamaoka Nuclear Plant. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201204160048 (accessed on 11/22/2016).

Asahi Shimbun. 2016. Memo: Residents Received 3 Billion Yen to Host Hamaoka Nuclear Plant. http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201607210064.html (accessed on 11/22/2016).

Bacon, Paul, ed. 2014. Human Security and Japan’s Triple Disaster: *Responding to the 2011 earthquake, tsunami and Fukushima nuclear crisis*. New York: Routledge.

Beck, Ulrich. 1992. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage.

Bickerstaff, Karen. 2004. “Risk perception research: socio-cultural perspectives on the public experience of air pollution”. Environment International, Vol. 30, No. 17: 827-840.

Blowers, Andrew, and Pieter Leroy. 1994. “Power, Politics and Environmental Inequality: a Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Process of ‘Peripheralisation’”. Environmental Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2: 197-228.

Commission on Human Security. 2003. *Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People*, New York.

Eiser, J. Richard, Joop Pligt, and Russell Spears. 1995. *Nuclear neighborhoods: Community responses to reactor siting*. Exeter: University of Exeter Press.

Eyles, John, S. Martin Taylor, Jamie Baxter, Doug Sider, and Dennis Willms. 1993.“The social construction of risk in a rural community: Responses of local residents to the 1990 Hagersville (Ontario) tire fire”. *Risk Analysis*, Vol.13, No. 3: 281-290.

Giddens, Anthony. 1999. "Risk and responsibility." *The Modern Law Review*, Vol. 62, No. 1: 1-10.

Hasegawa, Koichi. 2004. *Constructing Civil Society in Japan: Voices of Environmental Movements*. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.

Hymans, Jacques EC. 2011. “Veto players, nuclear energy, and nonproliferation: domestic institutional barriers to a Japanese bomb.” *International Security,* Vol. 36, No. 2: 154- 189.

Kakiuchi, George. H., and Masami Hasegawa. 1979. “Recent trends in rural to urban migration in Japan: The problem of depopulation”. *Tohoku University Science Reports Series 7*. Vol. 29, No.1: 47-61.

Kaldor, Mary. 2007. Human security: *Reflections on globalization and intervention*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007.

Katramiz, Tarek. 2015. “Nuclear Power and Host Communities in Japan: An Inquiry into Human Insecurities”. *KEIO SFC Journal*, Vol.15 No.1 2015.

Kiuchi, Shinzo. 1963. “Recent Trends in Urban Geography in Japan”. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol.53, No. 1: 93-102.

Knight, John. 1994. “Rural Revitalization in Japan: Spirit of the Village and Taste of the Country”. *Asian Survey*, Vol.34: 634–646.

Lautensach, Alexander K., ed. 2013. Human security in world affairs: *Problems and opportunities*. Vienna**:** Caesarpress.

Lesbirel, Hayden. 1998. *NIMBY politics in Japan: Energy siting and the management of environmental conflict*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lupton, Deborah. 1999. *Risk*. London, New York: Routledge.

Mainichi Shimbun. 2016. Shizuoka, Omaezaki Mayoral Election: No debate on the nuclear issue as the two candidates are pronuclear. http://mainichi.jp/senkyo/articles/20160408/dde/041/010/037000c (accessed on 11/22/2016).

Matanle, Peter and Anthony S. Rausch. 2011. *Japan’s Shrinking Regions in the 21st Century: Contemporary Responses to Depopulation and Socioeconomic Decline*. New York: Cambria Press.

Matanle, Peter. 2010. “Coming Soon to a City Near You! Learning to Live ‘Beyond Growth’ in Japan’s Shrinking Regions”. *Social Science Japan Journal*, Vol.13, No. 2: 187-210.

Oguma, Eiji. 2011. “The Hidden Face of Disaster: 3.11, the Historical Structure and Future of Japan’s Northeast.” *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 31.

Seaton, Philip. 2010. “Depopulation and financial collapse in Yūbari: market forces, administrative folly, or a warning to others?” *Social Science Japan Journal*, Vol.13, No. 2: 227-240.

Shizuoka Shimbun. 2016. Omaezaki Mayoral Election: Popular Will is Swaying Between For and Against Nuclear Restart. http://www.at-s.com/news/article/politics/shizuoka/election/228598.html?news=227337/ (accessed on 11/22/2016).

Thompson, Christopher S. 2010. “The Study of Hope in Kamaishi”. *Social Science Japan Journal*, Vol. 13, No. 2: 241-247.

Tulloch, John, and Deborah Lupton. 2003. *Risk and everyday life*. London: Sage.

International Society for Educational Information. 1973. *Understanding Japan: Postwar Japanese Agriculture. 1973*. Tokyo: International Society for Educational Information, Inc., Bulletin 30, p. 98.

United Nations Population Divisions (UNPD), Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2015. *World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, Key Findings and Advanced Tables*. https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/Key_Findings_WPP_2015.pdf (accessed on 11/22/2016).

Journal of Human Security Studies
Vol.6, No.1. pp.66-85.

Is Ethnic Federalism a Viable Solution to Political Repression, Social Inequalities and Human Insecurities in Uganda?

Vick L. SSALI[1]

Abstract

While the partition of Africa is widely believed to have sowed seeds of disparity, the colonial policy of divide and rule sharpened ethnic loyalties and made the task of post-independence national integration more difficult. Since independence, many African countries have been torn apart by a vicious circle of repression and sharp cleavages arising from the centrifugal tendencies typical of plural societies. There have been coups and counter-coups as the so called 'liberators' soon resort to a cruel and severe control of real and imagined 'enemy' groups. This has been the trend in Uganda since 1966 when the first Prime Minister, Milton Obote, abrogated the first post-colonial constitution hardly 4 years after independence from Great Britain.

This paper looks at the possible role a federal system of government can play in combatting ethnic conflict, political repression and insecurity in Uganda. The paper draws from the research notes of my inquiry into the grassroots perceptions of ethnicity and federalism in Uganda. Can federalism as an organizing principle be a viable solution to political antagonism and the gross socio-economic and political horizontal inequalities Uganda is experiencing now? Can it also guarantee the peace and security of the ordinary people in their respective tribal areas? Views from conversations with selected samples of ordinary people in at least ten different tribal areas of the country reveal that ethnic federalism, a recognition of Uganda's indigenous peoples and their indigenous systems of governance, is seen as one possible way of restoring and guaranteeing accountability in national politics.

Keywords:
disparity, repression, cleavages, insecurity, federalism

1. Introduction: Background to the Problem.

Revolutions and coups in Uganda, as in many other African countries, are usually greeted with relief and enthusiasm in many parts of the country. Joy and relief however soon turn into mourning when the revolutionaries and self-styled liberators resort to a cruel and severe control of real and imagined "enemy" groups. On account of the centrifugal tendencies typical of plural societies, a vicious circle of repression and sharp cleavages emerges. This is usually followed by deep social and political divisions and inequalities, a breakdown in democracy, and a threat to human security. This

[1] Graduate student of Global Studies, Doshisha University.

trend can be attributed to three main causes: the legacy of the partition of Africa; the colonial policy of divide and rule; and the subsequent post-independence developments.

1.1 The Legacy of Partition

The European "Scramble for Africa" resulted in arbitrary and unlikely borders that still remain to this day. Pre-colonial Africans belonged to clearly-cut, free societies that sometimes lived in cooperation and sometimes in rivalry with each other. However, "while such societies differed from one another and changed over time, authority was usually vested in the representatives of their so-called 'segments' – families, clans, age groups, religious-cults – usually senior men."[2] The European partition of Africa took little or no account of such an arrangement that existed in the myriad of traditional African ethnic societies. Indeed the resultant national boundaries meant that today we have nations with tribes some of whose 'ethnic blood cousins' live in neighboring countries. The Luo tribes of northern and eastern Uganda, for instance, are linguistically closer to the Luo of western Kenya than to the Baganda of central Uganda, just as the latter are linguistically closer to the Banyamwezi of Tanzania.

These artificial borders may be seen as one of the causes of the severe violent conflicts, inequalities, human insecurities and other pathologies that African countries have suffered in the last half a century. It is also significant that the partition and the colonization processes "triggered off social-economic and cultural changes that had serious consequences for the political system."[3]

1.2 The consequences of divide and rule

Having created nations with arbitrary borders, the Europeans went on to instrumentally enhance and exploit (existing) ethnic blocks to promote political interests. In extreme cases such as Rwanda, two purported 'tribes' were created out of a people who had never before considered themselves different except for their occupational inequalities.

In the case of Uganda, it is known that even though ethnicities and group identities had existed and defined their unique statuses even before any encounter with British colonial rule, the seeds of instrumentalism were sown by the colonial masters. "While recognizing some broad ethnic affinities, in the majority of cases the British attempted to segregate Uganda's different ethnic communities."[4]

---

[2] Parker and Rathbone 2007, 28
[3] Mudoola 1993, 10
[4] Lancaster 2012, 17

For example, they ensured the disproportionate presence of Bantu[5] in administration. The Baganda[6] in particular received preferential treatment, and as a means of keeping them under control there was an equally disproportionate Nilotic and Sudanic presence within the armed forces.[7] This virtual north-south division of the country was further entrenched by the way economic life was organized in the colony. As Mamdani observes:

> "Building upon pre-colonial differences, Britain turned the southern part (Buganda, Busoga, and Ankole) into cash-crop growing areas. But cash-crop production was officially discouraged in northern areas (West Nile, Acholi, and Lango), and in Kigezi in the west which were developed as labor reserves, from whence were recruited not only soldiers and policemen but also workers for factories and plantations in the south. In the commercial sector, Britain encouraged the entry of thousands of migrants from India. Legally barred from owning land, they were purposely channeled into commerce."[8]

At the peak of colonial rule, therefore, while most of the emergent educated elite were southerners, especially Baganda, the Ugandan military disproportionately consisted of Nilotic and Sudanic tribesmen. "It became a colonial truism that a soldier must be a northerner, a civil servant a southerner, and a merchant an Asian"[9] This created an imbalance which "influenced the process of institution building with regional groups taking advantage of whatever political resources (were) available to them."[10] Thus, the way colonial rule was conducted in Uganda would make Ugandans put emphasis on their separate identities. It would also create a heightened ethnic awareness among them, which unfortunately was carried on into the struggle for independence, and which has complicated the problem of nation building over the years.

1.3 Post-independence political developments

A combination of local interethnic tensions and regional and international developments have influenced the post-independence political situation in Uganda. For example, there has been all along the influence of neocolonialism which has resulted in the grave institutional shortcomings that Uganda has experienced since independence. It can be argued, however, that the underlying tension has mainly

---

[5] Bantu literally means "The People", and refers to a race that migrated from West Africa and became the main inhabitants of Eastern and Southern Africa. Today, more than half the population of Uganda is made of Bantu tribes.
[6] The "Baganda" are the largest single ethnic group in Uganda, and they occupy the central part which is the ancient kingdom of Buganda.
[7] Mazrui 1975, 431-432
[8] Mamdani 1983, 10
[9] Ibid.
[10] Mudoola 1993, 15

been between the (ethnically based) federal framework, which was adopted at independence, and the unitary "nation building" policies pursued by leaders from Obote, at independence, to Museveni today.

While at independence Uganda had fifteen ethnicities that were represented at the 1961 – 1962 Lancaster Constitutional Conference[11] (See Figure1 below), only Buganda received full federal status. The other kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro and the territory of Busoga were only given semi-federal status, while the rest of the country with no traditional kingships was divided into administrative districts that were incorporated into independent Uganda on a unitary basis. The existence of these unequal power bases, particularly Buganda which was virtually a state within a state, weakened and threatened the central government, for "they represented poles of political and administrative power and authority that were in rivalry with the central government."[12]

Figure. 1 Post-independence political map of Uganda

On attaining power at independence, therefore, the first Prime Minister Obote chose to build himself up as the center of opposition to Buganda traditionalism. He employed the coercive power of the state, and he became increasingly dependent on the ethnic and regional loyalties in the army and police, another colonial legacy (see section 3.3 above). Obote's actions, including the abrogation of the independence constitution and the abolition of traditional kingdoms and all cultural institutions,

[11] The 1961 Constitutional Conference in London, which preceded the 1962 independence constitution.
[12] Mutiibwa 1992, 29

were largely informed by local interethnic tensions. So were the actions of Idi Amin after him. Human rights abuses, political repression, sectarian violence, and ethnic persecution all combined to jeopardize human security in Uganda during the long eight years of Amin's regime. When Amin's tyrannical regime fell to the combined force of Ugandan exiles and the Tanzanian army, Uganda was left ravaged, lawless and bankrupt. Probably the death toll during the regime will never be accurately known, with most estimates putting it between 250,000 and 500,000.

The post-Amin era (1979-2016) has also seen many political divisions and violent conflicts. In the brief period between the overthrow of Idi Amin in April 1979 and the 1980 disputed elections that brought Milton Obote to a second term, Uganda had three governments and effectively two coups in 20 months. This brought untold insecurity to Kampala and the country as a whole as key players involved in the overthrow of Idi Amin began to recruit thousands of personal ethnic militias which they used to harass, arrest and eliminate political opponents.

In 1980, when Obote regained power, the country was plunged once again into an anarchic civil war. Obote would spend most of his second term (1981-85) fighting Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRA) and other guerrilla groups which had launched an armed opposition to what they saw as Obote's fraudulent regime. The war against Obote virtually became an ethnic affair as Museveni's NRA and other minor fighting groups mainly campaigned and recruited in the southern and western parts of the country. Estimates again put the overall death toll to anywhere between 300,000 and 500,000.

Museveni's victory and ascendency to power with predominantly southern support fueled northern opposition to his leadership. In an unending cycle of violence, the former rebels were now in government, and the former rulers had become rebels. Rebel movements in northern Uganda, notably Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army, wreaked havoc on the population of Acholi land in its campaign of murder and abduction between 1986 and 2008. Ironically the rebellion had started as a reaction to the perceived oppression of the North of Uganda by the Museveni Government. Nevertheless the LRA abducted thousands of children, both as rebel wives and child soldiers, destroyed villages and displaced millions of people across Northern Uganda.

The 1986 revolution that brought Museveni and the National Resistance Movement to power had promised much regarding security, individual freedoms, equality and sustainable development across the ethnic divide. However, as the guerilla-movement-turned political party stayed on longer and longer and entrenched itself into electoral politics, the configuration of executive, judiciary and military power merely shifted from northern to southern domination. "What had initially been a broad-based, anti-sectarian government encompassing a wide spectrum of political interests and ethnic

backgrounds became narrower and more exclusive in composition."[13]

The initial NRM government's five-tier Local Council (LC) system[14] had been seen as a transparent, honest, participatory, and decentralized system of government. In the long run, however, the focus moved away from the socio-political empowerment of the grassroots to the LCs as the primary vehicles for popular participation in the ruling Movement's politics. Later attempts at decentralization were touted as an effort to empower the people and bring services closer to them and have seen the creation of districts from a mere 33 in 1986 to 112 to date. In this model, however, power vaguely lies in the hands of politically appointed administrative personnel who are accountable only to the appointing authority. This model of decentralization is seen as stifling both socio-political accountability and economic security because it relies too much on increasingly narrow ethnic and political clientelistic networks.[15]

To challenge the hegemony of the centrist parties and their often tribal tendencies, a return to a federal constitution is often touted. Would Uganda be in a better shape if political power was shared mutually between the central government and tribal and regional bases? Would ethnic federalism serve better to address the problems arising from the persistent social, economic, political and cultural inequalities? This research set out to find out what people at the grassroots of society in Uganda think about this question. First, a brief look at the two concepts of ethnicity and federalism.

2. Conceptual frameworks

2.1 Understanding Ethnicity

The English origins of the word "ethnicity "can be traced to late Middle English (1470 – 1550), and are connected to the term ethnic, which itself has origins from the Greek *ethnos*, meaning nation. Its adjectival form, *ethnikos,* which entered ecclesiastical Latin as *ethnicus*, referred to the heathen, that is to say, neither Christian nor Jewish.[16] Original senses, therefore, profoundly religious, denoted a minority outsider in the meaning of a pagan, heathen or gentile.

Current senses of *ethnic*, relatively new, date from the 19th century, and are used more regarding

[13] Tripp 2010, 3

[14] Formerly Resistance Councils (RCs), Local Councils (LCs) were initially established in rebel-held areas during the 1981-86 guerilla war. They were support structures funneling food supplies to NRA fighters. After Museveni and the NRA took power, they were implemented in every district. The lowest (LC1) is at a village level, or neighborhood in the case of towns and cities. The area covered by local council 11, 111 and 1V incorporates several of the next lower level, and LC V is responsible for the whole district. RCs became LCs with the enactment of the Local Government Act in 1997.

[15] Ssali, 2016

[16] Cornell and Hartman 2001, 77

a "majority" group or, in a more general way, to describe "ourselves", rather than just "minorities" or "others". German sociologist Max Weber is one of the scholars who revolutionized the meaning of ethnicity. In his great work *Economy and Society*, Weber ties ethnic identity to the personal belief a (human) group has in their common descent "because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration**."[17]** Weber's theory and definition are particularly important for the tenet that an ethnic group exists wherever this distinctive connection – this belief in common descent – is "part of the foundation of community, wherever it binds us to one another to some degree."[18] Descent thus becomes the main attribute of ethnic identity, and virtually all social science definitions of an ethnic group emphasize the role of descent in some way. Different definitions, however, specify it differently, "to mean a common ancestry, or a myth of a common ancestry, a common region of origin, or a myth of a common region of origin, or a 'group' descent rule."[19] Various authors and commentators agree, however, that definitions of ethnic identities do typically combine descent with other features such as a common culture, a common language, a common history, a common territory and a communal character.[20] Indeed, for some time, in what Sekulic refers to as "the traditional 'static' approach to ethnic relations,"[21] the tendency was to consider the most common elements of culture, such as language or religion, to be the universal characteristics of ethnicity. They were taken as the property that groups owned and which ultimately determined their ethnicity.[22]

It is the seminal work of Frederik Barth (1969), however, that signaled a new understanding of the relationship between culture and ethnicity. He shifted from the traditional idea of an ethnic group as being defined by a common culture. He argued that cultural content such as language, customs, religion and so on, serve not as the 'properties' that define an ethnic group and give it its identity, but rather as 'markers' that distinguish members from non-members in the process of social interaction with others. Barth thus refers to the main aspect of an ethnic group as the "boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses."[23] Barth cautions, however, that these boundaries, though they may have territorial counterparts, are first and foremost social boundaries.

Another feature evident in other various attempts at the definition of ethnic groups, besides "common descent" and "social boundaries", is that what ultimately makes them what they are – their

[17] Weber 1968, 389
[18] Ibid.
[19] Chandra 2012,10
[20] Chandra 2012; Ringer and Lawless 2001; Sekulic 2008).
[21] Sekulic 2008, 457
[22] Sekulic 2008
[23] Barth 1969, 15

identity – is not a fixed and absolute entity, but is dynamic, negotiable and subject to change.[24] Barth himself argues in the same measure that the cultural matter that defines the boundaries of an ethnic group is not constrained by these boundaries: "it can vary, be learnt and change without any critical relation to the boundary maintenance of the ethnic group."[25]

Ethnic identity, in the final analysis, gives groups and individuals a sense of belonging. This in turn gives them a profound sense of security. On the other hand, when individuals and societies are denied this identity, or when they are marginalized because of it, they can experience a profound sense of insecurity.

2.2 Understanding federalism

Federalism, in its broadest sense, is often defined and understood as a political contract. Derived from the Latin *foedus* (genitive *foederis*), which means pact, contract, treaty, agreement, alliance, and so on, federalism is seen from most of its definitions as a separation and allocation of governing power among contracting parties. It is referred to, for example, as "an arrangement in which two or more self-governing communities share the same political space."[26] It is also defined in terms of nation-states as "a principle of self-determination for regional federated units."[27]

The origins of these federal units may differ from federation to federation. In some cases like the United States and Australia, aggregations of self-governing, former British colonies (of mainly European migrants) were created regardless of ethno cultural identities. Other federations like Belgium, Ethiopia, and Canada, however, originate from ethno cultural groups distinguishing themselves from other groups either by language, dialect, religion, ethnicity or race. In such cases, federalism is often debated in relation to ethnic diversity, horizontal inequalities, citizenship, justice, and stability. It is even sometimes seen as an alternative to interethnic violence, civil wars, and secession.[28] This current study on ethnicity and the possibility of federalism in Uganda may be viewed in this light. The main question is how much the need to manage problems associated with ethnic and cultural diversity influences grassroots perceptions of federalism. In the case of Uganda, these problems have always been mainly socio-political and economic. The question of the meaning of federalism in Uganda will, therefore, be considered in light of all three conceptual frameworks – political, economic, and cultural – of federalism. The relevance and utility of federalism are premised,

[24] Bangura, 2006; Parker and Rathbone, 2007; Purkayastha 2008
[25] Barth 1969, 38
[26] Karmis and Norman 2005, 3
[27] Turton 2006, 1
[28] Ibid.4

at least for this study, on the views and experiences of ordinary people whose interests may or may not be protected by this system.

2.3 Understanding Human Security

The term *human security* was first popularized by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in the early 1990s. It was conceptualized as a viable post-cold war link between various humanitarian, economic and social issues in order to alleviate human suffering and assure security. It was contrasted with the cold war concept of human security, which, according to former Secretary General Koffi Annan, "tended to be defined almost entirely in terms of military might and the balance of terror**."**[29]

The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report defined human security as:

1. Freedom from fear
2. Freedom from want and
3. Freedom to live in human dignity.[30]

Central to this definition was the idea that people have 'the right to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair… with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential.'

Later, the Commission on Human Security would outline two main concepts out of the above definition:

1. Protecting the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment.
2. Protecting people from critical and pervasive threats.[31]

Human security, to say the least, is about assuring priority freedoms so that "people can exercise choices safely and freely"[32], and can be confident that the opportunities they have are protected.

[29] Koffi Annan, 2001
[30] Human Development Report, 1994
[31] Commission on Human Security 2003, 4
[32] Human Development Report 1994, 23

2.4 Ethnicity and 'Horizontal Inequalities' as a Threat to Human Security

In principle, most countries should require only political will to have societies founded on the freedoms that guarantee human security. However, building such a foundation is usually more difficult in multi-ethnic countries like Uganda, mainly due to the presence of major inequalities. These inequalities pose a threat to those priority freedoms that guarantee human security. It is this threat that this thesis considers in pondering the question of whether ethnic federalism is a viable solution to political repression, social inequalities and human insecurities in Uganda.

While the experiences of one group in an ethnically divided society tend to be the experiences of its members, they are almost always likely to differ from group to group. Each group in such a society "has its own egalitarian impulse, but that impulse does not extend across ethnic lines, either by virtue of insurance or altruism."[33] Thus, groups tend to either dominate others or be marginalized. Some groups tend to become dominant because of their privileged position regarding the control of socio-economic and political resources. This results in a phenomenon known as Horizontal Inequalities (HIs). HIs are defined by Stewart[34] as "inequalities among culturally defined groups or groups with shared identities," and for simplicity she categorizes them into four status dimensions namely:

1. Economic dimensions, which encompass access to and ownership of assets (financial, land, livestock and human and social capital).
2. Social dimensions, which encompass access to various services (education, health, water, sanitation and housing)
3. Political dimensions, which encompass political participation at the level of cabinet, parliament, bureaucracy, local government or army, among others.
4. Cultural dimensions, which include the extent to which society recognizes (or fails to recognize) a group's cultural practices.

It can be argued that the absence of any or all of these inequalities would be a guarantee of human security. In Uganda, however, human security, in some or all three of its major forms, has been denied to various sections of society at various times before and after independence. As outlined in the introduction and background to this study, the seeds of disparity in Uganda had been carefully and instrumentally sown by our colonial masters. Post-independent governments systematically aggravated these inequalities by clinging to ethnic cleavages. These have culturally, socially,

[33] Ranis 2009, 5
[34] Stewart 2008, 12

economically and politically hindered the process of development. They have also often caused deep resentment and violent struggles by denying large sections of society the freedom from want, the freedom from fear, and the freedom to live in human dignity.

3. A federal Solution? The relevance of grassroots perceptions

The question at hand is whether or not ethnic federalism can be a viable solution to tribal cleavages which, by their nature, hinder modernity and result in power domination, political repression, social inequalities and human insecurities in Uganda. Most political activity since independence has been concentrated on centralizing political and economic power into the hands of segmental cleavages of various kinds. Judging from Uganda's history, the most evident of such cleavages have been tribal and/or ethnic. These are still extant even in the last thirty years, the longest spell of relative stability since independence.

This period has also been very exciting for the theory of federalism. This topic has generated a lot of lively, sometimes hot-tempered, but often inconclusive debates. These debates take place, nevertheless, usually among the political and media-savvy part of society: politicians, academics and researchers whose opinions on the relevance or irrelevance of federalism as an alternative to the post-independent unitary government are often well publicized. On the other hand, there seems to be a dearth of research in the mindset of people or society at the local level. This research therefore took the debate to rank-and-file citizens, or the voters themselves, rather than people at the center of major political activity. The objective was to discover and compare what ordinary people in the different tribal areas of Uganda think about the issue of federalism. How do they evaluate the legacy of independence? Are their respective ethnic power-bases of interest to them culturally, politically and economically? Are they relevant for their own well-being and security? Would people at the grassroots of society support the idea of federalism for a future Uganda?

4. The Survey

4.1 Scope and Methodology

A qualitative approach to data gathering and analysis was used, including the examination of books, papers and official documents that discuss the perspectives of the different players in colonial and post-colonial Uganda in regards to the roles of its five kingdoms and other boundaries of ethnic identity. Semi-structured, in-depth, qualitative interviews were then conducted with eight people from

each of 10 of the 15 administrative areas formerly represented in the independence arrangements. They are the kingdoms of Ankole, Buganda, Bunyoro and Toro; the territory of Busoga; and the former administrative districts of Acholi, Bugisu, Kigezi, Teso and West Nile (see Figure 1). It was partly due to limitations of time and resources that not more people, and from all the original 15 areas, were surveyed. Data collected may, on the outset, not look exhaustive given Uganda's relatively big population and ethnic diversity. It can be argued, however, that there were enough interviewees "to reflect the range of participants and sites that make up the population so that others outside the sample might have a chance to connect to the experiences of those in it."[35]

These 10 areas were selected because they were deemed to be "qualitatively" representative of the various trends in the experiences of colonial and post-colonial Uganda. Buganda has always occupied a special position in Uganda, and the "Buganda question"[36] has dominated political debates since the onset of colonialism. The kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro, and Toro, together with the territory of Busoga, were also relatively sophiscated political organizations before and after independence. Acholi, Bugisu, Kigezi, Teso, and West Nile were, on the other hand, selected as part of the more peripheral former administrative districts. Acholi, Teso, and West Nile are particularly significant as part of the so called "political north."[37]

Out of the 80 interviewees, 50% (40) were in their 20s and 30s, and the other 50% (40) were in their 50s and 60s. In addition, 52.5% (42) of the respondents were male, and the remaining 47.5% (38) were female.

The main survey questions were:

1. Would you support the idea of an ethnically based federal arrangement for Uganda, and do you think it is likely to happen?
2. Do you think this would be a better system, culturally, politically and economically?

[35] Seidman 2013, 58

[36] The *Buganda question* refers to what is seen in Uganda's political history as the failure of the colonial government to define a precise relationship between the Protectorate Government and the Buganda Government. It meant that towards independence, "Buganda regarded federalism as the only safeguard for her monarchy and her traditions" (Nsibambi, 1966: 41). It is still a difficult question for post-colonial Uganda to negotiate.

[37] There has been an ethnic fragmentation, post-independence, between the northern and southern tribes of Uganda. This is widely understood to be one of the casualties of British colonial policy and its effects on the post-colonial society, and it has often been a cause of conflict.

4.2 The Findings

Seen as a whole, 30 of the people interviewed were in favor of a federation of tribes and were hopeful that such a system was likely to happen. 34 others were also in favor, but were skeptical of the likelihood of such a federation. The remaining 16 were completely against federalism. All in all, a majority 80% of the respondents were found to support the federation of tribes as a viable option for managing diversity in Uganda (see Table 1 and Figure 2 below).

Table 1. Attitudes towards federation of ethnic groups

	Supportive and hopeful	Supportive but skeptical	Completely against	Total
Numbers	30	34	16	80
Percentages	37.5%	42.5%	20.0%	100%



Figure 2 Attitudes towards federation of ethnic groups

The Supportive Voices

The hopeful and skeptical supporters of ethnic federalism cited similar reasons for their support. Main among them was that localizing power would ensure that local leaders would be from among the tribal peoples of the area, and they would understand the socio-economic needs as well as the traditional values of their areas of administration. This was, for instance, reflected in an interview with a 60-year-old male peasant in Bugisu:

> If the Umukuuka [traditional ruler of the Bagisu] was given more power, he can bring the services and employment to his people without political wrangles and intervention. Politicians don't seem to be carrying our voices. They have too much pressure from elections.

Similar sentiments were expressed by a 52-year-old self-employed male Muganda:

> *Federo*, as we in Buganda call it, would be the best system for Uganda because people can pull together and use the resources that are common to them honestly and responsibly. Federalism is the way for Africa, not Pan-Africanism, let alone unitarism. These are but superficial. People can have better respect and understanding of people within the same ethnic boundaries.

These were also the sentiments of a 25-year old female student from Acholi:

> Yes I think we need to have more political power for the cultural leaders. Political cultural leaders should be more effective in controlling issues like land which are dear to us. Sometimes there is too much meddling by the central government in affairs that don't benefit the people.

These opinions reflected the acknowledgement in various tribal areas of the value of the cultural heritage of traditional institutions. Many respondents expressed faith in the power of these institutions to exert influence on their people because of their moral authority. They highlighted the danger of denying local people the opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. It is the danger of denying them the realization of sustainable development and genuine human security. The field interviews therefore revealed a preference for, and for some respondents, hope in, an ethno-nationalistic leadership, as a means of restoring power to the traditional foci of the people's social allegiance and ensuring their all-round security.

The maximization of chances for integral development was also cited as a possible positive outcome of a federal arrangement. A head figure such as a tribal king or chief was depicted as calming people's anxiety by ensuring their job security, income security as well as their social and environmental security. Active campaigns like those going on in Buganda to restore and maintain what the Baganda call "ebyaffe" [lit. 'Our things'][38] were often cited by respondents. As one 48-year old

[38] "Ebyaffe" is interpreted by the Baganda and political commentators in many ways, including the throne and the cultural rituals that go with it, properties owned by the Buganda Kingdom prior to 1966, but also political power for Buganda to regulate their own institution.

self-employed Kampala male resident put it:

> People used to pay keen attention to their king's rulings and biddings. They used to obey him by all means. Even today, the youth, who sometimes may look really disturbed and delinquent, pay close attention to and obey the king's biddings. Therefore if we are governed under our own king (s), society will be more upright.

Reducing inequalities was also cited by supporters as a possible positive outcome. Many respondents decried the current system of electoral politics which entrenches political patronage and rewards areas and individuals in exchange for support, and which has resulted in acute levels of inequalities and a breakdown in intercommunal relations and trust. Berhanu Balcha has argued that in multi-ethnic African societies, exclusive access to the state's resources and power by a particular group could create a process of "social closure" that alienates other groups from playing any significant role in politics and economics.[39] Hutchinson and Smith have also criticized this instrumentalist approach for its exaggerated belief in the power of elite manipulation of the masses and neglect of the wider cultural environment in which elite competition and rational maximization take place.[40] Decrying these inequalities, respondents in different tribal areas often referred to the fact that all their economic affairs, including employment opportunities, are in the hands of people sent in as 'reward' appointments. As a 51-year-old retrenched civil servant in Teso put it:

> If carefully scrutinized *Federo* is the solution. It will enable the people at the base to control the local resources. It will help fight corruption. It will ensure a fair distribution of resources. There is a lot of confusion now. Sometimes money and resources are sent where nobody knows what to do. The people who know what to do don't get the money.

In these responses, therefore, one can read a longing for accommodating and flexible politico-economic frameworks, as well as hope for the restoration to the locals of their political status and the power to determine their own local affairs. This sense of empowerment is also a sense of security.

Half of the supportive respondents (40% overall) were nevertheless doubtful of the current unitary government's commitment to such a fundamental change. Many skeptical respondents mentioned the fact that the (current) National Resistance Movement government's efforts at decentralization had created an unprecedented number of districts (from 33 when NRM took power in

[39] Balcha 2012, 7.
[40] Hutchinson and Smith 1996.

1986 to 112 by 2015), but these districts had failed to guarantee sustainable development and the integrity of the people's identities, cultures, and traditions. These districts are seen as serving, instead, to organize votes for the ruling party and create jobs for its supporters. Respondents argued, therefore, that such a government may obviously not be so keen on recognizing and empowering the pre-existing cultural and political structures Uganda's diverse ethnicities as this would break apart its own patronage machine.

Another reason for skepticism was cited as the fact that the current government continues to instrumentally intervene in the affairs of local traditional institutions, especially the kingdoms of Ankole and Busoga and the chieftaincy of Bugisu. Skepticism in Ankole, for instance, can be attributed to the fact that it is because of government intervention that the traditional *Obugabe* (Ankole kingship) has remained in limbo even after the 1993 restoration of traditional rulers. As a 63-year-old male respondent from Ankole noted, it is simply a case of giving back what was taken:

> There are voices that are crying out that our inheritance was occupied and it must be returned, and the present administration is saying, 'No, let's take our time. Let us first study the situation'. What are you studying? If you entered into someone's house, and you found it was his house, why don't you come out and let him enter? But you say, 'No, let's first study the situation.' What situation are you studying? You are killing the culture.

Most skeptical, however, were voices from areas which don't have as much local political organization as the regional kingdoms of Buganda, Toro, Bunyoro, Ankole and Busoga. As a 52-year-old female farmer in Kigezi put it:

> An ethnically-based federal style of governance would be good, and obviously developmental, but it is impossible in Kigezi. We do not even have people who can bring it about like in Buganda. If we had 20 elders who can navigate towards it, it could happen, but Kigezi doesn't have them.

Voices Opposed

Some other grassroots respondents were opposed to the federation of tribes, and they raised quite a few issues that cannot be overlooked. Prominent among them is the fact that some areas cannot really stand on their own in terms of economics and development. They lack resources, and breaking apart the unitary state could aggravate disparities and insecurity. Related to this argument, the "Buganda

question"[41] was also often raised; especially the fact that Kampala is the heart of Uganda, and Kampala is in Buganda. What would you do with the city in a federal Uganda? This worry was expressed among others by a 22-year-old male primary school teacher from Ankole:

> The problem is saying Buganda is ours. Remember Kampala is in Buganda, and it is the capital city of Uganda. If the Baganda say Buganda is ours, it means that Kampala is for Baganda. And Kampala, remember, is for Uganda. It means they would be saying that Uganda is ours.

These respondents were arguing mainly for the fiscal security of citizens that would be inconvenienced by, rather than benefitting from the federation of tribes. What should be done with greater Kampala and its multiethnic population, and how can we ensure sustainable development for the less privileged tribal areas? Comments from respondents in other tribal areas indicate similar concerns regarding regional imbalances as this 25-year-old male from Bugisu put it:

> In economic terms our traditional functions and institutions are good as tourist attractions. The *Imbalu*[42] month, for example, is a big tourist attraction. In the bigger economic picture, however, federalism is difficult and not practical because of the regional imbalances.

He also claimed:

> For instance Kampala alone raises 80% of Uganda's revenues. Another 111 districts raise only 20%. So for me *federo* is not a matter of time, but it is a problem.

Other respondents who belong to different tribes from where they are originally from raised the fear that federalism could precipitate confusion. A 51-year-old Musoga farmer of Teso descent, for example, argued that creating a semi-autonomous Busoga local government could see locals discriminate or even rise up against non-ethnic Basoga irrespective of how long they have been part of the kingdom:

---

[41] See note 34
[42] The *imbalu* is a month-long celebration of circumcision and initiation ceremonies among the Bagisu tribe.

> Politically, federal demarcation could be good; for we are not only Ugandans but also tribal. It may be good for education and health services. Economically it is good for our own children's employment, but No! Federalism would create confusion and discrimination, so I am against it.

He was echoing scholarly critics of ethnic federalism who argue that it "could institutionalize ethnic discrimination, obstruct individual citizens' rights, strengthen centrifugal forces, introduce zero-sum ethnic competition and generate dangerous reactions like ethnic cleansing, expulsion and disintegration."[43] This is a genuine concern for security, as ethnic federalism is seen as a possible cause of division and retribution for multi-ethnic residents of certain areas.

5. Towards a Synthesis

Grassroots perceptions of ethnicity and federalism depended very much on the age and education levels of the people interviewed. One common factor across both age brackets and levels of education, however, was the high degree of awareness of the current chronic crisis of national governance and the resurgence of the debate about the need to align the structures of the state with the demands of pluralism and gross horizontal inequalities. The loyalty of the people at the grassroots, as most of the narratives show, is, therefore, fading away from the state to traditional authorities such as monarchies and chieftainships. These have been depicted in this study as being popular in some areas and positively capable of playing an active role in addressing the central issues raised in this research.

First and foremost, a federation of tribes has been depicted as good for the identity of the various ethnic groups that make up Uganda. Federalism has been widely predicted as one way of empowering people in their traditional institutions and enabling them to play a decisive role in socio-political and economic development. Ethnically based federal units would presumably have their principal areas at heart, and safely accommodate ethnic diversity in a democratic state.

Secondly, Ethnic Federalism has been seen as a means of fighting the pronounced social, economic, political and cultural inequalities that have inevitably become the defining feature of the divisive, cleavage-driven post-independence state. This observation may sound contradictory as many 'skeptic' voices and those 'opposed' to federalism have cited the natural and historical inequality of the tribal areas as the main argument against the relevance and practicality of federating tribes.

[43] For example, Balcha, *Restructuring the State and Society,* 1, citing Lipset, 1963; Nordlinger 1972; Ake 1996; Fleiner; 2000; Nyang'o 2002; Egwu 2003; and Mamdani 2005).

However, it is also evident from the views of most respondents that federalism as a power-sharing instrument would ensure an equitable distribution of national resources in so far as each and every customary institution would get their fair share irrespective of their political allegiance or even ethnic relationship to the executive.

It can be argued in conclusion that, given the systematic fading of the hopes and ambitions of the post-independence era, re-thinking the structure of the state is a *sine qua non*. Whether federalism is perceived by the local populace in Uganda as an effective device for managing diversity and reconstructing the state was the primary focus of this study. The (presumed) outcry for a federal system of government in Uganda stems from a (presumed) people's frustration with the unbalanced distribution of power and resources. It is an outcry for an organizing political principle that will once and for all accommodate ethnic differences, ensure sustainable development, eradicate the chronic horizontal inequalities that have been rampant since independence, and ensure all-round security for all citizens.

A federal demarcation for Uganda today, and the debate about its relevance or not, would (almost) naturally be premised on the pre-colonial, semi-autonomous kingdoms and chieftaincies which in all cases conform to tribal groupings. The stability of these units and their role in organizing their own people for both regional development and national stability is an issue of vital importance. What should be done with tribal areas where traditional leadership is not as organized as in some of the traditional kingdoms is another question that needs to be explored.

References

Annan, Koffi. 2001, Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Balcha, Berhanu. 2012, Restructuring the State and Society: Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia. Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing.

Bangura, Yusuf. 2006, Ethnic Inequalities and Public Sector Governance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Barth, Fredrik, (ed.) 1998, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference, Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press Inc.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2012, Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics. New York: Oxford University Press.

Commission on Human Security. 2003, "Human Security Now."

Cornell, Stephen and Douglas Hartman. 2001, Race and Ethnicity – Critical Concepts in Sociology. London & New York: Routledge.

Hutchinson, John and Anthony Smith. 1996, Ethnicity. New York: Oxford University Press.

Karmis, Dimitrios, and Wayne, Norman. 2005, Theories of federalism – A reader. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lancaster, Andy. 2012. "The Divisive Nature of Ethnicity in Ugandan Politics, before and After Independence", http://www.e-ir.info/2012/05/25/the-divisive-nature-of-ethnicity-in-ugandan-politics-before-and-after-independence/ accessed on February 25, 2014.

Mamdani, Mahmood. 1983, Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda. Nairobi: Heinemann.

Mazrui, Ali. 1975, Ethnicity: Theory and Practice. Cambridge Ma: Harvard University Press.

Mudoola, Dan. 1993, Religion, Ethnicity and Politics in Uganda. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Mutiibwa, Phares. 1992, Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes. London: Hurst.

Parker, John and Richard Rathbone. 2007, African History. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ranis, Gustav. 2009, "Diversity of Communities and Economic Development: An Overview." http://ssrn.com/abstract=1475329 (Accessed on June 2, 2016)

Seidman, Irving. 2013, Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and the Social Sciences. New York/London: Teachers College Press.

Sekulic, Dusko. 2008, Encyclopedia of Race, Ethnicity and Society, Vol. 1. LA, London, New Delhi, Singapore: Sage Publications.

Ssali, Vick L. 2016, "Patronage, Clientelism and Economic Insecurity in Uganda." Pambazuka News (Addis Ababa) January 1st 2016, Issue 756. http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/96316_

Stewart, Frances. ed. 2008. Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tripp, Aili Mari. 2010, Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Turton, David. 2006, Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective. Addis Ababa: University Press.

United Nations Development Program. 1994, "Human Development Report." New York: Oxford University Press.

Weber, Max. 1968, Economy and Society – an Outline of Interpretive Sociology. New York: Bedminster Press.